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Abstract 
Systems structures and data structures which make 
possible the state restoration of user objects, are 
described in this thesis. Recovery is linked with types, 
which suggests making a distinction between recoverable and 
unrecoverable types. For convenience, recovery is discussed 
in terms of recovery blocks as developed at the University 
of Newcastle upon Tyne. Recovery is taken to mean restoring 
the values of recoverable types. 
Recoverable multi-level systems are considered. On the 
one hand levels in such systems can be backed out. On the 
other hand these levels provide explicit recovery for new 
types they introduce, and so can be called on to restore 
states of objects used in higher levels. The concepts and 
issues are discussed and explained; mechanisms and 
techniques for building such systems are presented. 
Recovery techniques for complex global data structures 
and techniques to maintain consistency at any time, even 
when recovery is impossible such as after a crash, are 
described and compared. 
Many of the presented techniques are employed in an 
implemented recoverable two-level system, with a recoverable 
filing system. This two-level system is described in detail. 
It is argued that in order to implement recoverability 
in multi-level systems with efficiency and flexibility, the 
interfaces of the system should provide both recoverable and 
unrecoverable types. 
It is also shown that the way in which complex data 
structures are updated is of major importance if recovery is 
to be provided in a "reasonably" efficient way and 
consistency is to be guaranteed after a crash. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Recovery techniques can be used to restore data in a 
system to a. usable state. Such techniques are widely used in 
filing systems and data base systems, in order to cope with 
failures. A failure of a system occurs when that system 
does not perform its service in the manner specified, so a 
failure is an event. These failures can be of different 
natures, such as failures caused by hardware faults (e.g. a 
power failure or disk failure), software faults (e.g. bugs 
in programs or invalid data) or human errors (such as when 
the operator puts a wrong tape on a drive, or a user does 
something he did not intend doing). A failure occurs when 
the system is in an erroneous state and the normal 
algorithms of the system continue processing (HeR76). The 
term error is, in this context, used for that part of the 
state which is "incorrect". An error is thus a piece of 
information used as a casual equivalent for erroneous state. 
A fault is a mechanical or algorithmic cause of an error. 
A system can be designed to be fault tolerant by 
incorporating into it additional components and abnormal 
algorithms which attempt to ensure that occurences of 
erroneous states do not result in later system failures, or 
which deal with these failures and restore the system to a 
"correct" state from which normal processing (using the 
normal algorithms) can continue. These additional 
components and abnormal algorithms will in this thesis be 
termed recovery techniques and are the subject of the 
present thesis. There are many kinds of failures and 
therefore many kinds of recovery possible. For the 
recoverable systems considered here, the recovery mechanisns 
and redundant data maintained to make recovery possible 
(recovery data), form an integral part of the system. There 
is always a limit to the kind of recovery that can be 
provided. If a failure not only corrupts the ordinary data, 
but also the recovery data, then there are obviously 
problems. As described by Randell (RLT77), a recovery 
mechanism will only cope with certain failures. The failures 
it does not cope with may, for example, be rare, or not have 
been thought of, or have no effects, or it could be too 
expensive to provide recovery to cope with them. For 
example, a head crash on disk may not only destroy the data, 
but also the recovery data. It would therefore be preferable 
to maintain these recovery data on a separate device. 
However, there are obviously other failures which may effect 
that separate device (for example failures in the machinery 
that writes the recovery data to that storage device). 
Recovery data can itself be protected from the consequences 
of failures by the provision of a yet further form of 
recovery data to provide the ability to restore the 
"primary" recovery data in the event of a failure which 
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corrupts those recovery data. This progression could in 
theory go on indefinitely. In practice of course, there ~ust 
be some total reliance on the reliability of some ultimate 
recovery data (or rather, some degree of acceptance of the 
fact that such recovery data is not totally reliable). 
Reliability, or some level of reliability of a system, 
can be achieved by avoiding faults or by tolerating them. 
The second approach, fault tolerance, is a common way of 
dealing with (certain types of) hardware faults; read after 
write plus retry as a means of tolerating faults is an 
example. This fault tolerant approach has been used 
extensively for hardware where very high reliability is 
needed (Avi71), (Wen72), (Bor72), (Sk176). 
The traditional, and often satisfactory, approach to 
achieving reliable software has been based on avoiding 
faults. This approach has been termed fault intolerance by 
Avizienis (Avi75). The aim of this approach is to build 
systems such that all the causes of failures are eliminated 
as much as possible. Occasional system failures are accepted 
as a necessary evil, and (usually manual) maintenance is 
provided for their correction. Over the past years a variety 
of methods and utilities have been developed which can be 
used to try to obtain reliable software using the fault 
intolerant approach. Examples of such utilities are 
debugging facilities (Sat72), (IBMa), (IBMb) and methods of 
systematically testing programs. In the area of program 
testing a method capable of demonstrating the absence of 
erors using condition tables has been reported (GoG75). Also 
methods ensuring that all of the possible paths through the 
program will be traversed have been developed (MiM75). The 
latter methods, however, do not demonstrate the absence of 
errors. However, all of these testing methods seem to have 
been defeated by theoretical difficulties and practical 
problems, so they have not yet led to any practicable 
utilities. Systems have been built to allow the symbolic 
execution of programs which can be used to test and debug 
programs (Kin76) or to find test data (Boy75). Much work has 
also been done in the area of program design (DDH72), 
(Jac75) and language design (WLS76), (Ast75) to facilitate 
the construction of more reliable programs. Also 
specification methods used to give abstract specifications 
of programs such that more reliable software can be 
obtained, have been developed (Par72a), (Par72b), (Rob75), 
(Gut76). One method on which a lot of work has been done and 
goes as far as you can go to obtain reliable software using 
the fault intolerant approach, is the proving of correctness 
of programs by formal analysis. Much work has been done in 
this area (BaW76), (Els72), (Gut76), however, the practical 
accomplishments in this area so far fall short of a tool for 
routine use. 
There are two major reasons why the fault intolerant 
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approach is not a complete solution for software for which 
high reliability is required: 
1. All the strategies and techniques based on the fault 
tolerant approach have in common that at some stage a 
program is assumed to be correct (i.e fully debugged or 
proven or demonstrated by testing to be correct). 
However, none of the strategies and techniques 
guarantee that the final program will be 100% correct. 
If the program is large then it will probably still 
contain some errors, as indeed even small apparently 
proven programs can do (see (GoG75)). 
2. The correct working of the program, i.e. the required 
reliability and availability, does not only depend on 
the correctness of the program. A failure can be 
caused by any other part of the system in which the 
program is running, for example, by the operator, a 
mechanical defect or other programs in the system. 
Since the fault intolerant approach may not be 
sufficient if high reliability is required, fault tolerance 
can be sought, not as an alternative, but rather as a 
complementary technique. The key to fault tolerance is 
redundancy. The three principle forms of software redundancy 
for obtaining fault tolerance, which were also distinguished 
by Avizienis, are: 
1. Multiple storage of programs and data. 
Kopetz (Kop74) shows with a mathematical model how 
great the improvements in reliability are when stand by 
software is used (different algorithms should be used 
for the processing modules and spare modules). Several 
applications of this principle are mentioned by Gilb 
(Gil74). 
2. Tests to detect errors. 
The results of programs have to be tested, in order to 
guarantee reliability for these programs. A stand by 
module will only be invoked after the main processing 
module fails its test. (An alternative is to do 
majority voting as is used, for example, in the space 
shuttle computers (Sk176).) Hardly any work at all has 
been done so far on the design and implementation of 
run time tests which are built in programs to guarantee 
that the programs are performing correctly if their 
tests do not fail. 
3. Executive programs for restart and recovery. 
After an error has been detected, the module that 
failed to perform correctly is recovered and the stand 
by module is invoked (or the module is retried after 
certain errors have been corrected). Any system that 
uses recovery to provide fault tolerance needs such an 
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executive program. Most of the 
been done for data base systems 
in a subsequent chapter) or for 
reconfiguration or graceful 
(Wen72), (Bor72), (Sk176). 
work in this area has 
(see the survey given 
systems that implement 
degradation (Avi7l), 
An example of a system, which has many of the features 
of fault tolerant systems (even though these features were 
included for obtaining efficiency) has been described by 
Lampson (Lam7S). The system described makes use of "hints", 
for example to find a file. A hint is information provided 
solely to improve efficiency of the implementation. 
Whenever a hint is used, it is checked against some 
"absolute" (a non redundant information item which is 
presumed to be always correct) to confirm its continued 
validity. If a hint appears to be wrong then an alternative 
and less efficient algorithm is used to do whatever the 
program that initially used the hint wants to do. Several 
schemes for fault tolerance are used in a number of systems 
at present, such as input validation schemes or schemes 
designed to tolerate hardware faults. However, it is only 
recently that effords have been undertaken to extend the 
fault tolerant approach to include design faults. The three 
forms of software redundancy described above have been 
incorporated in a scheme facilitating (a certain degree of 
hardware and software) fault tolerance, designed and 
implemented by the project team on highly reliable software 
at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, England (Hor74), 
(Ran7S). The scheme is called the recovery block scheme. 
A recovery block is a set of alternative program 
blocks, each of which is an alternative implementation 
intended to satisfy the same abstract specification. 
Associated with a recovery block is an acceptance test, 
which is a piece of program which tests the results or-in 
alternative against the abstract specification (which is the 
same for all alternatives of a recovery block). The first 
alternative will be invoked when the recovery block is 
entered. When the alternative has been executed, the 
acceptance test will be evaluated. If the acceptance test is 
successful (i.e. the results conform to the specification) 
then the recovery block will be exited. If it is not 
successful then the effects of the first alternative will be 
undone and the next alternative invoked. In that case the 
first alternative is said to be backed out. (The term 
recovery is used for data, the term backing-ollt is used for 
programs and processes.) This sequence will be repeated 
until one of the alternatives passes the acceptance test; if 
none of the alternatives passes the acceptance test then 
this causes an error to occur. If an error occurs (an error 
may occur for various reasons such as an exhaustion of 
recovery block alternatives or a failing of the acceptance 
test) within an alternative of a recovery block then this 
alternative is backed out (and the next alternative is 
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invoked without performing the acceptance test). Recovery 
blocks can be nested and if an error occurs during the 
execution of the last alternative of the outermost recovery 
block or if this alternative fails its acceptance test, then 
the program in which this recovery block is used has to be 
aborted. 
The term "recoverability" will be used in this thesis 
for the kind of recoverability provided by the recovery 
block scheme. The recovery and recovery techniques 
discussed in the present thesis are based on these three 
forms of redundancy mentioned above. Since the recovery 
block concepts appear to have all of the features for fault 
tolerance as discussed in this thesis, recovery is discussed 
in terms of recovery blocks. Recovery blocks provide a very 
convenient forum for discussing the recovery techniques of 
this thesis. However, the work on recovery presented in 
this thesis stands on its own and need not be incorporated 
in a system providing recovery block stuctures. 
1.1 The goal.£!. the thesis 
The main results of the research work on fault tolerant 
systems in Newcastle so far consist of: 
* The recovery block scheme. 
* The design and implementation of a mechanism and machine 
architecture (the fault tolerant interpreter) which 
provide recoverability for program variables inside 
recovery blocks. 
* Techniques, rather limited at present, for extending 
these ideas so as to provide recoverability for systems 
involving asynchronous processes. 
The research on recovery blocks and mechanisms to 
implement them has mainly dealt with the problems of 
providing recoverability for simple variables, for example 
integer variables, real variables and boolean variables in 
user programs. 
The goal of the present thesis is to examine how the 
recovery block concepts and principles can be used, 
generalized and implemented for the construction of 
recoverable multi-level systems and recoverable abstract 
(and complex) data types such as files. 
The levels in 
considered are levels 
higher levels. A type 
the recoverable multi-level systems 
that provide new recoverable types to 
(which is defined by the operations on 
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the type and the mapping function mapping the type onto 
lower level types) and the recoverability of that type 
(which is provided by the recovery mechanisms) are 
implemented by the level providing the type. The levels can 
be backed out themselves and can be called on to recover 
states of .obj ects of the recoverable types they provide, 
used in higher levels. 
This thesis concentrates on the problems, requirements 
and constraints of providing recovery for objects in 
multi-level systems and for complex data types. Different 
approaches and a number of techniques and mechanisms that 
can be used to implement recovery for multi-level systems 
and complex data types are described and compared. A 
prototype system implementing many of the techniques and 
mechanisms described, has been built and evaluated. 
Mechanisms and system structures to facilitate the 
multiple storage of programs and data, and the incorporation 
of executive programs for restart and recovery, are 
described. The problems of error detection (i.e. the 
construction of good tests) are largely ignored; a little 
discussion on some initial work done is given at the end of 
this thesis. 
Recovery between interacting processes will not be 
dealt with at all. The problems of providing recovery for 
interacting processes have been described elsewhere (Ran75), 
(GiS76), (Ast76), (RLT77) and appear to be a major topic for 
research in their own right. A major problem is that if 
processes interact somehow and one process needs to be 
backed out, then a IIdomino ll -effect (Ran75) may result. If 
parallel processes do not interact, but instead only share 
data such that these processes do not need to run 
concurrently, but could progress independently, then a 
mechanism that would prevent the interactions ~"ould avoid 
the recovery problems for interacting processes. A resource 
locking scheme, as for example described by Gray (Gra76), 
could be used to achieve this. If processes have to 
interact in order to make progress then something like 
conversations, as defined be Randell (Ran75), will be 
needed. If several processes need to interact to progress 
then, in fact, they co-operate to perform a task, or do 
subtasks of a bigger task. A conversation incorporates the 
processes working on one task and prevents other tasks from 
reading or wr1t1ng objects updated by this task. The 
checkpoints and commitment points of processes involved in a 
conversation are synchronized, such that if one process 
fails all the processes involved in the conversation can be 
backed out to undo their parts of the task performed so far. 
In recovery block terms this will mean that entering and 
exiting of recovery blocks is to be synchronized for 
interacting processes. A full discussion on these problems, 
in very general terms, is given elsewhere (RLT77). 
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l.~ Summarr of thesis 
A description of how recoverable multi-level systems 
can be constructed by distinguishing between recoverable and 
unrecoverab~e types forms the first major topic of the 
thesis. A special mechanism that copes with the problems of 
operating on unrecoverable types inside recovery blocks has 
been developed. The implementatoin of a prototype system 
which incorporates the most important techniques is 
described. 
The second major topic is the presentation of 
techniques that can be used to provide recoverability for 
complex data structures. A recoverable filing system. which 
is incorporated in the prototype system. is used to 
illustrate the problems and techniques discussed. 
However. the thesis first gives, in chapter two. a 
comprehensive survey of the techniques used in filing 
systems, data base systems and operating systems for 
recovery. restart and the maintainance of consistency. 
Examples of existing systems using the various techniques 
and descriptions of the ways in which these techniques are 
implemented, are given. 
Chapter three deals with the requirements and 
constraints of the architecture of a single level in a 
recoverable multi-level system. Several possible solutions. 
designs and mechanisms satisfying the requirements and 
constraints are described. An implementation of a 
recoverable two-level prototype system ~s described for 
illustration. 
Chapter four describes the problems of providing 
recoverability for complex global data structures. A number 
of recovery techniques are described and compared. Several 
mechanisms that assure consistency and recoverability at any 
time have been found and are described. The recoverable 
filing system that is implemented as the second level in the 
prototype two-level system is described and used to 
illustrate the problems. 
Chapter five gives a cost analysis of the 
recoverability provided in the prototype recoverable system. 
The three criteria used for the cost analysis are a) the 
extra execution time needed for programs that make use of 
the recoverability provided, b) the impact on the sizes of 
the system programs due to the provision of recoverability. 
and c) the extra data space necessary to provide the 
recoverability. 
Finally chapter six gives some directions for future 
research and presents the conclusions of this research. One 
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of the main conclusions is that the distinction between 
recoverable and unrecoverable types leads to a better 
understanding of the problems and issues involved 1n 
recoverable multi-level systems. It is shown that in order 
to implement recoverability in multi-level systems with 
efficiency. and flexibility, the interfaces of the system 
should provide both recoverable and unrecoverable types. 
Another main conclusion is that three factors are of major 
importance if recovery for complex data structures is to be 
provided with "reasonable" efficiency and if consistency of 
the data is to be guaranteed after a crash: 
1) The structure used to implement the complex data. 
2) The redundant information maintained to make recovery 
possible. 
3) The way in which the data structures are updated. 
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2.0 A SURVEY OF TECHNIQUE S FOR RECOVERY A:~D CRASH 
RESISTANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
This survey describes techniques and utilities that can 
be used for recovery, crash resistance, and mainta~n~ng 
consistency after a crash. The techniques and utilities 
describe how data structures should be constructed and 
updated, and how redundancy should be retained to provide 
these facilities. 
This survey deals with 
data bases; not with other 
processes operate on data, 
protection (Lin76). 
recovery for data structures and 
issues that are important when 
such as locking, security and 
For the purpose of this survey the notions of filing 
system and data base system are treated as synonymous. The 
definition of the notion of data base given by Martin 
(Mar76) is used here, and is: "adatabaSe is a collection 
of interrelated data stored together with controlled 
redundancy to serve one or more applications in an optimal 
fashion; the data are stored so that they are independent of 
programs which use the data; a common and controlled 
approach is used in adding new data and modifying and 
retrieving existing data within the data base". 
A data base may consist of a number of files. A file is 
a logical unit in the data base, used to group da~The 
data that can be retrieved by users from the data base forms 
the information in the data base. If some of the data stored 
in the data base cannot be retrieved, then some of the 
information put in the data base is lost. 
The notions of data base, file and information are 
logical. In physical terms the data base ~s held on 
secondary storage. Secondary storage is permanent storage 
space, which is separate from the computer and retains the 
data base whether it is on-line (mounted on a storage device 
unit and readable by a computer) or not. Secondary storage 
consists of records, which are the smallest (fixed length) 
accessible units. 
A data base ~s an abstraction of secondary storage 
provided to the user by a data base system. The data base 
---,- d system implements the user operat~ons on the data base an 
implements the data structures on secondary storage. 
Objects are the substructures from which these data 
structures are built. Examples of objects are: a logical 
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record, a header of a file, a linked list of pages or 
records and an entry in a directory. 
Users may add data, delete data and update data in a 
data base. A data base is in the correct state if all t~e 
information in the data base consists of the data which is 
stored in the data base by users, and is in its most recent 
state (after the last updates), minus the data deleted by 
users. A data base is in a valid state if all the 
information in the data base consists of data stored in the 
data base by users. The data base is in a consistent state 
if it is in a valid state and the information held satisfies 
the users' consistency constraints. It is assumed here that 
a correct state is also consistent. The notion of 
consistency will have to be a well-defined notion for every 
data base. Different sorts of consistencies (possibly at 
different levels of abstraction) or degrees of consistencies 
(Gra76) may be defined. No exacter definition of 
consistency will be given here, since it is assumed that the 
notion may be defined differently for different data bases. 
For example, suppose that a user maintains a source 
file and a text file (produced by a compilation of a source 
file). The data base will then be in a correct state if the 
most recent source and text files are available. The data 
base is will be in a valid state, for example, if a source 
file and a text file, but not necessarily the most recent 
ones, are available. The data base may be in a consistent 
state if a corresponding source and text file are available. 
A failure of the system occurs when that system does 
not perform its service in the manner specified (HeR76). 
Recovery is the restoration of the data base after a failure 
to a state that is acceptable to the users. The notion of 
"acceptable" is different for different environments; in 
general it will be correct, valid or consistent. There are 
many sorts of failures and therefore many sorts of 
recoveries possible. A recovery technique provides recovery 
from certain kinds of failures. One data base system may use 
different recovery techniques to provide recovery from 
different failures. Typically, if several recovery 
techniques are used then the sets of failures from which 
they provide recovery are subsets of each other. The 
recovery technique which provides recovery from the biggest 
set of failures is, in general, the least efficient and 
least used technique, and may involve the loss of some 
information (i.e. the data base may not be restored to the 
correct state). The recovery technique which provides 
recovery from the smallest set of failures, is usually the 
most efficient technique involving none or little loss of 
information. 
A recovery technique maintains recovery ~ to make 
recovery possible. A recovery technique provides recovery 
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from any failure which does not affect the recovery data nor 
the mechanisms used to maintain these data and to restore 
the states of the data in the data base. A failure with 
which a recovery technique can cope is said to be a crash of 
the system with respect to that recovery technique in case 
no normal ~ontinuation of processing is possible without 
using the recovery technique to cope with the failure. A 
failure with which a recovery technique cannot cope 1S 
called a catastrophe with respect to that technique. 
A system using three recovery techniques could. for 
example, consist of the following subsystems (see also 
Fig.2.l) : 
A) The data base system without any recovery techniques. 
B) A plus a recovery technique that uses built-in redundant 
pointers in data structures to be able to recover from 
certain failures causing particular errors 1n the data 
structures. 
C) B plus a recovery technique that does not use built-in 
redundancy in data structures, but maintains backup 
copies of (parts of) the data structures. 
D) C plus a recovery technique that keeps a complete backup 
copy of the data base on a separate device. 
These systems could be built using an approach similar 
to the so-called safe programming approach described by 
Anderson (And75). The bigger the damage the cruder the 
recovery technique used. Restoration of the correct state is 
most desirable and can be done. say, in B. However, if the 
damage is such that recovery in B is not possible then the 
restoration to a consistent, but not the correct state may 
be the only alternative in C, and so on. 
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The states assumed 
during processing 
without failures. 
The states that can 
be assumed in B. 
The states that can 
be assumed in C. 
The states that can 
be assumed in D. 
The states after failures 
from which no recovery is 
possible. 
Fig.2.l, The state space for a data base system with 
several recovery techniques, coping with 
subsequently larger sets of failures. 
No recovery technique, nor any series of recovery 
techniques, will cope with every possible failure. Many 
different kinds of recovery techniques have been developed, 
each with its own particular advantages and disadvantages. 
These recovery techniques are therefore used to cope with 
different kinds of failures in different environments. This 
survey describes recovery techniques known and used at 
present; an attempt is made to make this survey complete by 
categorizing these techniques. First the categories of 
recovery techniques considered are briefly described, the 
kinds of recoveries they provide and the relationships 
between the techniques are given. Then the different 
techniques are defined and described ~n detail, and the 
purposes for which they can be employed and existing systems 
using them, are described. Finally some conclusions are 
drawn and some developments in the techniques in recent 
years are identified and anticipated trends are described. 
2.2 The categorization £! ~ techniques 
The different kinds of recovery for a data base 
considered are: 
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1. Recovery to the correct state. 
2. Recovery to a state which existed at some moment in the 
past (i.e. a checkpoint). 
3. Recovery to a state which is effectively a previously 
existing state (such as a set of previously existing 
states of logically independent files, which may not 
have existed at exactly the same moment in time). 
4. Recovery to a valid state. 
5. Recovery to a consistent state. 
6. Crash resistance. If the system is always left in a 
state from which normal continuation of processing is 
possible after a failure of the kind a particular 
recovery technique used copes with, then that recovery 
technique is said to provide crash resistance. Crash 
resistance is different from other kinds of recovery in 
the sense that the other kinds of recovery involve 
explicit state restoration, while crash resistance does 
not. Crash resistance is provided by techniques used 
during normal processing, which ensure that state 
restoration 1S done implicitly at the time of a 
failure; no special actions are required. The 
differences between crash resistance and other kinds of 
recovery are fully explained in the descriptions of the 
various recovery techniques in this survey. The notion 
of crash resistance is defined as vaguely as the notion 
of consistency was. For example, different degrees of 
crash resistance could be defined. However, making such 
distinctions is not of importance for the purpose of 
this survey; the definition of crash resistance can be 
tied in with the definition of consistency given above. 
A checkpoint is a state which existed in the past, 
which can be restored, and mayor may not have been 
established explicitly, for example by taking a snapshot. 
Checkpoints are used by recovery techniques of kinds 1, 2 
and 3. Checkpoints can be established for files or the 
whole data base. The creation of a checkpoint is called 
checkpointing. If a checkpoint is established explicitly 
then this implies that a backup version is created. A backup 
verS10n is a complete copy of the checkpointed file or data 
base. 
The term backing out is related to processes or 
transactions. A process iS1backed out if all the effects of 
the operations performed by that process are undone. This 
means that only files affected by that process are restored. 
Backing out of some processes may be required, for example, 
to resolve a deadlock, or to undo the operations of a 
failing process. Backing out is a special sort of recovery 
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of kind 3. 
The survey of techniques described is intended to be 
complete, although the categorization is the responsibility 
of the author and definitely not the only possible one. The 
seven categories into which the techniques used for 
recovery, restart and maintenance of consistency are divided 
in this chapter are introduced below and their relationships 
briefly described. 
* Salvation program. 
* 
A salvation program is run after a crash to restore the 
system to some valid state, without using recovery data. 
This program is needed after a crash if other recovery 
techniques (using recovery data) fail or are not used, 
and if no crash resistance is provided. This program 
scans the data base after a crash to ascertain the 
damage and to restore the data base to some valid state. 
This program rescues the information that it can still 
recognize in the data base after a crash. 
Incremental dumping. 
Incremental dumping involves the dumping 
files onto archive storage (usually tape) 
has finished or at regular intervals. 
dumping provides checkpoints for updated 
provides backup copies of files which can 
after a crash. 
of updated 
after a job 
Incremental 
files. It 
be restored 
* Audit trail. 
An audit trail records, "who did what to which files, 
and in what sequence". An audit trail can be used to 
restore files after a crash to the state they were in at 
the time of the crash, to back out processes and for 
certifying the integrity of the system (i.e. verifying 
that rules and laws are obeyed). An audit trail keeps 
track of operations performed by processes, whereas 
incremental dumping, for example, keeps track of updates 
made on files. An audit trail thus also provides the 
means to back out a process while incremental dumping 
just provides the means to restore files to previous 
consistent states. 
* Differential files. 
A file can be implemented such that it consists of a 
main file, which is kept unchanged, and a differential 
file to register the alterations made to the file. At 
regular times the main files must be merged with the 
differential files, after which the differential files 
are empty again. Records in the differential files can 
be stored with the process identifier, a time stamp and 
other identification information to provide special 
facilities, such as recovery or crash resistance. In a 
sense the differential file could be regarded as a 
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special audit trail in a system where the forming of the 
audit trail is the only effect of file updates. So 
facilities similar to audit trail facilities are 
provided. Since the differential file is part of the 
logical file it may be used to provide other facilities 
such aa crash resistance. 
* Backup and current version. 
The files containing the present values of existing 
files form the current version of the data base. Files 
containing previous values (values that existed earlier 
in time), which form a consistent data base, comprise a 
backup version of the data base. Backup versions can be 
used to restores files to previous values. 
* Multiple copies. 
More than one copy of each file is held. The different 
copies always have the same value, except during update 
of course. An inconsistent copy can always be recognized 
either by voting or an "update-in-progress" bit. So 
after a crash during update the most recent consistent 
state of a file can always be retrieved. Consequently, 
this technique provides crash resistance and may be used 
to detect faults if the different copies are maintained 
on different devices or by different processors and the 
validity of the data can be checked. 
* Careful replacement. 
Under the careful replacement scheme no part of a data 
structure is ever updated "in place". Altered parts are 
instead copied into new objects. Therefore during update 
there are two copies of the data structure which overlap 
in identical parts (objects). One copy contains the 
pre-update value, the other one is in a transition to a 
new value. At the end of the update the copy containing 
the pre-update value is destroyed (only objects which 
are not shared with the other copy are released). The 
difference with all of the other methods is that two 
copies exist only during update. The two copies have the 
same structure (so it is not a differential file 
scheme), but will overlap in identical objects that form 
part of the structure. The technique is used to provide 
crash resistance. The pre-update copy will always be 
available after a crash during update, the other copy 
will then be lost. 
A cross-reference table showing for which kinds of 
recovery the recovery techniques described above, can be 
used is given in Fig.2.2. 
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1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
correct previous eff. prev valid consistent crash 
state state state state state resista:-.cE 
~alvation 
program 
* * 
ncrement 
dumping 
* 
~udit 
trail 
* * * 
~iff • 
files * * * 
packup 
urrent * * 
tnultiple 
copies * 
t-areful 
~eplacem. * 
Fig.2.2, A cross reference table indicating for what purposes 
the various recovery techniques can be used. 
From the description of the techniques and Fig.2.2 the 
following relationships between the techniques are apparent: 
* The differential file technique makes incremental 
dumping very easy to implement. Incremental dumping, in 
general, copes with failures the differential file 
technique cannot cope with. Thus the two techniques may 
complement each other very well. 
* The audit trail technique is an alternative technique to 
differential files, careful replacement or multiple 
cop~es, that can be used to provide the facility of 
restoring the correct state after a crash. Audit trail 
is therefore hardly ever used as a recovery technique in 
one system together with differential files, multiple 
copies or careful replacement. 
* 
* 
* 
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It will be shown in this survey that multiple copies and 
careful replacement may be used as alternative 
techniques, but also to complement each other to provide 
crash resistance against similar or the same set of 
failures. 
Also the incremental dumping, the audit trail, the 
differential files and the backup current version 
techniques can be used as alternative techniques or to 
complement each other to provide recovery from different 
failures. 
The salvation program is a recovery technique 
used if all other techniques fail. It cannot 
data base back to a previous state, because it, 
rescues what is left in the data base. 
which is 
put the 
in fact, 
These seven techniques could be 
recovery, crash resistance and maintenance 
one of the following three ways: 
said to provide 
of consistency in 
* The way in which the data is structured. 
The mUltiple copies, differential files and backup 
techniques, are techniques to structure the data or data 
base such that the required facilities are provided. 
* The way in which the data is updated and manipulated. 
The careful replacement technique is a crash resistant 
way of updating complex data structures. It will be 
shown ~n this thesis that this also sets special 
constraints and requirements for the data stuctures. 
* The provision of utilities. 
The salvation program, incremental dumping and audit 
trail are utilities which have nothing to do with the 
way in which the data is structured or updated. They 
could be regarded as external utilities which can 
usually be added to any data base system without great 
difficulty. 
The division of the techniques in the three groups 
could be misleading in cases where techniques complement 
each other or are alternatives. The seven techniques will 
therefore be discussed separately. The categorization of 
the techniques, however, is partially justified by 
distinguishing the three groups of techniques. For example, 
the backup and current version technique is in a different 
group than incremental dumping. It is therefore justified to 
distinguish them as two different techniques. 
The seven techniques are described 
following seven sections. Examples of 
techniques are given for illustration. 
in detail in the 
systems using the 
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2.3 Salvation programs 
A salvation program in a data base system is used after 
a crash to restore the data base to some consistent state. 
The salvati.on program tries to restore the state of the data 
base as it was before or at the time of the failure. 
However, in general some files or data may be lost. A 
salvation program basically scans through the data 
structures and tries to reconstruct the data base or restore 
consistency, possibly at the cost of deleting some files or 
data. 
A salvation program is needed after a crash if the data 
kept on secondary storage is not kept in a consistent state 
all the time and other recovery techniques to restore all 
the data to a consistent state are not available or cannot 
cope with this crash. Otherwise no salvation program ~s 
needed. 
One of the reasons for the data on secondary storage to 
be left in an inconsistent state after a crash could be, for 
example, the loss of buffers kept in main storage. The 
reasons for having to delete some inconsistent files could 
be (SmH72): i) the violation of standard error checks on 
reading a file, ii) a conflict because the same storage 
appears to have been assigned to more than one file, iii) a 
conflict (e.g. on the file length) determined from redundant 
information (e.g. from a file header). 
A system may use buffers for the data base (data 
buffers) and for audit trail tapes (audit trail buffers). 
After a crash there is in general no way to tell which 
updates recorded in the audit trail have been written to the 
data base and which were still in data buffers, and 
similarly which updates made in the data base are recorded 
on audit trail tape or were still in buffers (GiS76). Using 
the audit trail to restore the data base to what it waS at 
the point of failure may therefore not be possible. Several 
systems such as IMS (IBM) or the CMIC system (GiS76) first 
use a salvation program which tries to rescue the contents 
of the buffers in main storage, after a failure, in order to 
close the audit trail tapes properly. However, main storage 
may be lost in wich case restoration of the correct state is 
not possible. 
A system in which a salvation program is of great 
importance is the HIVE system (Tay76) (here the program is 
called the recovery procedure). The system consists of a 
fixed number of virtual processors (VPs) which are assigned 
permanently to execute particular functional application 
programs in a cyclic manner. A processor cycle, performing 
such a particular function, is triggered by a message 
received from another VP or from outside the network of VPs. 
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Capabilities for the necessary code and permanent data areas 
are given to the VPs at system build time and the cessage 
routes between VPs are also set up permanently. Basically 
only the files for which permanent capabilities have been 
created at system build time can be restored after a crash. 
However, 
a) Transaction checkpoints 
of each transaction into 
checkpoint file, which 
after a crash. 
can be made by wr~t~ng the data 
a common, permanent, safeguarded 
can be accessed and recovered 
b) Files may be created dynamically and capabilities for 
them may be put in special files called cap-files. 
The recovery procedure run after a crash restores in core 
the read-only core image, which also contains recovery code. 
The main task of the recovery procedure is to perform a 
garbage collection in the the data base by scanning all 
files. Files for which capabilities are kept in cap-files 
are processed first. For each version of each file (several 
versions of each file are maintained) the check sums are 
evaluated to detect partially updated and corrupted pages, 
and where possible the appropriate updating and backtracking 
from other versions is carried out. (At most one version can 
be corrupted after a crash, and if so, the corrupted state 
will be detectable using the check sums. Only a catastrophe, 
such as an fire in the computer centre, may corrupt more 
than one version.) The checkpoint files are used to 
initialise the transactions represented in those files. 
Other systems in which a salvation program is used to 
recover the disk contents after system failure have been 
described, for example, by Lockemann and Knutsen (LoK68), 
Daley and Neumann (DaN65) (salvage procedure), Fraser 
(Fra69) (start-up procedure) and in the EMAS system (E}~7~). 
(See also the surveys in (Ton75) and (Mas73).) 
2.4 Incremental dumping 
Incremental dumping is used to copy updated files onto 
archive storage (usually tape); it checkpoints files that 
have been altered. Incremental dumping will normally be 
done after a job has finished and can also be done at 
regular intervals, while continued use is made of the files, 
in order to get checkpoints more frequently. The 
incremental dump tapes can be used to bring all the files to 
their last consistent state again after a crash has occured. 
Jobs completed before the crash, will not have to be rerun. 
All of the updates performed by jobs running at the time of 
the crash will not be restored completely by the processing 
of the incremental dump tape after a crash; the effects of 
these updates may be restored partially. Fraser (Fra69) 
gives a very good description of the technique as used at 
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Cambridge, which makes complete copies of updated disk files 
every twenty minutes. 
In the MULTICS system (DaN65), for example, all of the 
disk files updated or created by the user are copied when he 
signs off, ~nd every N hours all newly created or modified 
files which have not previously been dumped, are also copied 
to tapes. 
The EMAS system (EMA74) provides an automatic 
checkpointing facility for files. Files are part of the 
user's virtual memory and cannot be accessed through the 
paging mechanisms until they have been connected (i.e. the 
virtual memory disk address mapping has been set up). When 
a user process is created its virtual memory space is 
created, initialised and copied to disk. When the process is 
run the working set is in core and pages are transferred 
back and forth between core and drum. A page may be forced 
to disk, because the drum gets full or the process becomes 
dormant again. If a page is forced to disk then all of the 
updated virtual memory pages are forced to disk at the same 
time. This mechanism is required by the so-called 
consistency rule in the EMAS system. Therefore a suitable 
restart copy of the virtual memory of a process (which 
includes the files) is provided on the disk. The problem of 
having inconsistencies between the state of the process and 
the states of its associated files are avoided, because the 
filing system uses the resources provided by the paging 
system. The paging system assumes complete responsibility 
for maintaining a consistent backup copy of all of the state 
variables of the process (including files). Consequently, 
if the consistency rule is always obeyed then automatic 
checkpointing is provided. 
Incremental dumping can be done as a part of an audit 
trail scheme (Mas7l), (Ran70), (Mas73). An audit trail only 
gives the changes made to files from given states onwards. 
These states are redefined regularly for reasons of 
efficiency (in order that audit trail journals do not become 
too long). For example, in a system described by Wimbrow 
(Wim7l) files are dumped when they have to be reorganized, 
because they become disorderly as a result of the operations 
performed. In the CMIC system (GiS76) all files are 
checkpointed regularly at moments when no user has the data 
base open. 
Another scheme used in System R (Lor77), works as 
follows (see also Fig.2.5). Segments (which are similar to 
what we called files) consist of page tables with pointers 
to the data pages. Associated with each pointer in the page 
table are three bits: a shadow bit, a cumulative shadow bit 
and a long term shadow bit. When a segment is updated a 
backup and a current copy are maintained (in a way which 
will be described in one of the following sections). For 
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every page which is updated during a transaction, the shado~ 
bit and cumulative bit are set in the relevant page table cf 
the segment. When the current state of the segment is saved 
(i.e. replaces the old copy) at the end of the transaction, 
then the shadow bits are switched off and the old pages (of 
the backup ~ersion) which are replaced by the new versions 
of the current copy, are released. Checkpoints of all the 
segments are taken regularly. This involves the copying of 
all the page tables for which at least one cu~ulati,e shadow 
bit is switched on, the cumulative bits are copied into the 
long term bits and then switched off, and a so-called 
process P is started. Process P copies onto tape all of the 
pages for which the cumulative shadow bit is on at 
checkpoint time. The long term checkpoint bits are used to 
make sure that subsequent saves will not release the pages 
before P has copied them. 
A special checkpoint file is used in HIVE (Tay76) to 
checkpoint transactions. Information put in the checkpoint 
files can be recovered after a crash to restart those 
transactions. Individual transactions can also be 
reprocessed selectively using this checkpoint file. 
2.5 Audit trail 
An audit trail records "who did what to whom, and in 
what sequence" (Bj075), by keeping track of all of the 
operations performed. All the relevant information about 
the operations is registered in the audit trail, such as: 
the effects of the operations, the times and dates at which 
the operations toke place and the identification codes of 
the user (or user program) issuing the operation. 
as: 
1. 
Audit trails can be used for different purposes such 
Crash recovery. 
Backup versions of files can be 
audit trail can then be used to 
what they were at the time of the 
re-installed and an 
restore the files to 
crash (Cur77). 
2. Backing out. 
If a system crashes (without damaging second~ry 
storage) the files affected by the processes runn~ng 
during the failure can be restored to what they were 
before those processes started. In other words the 
audit trail can be processed backwards for backing out. 
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3. Certifying the integrity of the system by providing 
means for verifying that rules and policies cictated by 
laws, business agreements, etc., are being followed by 
the application (Bjo75). 
It is for this reason that Bjork concludes that audit 
trail will be the major integrity tool for shared data 
usage for the late 1970s and beyond. This could, 
however, well prove to be a rather controversial 
conclusion. For example, differential files combinec 
with the incremental dumping technique could provide 
the same facilities, although the provision of 
integrity verification by this combination of 
techniques depends on how the differential file is 
implemented and on the requirements for verification. 
Recovery techniques as described, for example, by 
Fraser (Fra69) and often used for filing systems, may, as 
described in a previous section, cause the loss of the 
effects of the most recent operations performed on the 
filing system. Incremental dumping, as used by Fraser, 
checkpoints files at regular intervals. The effects of 
operations performed on files since their last checkpoint 
was made, will be lost. This may not matter in many 
operating systems, because jobs can be resubmitted or 
operations can be redone. However, for systems where updates 
are made online from different sources, such as in banking 
or airline reservation systems (Mas71), (Ran70) , (Wim7l) , 
(Ton75), this may be impracticable. One cannot afford to 
lose any update in the event of a failure in such systems. 
In systems like these an audit trail, kept say on tape, can 
provide a solution. Before a transaction is done on a data 
base an audit trail entry is written onto tape. The writing 
of audit trail entries must normally be done without the use 
of buffers (Wim7l) to make sure that crash recovery is 
possible at any time; the use of buffers (see also Fig.2.3) 
may lead to inconsistencies between the data base and the 
audit trail (GiS76). (However, another possibility would be 
to salvage the buffers from main storage after a system 
crash, thus making possible the proper closing of the audit 
trail tape. This is, for example, tried, but not always 
successful, in IMS (IBM) and in the CMIC system (GiS76). 
The salvaging of the buffers is not possible in case the 
contents of main storage is lost after the crash.) 
The audit trail can be used to back out a process. This 
process may have interacted with another process in such a 
way that that other process will have to be backed out. The 
audit trail can be used to back out that other process which 
may have interacted with again some other process, and so 
on. Thus using an audit trail to back out unfinished 
transactions performed by interacting processes, leads in 
general to a so-called domino effect (Ran75) (GiS76) 
(Cur77). A locking scheme, as used in System R (Ast76), may 
avoid these problems by making these interactions 
users processes 
-23-
data base 
buffers 
audit trail 
buffers 
CURRENT AUDIT TRAIL 
audit tra i 1 on 
secondary storage 
The current data base is always consistent with the current 
audit trail, however the data base on secondary storage is. 
in general t not consistent with the audit trail on secondary 
storage. 
Fig.2.3, A general data base system using audit trail. 
impossible. (Practicable only when the interactions are 
accidental, rather than deliberate.) This will make the 
undoing of partially finished transactions possible using an 
audit trail (or a "log" as it is called in System R). 
Another solution would be to checkpoint all files while no 
user is active (GiS76). This would always stop the domino 
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effect at that point. However, such occasions may Occur too 
infrequently for this scheme to be much help, and frequent 
forcing of all users to become inactive may be 
impracticable. 
Audit. trail schemes can appear in rr.any guises. For 
example, in a system described by Lampson and Sturgis 
(LaS76) so-called intention lists are used. An intention 
list specifies the operations to be performed by a 
processor. A processor, which is a node in a network, may 
receive an intention list, containing the specifications of 
the operations to be performed on its local data base. 
Intention lists, like the audit trail used in the CMIC 
system (GiS76), can if kept, be reprocessed if processing is 
interrupted without backing out the interupted process. 
Intention lists, once received and accepted, cannot be lost 
unless a catastrophe, such as a head crash, occurs, because 
they are stored on disk at a fixed place known to the 
system, and are not altered when processed. So unless the 
processor breaks down and is never repaired the operations 
specified in the intention list will always be done. An 
intention list could be regarded as (an entry) in an audit 
trail. The difference between intention lists and audit 
trails is that audit trails are made as a result of issued 
data base updates, intention lists are created first. As 
far as processors processing intention lists are concerned, 
they could also be regarded as the programs issuing the 
update operations (like audit trails when they are 
processed, not when they are created). During crash 
recovery or backing out, the intention lists and audit 
trails are not different. 
2.6 Differential files 
Under the differential file (also called "change set") 
scheme the main files are kept unchanged until 
re-organisation. All changes that would be made to a main 
file as a result of transactions performed are registered in 
a differential file. A file as seen by the user is 
implemented as a fixed main file and a differential file. 
As a result of this the differential file will always be 
searched first in case data is to be retrieved. Data not 
found in the differential file is retrieved from the main 
data base. ]he most recent entry for a given record in the 
differential file must always be retrieved. 
Severance and Lohman (SeL76) fully describe the 
technique and an efficient hashing method to implement it 
(see also Fig.2.4). A small associative memory in the form 
of a bit map, accessed by the hashing scheme, is used to 
reduce the probability of making an unnecessary search in 
The data base 
read/wri te 
di fferenti a 
fi 1 e 
-
bit map 
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o 11 1010 II 0 •• .. 
hashing function(record r) = -bit pattern-
The data base 
system operating 
on the data base 
The bit map suggests that record r is in the differential file. 
because the bits set in the bit pattern produced by the hashing 
function are set in the bit map. 
Fig.2.4. A differential file technique using a hashing scheme. 
the differential file. Severance and Lohman show 
analytically how to keep the probability of a filtering 
error (i.e. the bit map suggests that that a record is in 
the differential file while it is not. because the relevant 
bits are set to represent other records) low. They also 
describe the advantages of differential files for the 
prov~s~on of recovery. integrity. the implementation of 
(incremental) dumping schemes and other general advantages 
such as the simplicity of software. Another advantage 
claimed is the possibility to perform queries which do not 
need the exact values of all files; such queries get a 
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suitable (but out of date) view of the data without locking 
out the update transactions. 
The disadvantages of the approach using differential 
files are (Lor77): 
* An access to a data element must first search the 
differential file; if the data element is not among the 
modifications then it must be fetched from the data 
base. However, Severance and Lohman show that, using a 
hashing scheme, this problem can be almost completely 
overcome. They also show how to construct a good 
hashing scheme for particular systems. 
* Eventually a merge of the modifications and the main 
data base must be performed, and this operation can be 
time consuming. This will certainly be a big problem if 
the system needs to be available without interruption. 
* Since an update can affect an element which has already 
been modified, the organization of the differential 
files must accommodate such cases. If hashing schemes 
described by Severance and Lohman, are used or a scheme 
similar to the one described by Rappaport (Rap75) in a 
system called VADIS, then this problem may be avoided. 
Differential files are, for example, used in the VADIS 
system (differential files are called MODFILEs). For every 
file in the system there is a MODFILE. The system has been 
developed to facilitate recovery after power failure; this 
has been implemented by providing resistance from crashes 
due to power failure. So after a power failure the system 
can restart as if nothing had happened. Uncompleted 
transactions before the failure are not undone, rather the 
effects of these operations are ignored using the MODFILEs 
and a TRNSDONE file as follows: 
* Each entry in a MODFILE has a header with: record type, 
transaction code, pointer to previous modification of 
the same record, time, transaction number and some other 
identification codes. 
* There is a file TRNSDONE which contains the numbers of 
the completed transactions. 
* For every record fetched from a MODFILE the transaction 
number is compared with the TRNSDONE numbers and the 
current transaction number. 
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* If the number is neither in TRNSDONE nor is the nu~ber 
of the current transaction, then the previous version of 
the record is taken (the one pointed to by the retrieved 
entry from the MODFILE, or in the main file), because 
this means that the record was put in the HODFlLE by an 
uncompl~ted transaction before a failure. 
Differential files are used in a system, described by 
Titman (Tit74), for both efficiency and reliability reasons. 
The way in which ordinary files are kept makes insertions or 
deletions very expensive. In Titmans system the files are 
binary relations which are stored, in a highly compressed 
form, in fixed length blocks. Elements are identified by a 
block number and the sequence number of the element in the 
block. An insertion or deletion requires the complete 
re-organization of the file giving the elements new 
identifiers. So, for efficiency reasons, an "add set" and a 
"delete set" of inserted and deleted elements are kept for 
each file. For reliability purposes a "change set" is also 
kept for each file, which is used to register the changed 
records. The "add set", "delete set" and "change set" 
together form the implementation of a differential file. 
The main files are kept on a separate device which is never 
written on except during re-organization. These files can be 
duplicated on tapes for recovery. Checkpointing is carried 
out by saving the add, delete and change sets. 
2.7 Backup and current versions 
Backup versions of 
order to make possible 
previous state. 
files or data bases can be kept in 
the restoration of the files to a 
For example, many file-editors produce a complete new 
version of a file while a user is editing a file. The 
original file remains unchanged during the edit-session. 
The new version is a complete new copy; it is not achieved. 
for example, by using a differential file. If a user 
notices during the edit session that he has made a blunder, 
for example deleted 100 lines instead of 10, he does not 
replace the original copy of the file. 
Incremental dumping (of current versions) can be used 
as a utility to maintain a backup version of a filing system 
or data base: altered files are copied, which can 
subsequently be used to update a backup version of the whole 
system or data base. This is done in the Cambridge filing 
system (Fra69), where two processes are used: one makes 
incremental dumps and the other creates backup versions of 
the system. 
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Similarly, complete copies of the data base can be made 
regularly in order to make possible the restoration cf the 
data base to an earlier state. For example, ~n ~'XLTICS 
(DaN65) a weekly dump is prepared of all files which have 
been used within the last M weeks plus all of the system 
files necessary to run the system. 
An optimised version of this technique (see also 
Fig.2.5) is used in System R (Lor77) for so-called segments 
(synonymous to our notion of files). For each segment a 
page table is used to point to the data pages. There are two 
copies of each page table, which are identical when no 
transaction is in progress. If a page of a segment is 
altered during a transaction then its new value is put in a 
newly allocated page and the current version of the page 
table is updated to point to the new page. The backup 
version remains unaltered. At the end of a transaction the 
current version is copied into the backup version and the 
replaced or deleted pages are released. This releasing of 
pages causes the bit map used to indicate the free pages to 
be updated. Two copies of the bit map are maintained. A 
MASTER table points to the current map. The current bit map 
always reflects a consistent state of the system (i.e. all 
of the pages pointed to by the backup versions of the page 
tables). At the end of a transaction the ~~STER table is 
then made to point to the up to date bit map. This scheme 
provides the possibility of restoring a segment to its last 
consistent state (held in the backup version) and of 
restoring consistency after a system failure (the operations 
of unfinished transactions, performed before the failure 
will be lost; these transactions will have to be restarted). 
Physically completely separate backup and current 
versions of the page table provide logically completely 
different, but physically overlapping. backup and current 
versions of the segment under this scheme. The logically 
different versions of a segment overlap (physically) in 
their implementation where they are equal. 
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Fig.2.5, The implementation of segments in System R. 
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2.8 Multiple copies 
* 
* 
The technique of multiple copies involves either: 
Keeping more than two copies of the data so that they 
can be compared when needed. If a majority of the 
copies have the same value, then that value is taken. 
This technique is then called majority voting. 
or, 
Holding two copies with flags indicating 
"update-in-progress". 
suspicious copy) is 
because of the flags 
update the flag will 
An inconsistent copy (or 
always recognizably inconsistent, 
used; if the system crashes during 
still be set after the crash. 
Except during update the mUltiple copies must always 
have the same value. If the different copies are updated by 
the same processor then a flag "update-in-progress" 
(sometimes called "damage flag" (Cur77)) is used if there 
are only two copies, in order to provide crash resistance. A 
consistent copy can always be retrieved after a system 
restart; this copy will either have the value it had before 
the update in progress during the crash, or the new value. 
The inconsistent copy can always be recognized as such and 
discarded. The keeping of more than two copies provides 
crash resistance. The use of two copies plus flags also 
safeguards against crashes. Majority voting may also be 
used to detect incorrectly performed operations, which is 
especially useful if different processors update the 
different copies. Faulty processors can then be detected and 
ignored or disconnnected. 
The important difference between the mUltiple copies 
technique and other techniques such as backup and current 
version, and careful replacement, is that with the multiple 
copies technique the different copies always have the same 
value, except during update. The mUltiple copies also exist 
all of the time and are implemented as physically different 
files which may not overlap. Schemes, for example, using 
different backup or archive versions, are therefore 
definitely not implementations of the mUltiple copies 
technique as described here. 
Majority voting on data has 
space flight applications, such 
system where four computers are 
same input data and calculate the 
been used extensively for 
as in the space shuttle 
configured to receive the 
same outputs (Sk176). 
The technique of two copies with flags is 
provision of recovery for segments in System R 
MASTER table is used to indicate which segments 
used in the 
(Lorn). A 
are open or 
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closed and which bit map (two copies are held) is the up to 
date one (see Fig.2.5). Two copies of the ~1ASTER table, 
both containing the same information, are kept to ensure 
that if the system crashes while the ~STER table is being 
updated, always at most one copy will be left behind in an 
inconsistent state; the other copy either has the new state 
or the state the table was in before the update started. 
The copy that is in an inconsistent state can always be 
identified. 
Similarly two copies 
filing system of GEORGE 3 
bits to make possible the 
invalid copy after a crash 
of the ~STER-directory in 
are maintained (New72), and 
distinction between a valid 
during update. 
the 
two 
and 
System HIVE (Tay76) maintains two read-write versions 
for every file. This provides one of the characteristics of 
a cycle (see section 3) which is that the local effects can 
be undone as long as the cycle has not yet finished. During 
a cycle one of these two versions is updated. At the end of 
the cycle this version is copied into the other version. 
The system knows which of the two versions is the one 
updated during a cycle. Crash resistance is therefore 
provided for individual files. Apart from this, a sum check 
is maintained for each version. This, generally, enables 
partially updated or corrupted files to be detected (this of 
course depends on the kind of crash, but it is the case for 
most likely kinds of crashes). In general two copies and 
two flags (bits) are sufficient to provide crash resistence. 
The flag indicates whether a copy is suspicious or not. If 
the two copies are updated immediately after each other, as 
in System R, then a copy is very likely to be inconsistent 
if its flag is set. In system HIVE, however, the two copies 
are kept on separate storage devices, so the check sum 
provides extra facilities: it makes the detection of 
incorrectly performed operations possible; in other words 
faults can be detected. System HIVE is one of the few 
existing systems in which more than one complete copy for 
every safeguarded file are maintained to provide crash 
resistance. One copy is updated during a cycle and the 
second copy is updated in pages which correspond to the 
changed pages of the first copy to reduce the overhead. 
2.9 Careful replacement 
This technique implies arranging that, as far as 
possible, no data structures are ever updated "in place". 
Instead updated objects (records, pages, disk blocks) that 
are part of a data structure, are copied into other objects 
and the updates are made there. The same is done for objects 
in the data structure which point to those objects. During 
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the update there will be two copies of the data structure, 
which overlap such that the same objects (for example pages) 
are used for both data structures, for those objects that 
have the same values in both data structures. One copy 
contains the pre-update value and the other copy is i~ a 
transition.from that value to the new value and ~ill only be 
~n a valid and consistent state (from the users point of 
view) when the update is completed. Once the update is 
completed the copy containing the pre-update value is 
destroyed (only objects which are not shared with the other 
copy are released). Only during update are there two copies 
(which overlap in identical objects). If no update is in 
progress then the data structure contains the normal current 
value. This is different from the differential file 
technique where there is one copy all the time, which 
remains unaltered, and a differential file to register 
updates made to the file. (Careful replacement could be used 
to merge the main file with the differential file when 
merging is done.) 
The important difference between the careful 
replacement technique and other techniques is that with 
careful replacement two "virtual" copies are held only 
during an update (or perhaps within a recovery scope 
specified by the programmer (Ver77)) to make the update or 
sequences of updates as safe as possible (i.e. reduce the 
chance of being left with a inconsistent copy or mutually 
inconsistent set of files, in the event of a crash). 
This technique is fully explained by Gamble (Gam73) who 
describes a filing system in which this technique is used. 
Files consist of data pages pointed to by a tree of 
directory pages. A master directory points to each top 
directory page of the files. If files are updated using 
careful replacement then they can always be restored in 
their pre-update consistent states. 
This approach resembles the differential approach. 
However, the three disadvantages of differential files 
(Lor77), mentioned above, are avoided. Instead the major 
disadvantages of careful replacement are: 
1. The file or data structure must be such that the 
technique is feasible. For example, if a file was 
implemented as a list of linked pages, then this 
approach would be impossible (or incur prohibitive 
costs), because if a page is replaced then the page 
pointing to it is to be updated and may therefore have 
to be replaced, which will require the updating of the 
page pointing to that page, and so on. The constraints 
and requirements careful replacement sets for the data 
structures are fully described elsewhere (Ver76) 
(Ver77) (and in later chapters of this thesis). 
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2. There is a certain overhead in (disk) accesses. In 
GEORGE 3, by using the technique only for files, but 
not for the much more heavily used ~~STER-directory, 
the measured overhead reported by Newell is 
surprisingly insignificant. The method is also ~sed in 
the MUS system (Gam73), so also the overhead in that 
system must at least be acceptable. 
Files in the system described by Lampson and Sturgis 
(LaS76) are updated using careful replacement, during the 
processing of the intention lists. Segments in System R 
could be said to be updated using careful replace~ent as 
well; certainly the basic idea is used. 
Basically the same technique is used in the CMIC system 
(GiS76). The storage structure used is similar to those of 
B-trees (Knu73). If an insertion is made in a full track 
then two new tracks are obtained and the contents of the 
full track plus the new entry are put in these two new 
tracks (see also Fig.2.6). The same is done for the index 
(the table containing pointers to the data tracks). This 
method of updating is combined with the use of the 
leaf-first rule. This rule states that copying of 
information to slower memory (e.g. from main storage to 
drum, or from drum to disk) is done such that no descriptor 
or pointer can ever reference a block at a faster level of 
the device hierarchy. In this way the following two things 
are ensured: 
1. The (sub-)structure on mass storage is always valid, 
because this (sub-)structure will always be a valid and 
consistent tree. 
2. No data on mass storage is ever removed from the 
structure during update. Instead replacement is used 
by using new tracks when necessary. 
The careful replacement technique is often used in 
filing systems using a hierarchy of devices by employing the 
leaf-first rule and the root-segment rule (see also 
Fig.2.7). The root-segment rule states that if a data page 
is on a particular level of storage ~n the hierarchy, then 
every directory page between it and the root of the file is 
on that level or a faster level (the root is the top 
directory in the tree of directory pages). These two rules 
mean that careful replacement is used at every level in the 
hierarchy. So if, for example, the contents of core is lost 
after a crash then the drum and disk will still have two 
copies of the file: the disk copy contains an old value, the 
drum copy (of which some pages are on drum and the others on 
disk) contains a newer value of the file. Fig.2.7 shows how 
updates of a file, made in core, are subsequently made to 
the copies of that file held on drum and disk using these 
two rules, thus always maintaining a valid and consistent 
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copy at every level. Although pages are updated "in place" 
this technique can be classified as being a careful 
replacement technique, because of the way in which the total 
structures are updated (the replacement takes in fact place 
on other devices and updates are consolidated on the 
device(s) ~intaining the files) and because every valid 
tree structure, in systems using these rules, is by 
definition a consistent structure. If the contents of both 
core and drum are lost then there will still be a consistent 
copy on disk. If the contents of core are lost then the 
updates which were reflected in the core copy (which LS 
partially in core, partially on the drum, and partially on 
disk) and not in the drum copy will be lost. If the contents 
of the drum are lost as well then the updates which were 
reflected in the drum copy, but not yet in the disk copy, 
will be lost too. A system using these rules has been 
described by Schwartz (Sch73). Files are trees of pages 
which are either index pages (i.e. directory pages) or data 
pages. A file descriptor is the root of the index table in 
the system described by Schwartz and a directory file 
contains the descriptors. In that system, and in CHIC too, 
the directory file is updated "in place". If absolute crash 
resistance was to be provided in this system then the 
multiple copies technique could be used for the directory, 
as is done in GEORGE 3 (New72). 
The careful replacement technique provides an easy way 
of restoring the state of a data structure as it was before 
an update or transaction started. The technique can also be 
used to provide crash resistance. 
If the recovery is to be provided for transactions 
consisting of more than one update then replaced pages (or 
newly allocated ones in case of insertions or extensions) 
can be updated "in place". This technique has been used at 
Newcastle (Ver77) (and is fully described in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis) to provide recovery for files 
within user defined scopes, which can be nested. The 
nesting means that a copy of a file is maintained for every 
level of nesting in which the file has been operated upon 
(these copies overlap in identical pages). The current 
value of the file is in the latest copy. Recovery means 
restoring the copy as it was before the current recovery 
scope was entered. Exiting a recovery scope successfully 
means the replacing of the copy, as it was before the 
recovery scope was entered, with the latest copy. 
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2.10 Summary and conclusions 
Many of the techniques to provide backing out, cras~ 
recovery and crash resistance and to maintain consistency, 
which are .known and used at present, have been describec. 
One of the main conclusions is that the techniques can be 
used in different environments or for different purposes or 
complement each other. None of the techniques is out of 
date, although some are older than others. All the 
techniques described are still used for different purposes 
and in different environments. 
In order to show which combinations of techniques are 
used in practice (see also the introduction and Fig.2.l), a 
cross-reference table, showing which techniques discussed ~n 
this survey are used in particular systems, is given ~n 
Fig.2.8. 
System IMS George HIVE MUL Cambr EHAS cme VADIS New-
R 3 TICS idge, castle 
Fra69 Ver77 
salva-
tion 
* * * * * * * program 
incre-
mental * * * * * * * * dumping 
audit * * * 
trail 
differ-
ential * 
files 
backup 
* * * 
~, 
* * * * * 
current 
mUltiple 
* * * 
copies 
careful 
rep lac- * * * 
ement 
Fig.2.8, A cross-reference table of systems and recovery 
techniques. 
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This table may not be complete for the systems it 
covers (e.g. System R may have some sort of salvation 
program), but it shows the most important features of the 
systems as far as recovery and crash resistance are 
concerned. 
It appears that for filing systems, where short term 
losses are not considered serious, the combination of 
incremental dumping, having a complete backup version of the 
system and a salvation program suffices. This is for 
. , 
example, used 1n MULTICS, the Cambridge system and E~~S. A 
salvation program may be needed for "clean up" purposes 
after a crash, which may lead to the loss of some data. 
This combination can be improved, by using an audit 
trail, to guard against the loss of any updates, as is 
possible in IMS. The recovery facilities in IMS, however, 
seem very ad hoc; there is no general approach and there is 
no dominant technique as in the Cambridge system or VADIS. 
IMS provides an enormous range of facilities, 50% of the 
code is said to be for recovery purposes (Inf75). However, 
the application programmer, it seems, needs to build his own 
mechanisms and utilities, certainly if high integrity is 
required. The programmer also has to make explicit 
checkpoints if they are required. 
The loss of any completed update can also be avoided by 
using careful replacement or mUltiple copies as in GEORGE 3, 
HIVE, CMIC and System R. It may also avoid the need for a 
salvation program (e.g. as in GEORGE 3). Also the 
differential files technique is very powerful and can be 
used to provide recovery facilities and crash recovery. 
Audit trail with backup, or incremental dumping with 
backup, or audit trail with incremental dumping and backup, 
or multiple copies could be used for recovery from more 
serious failures which other recovery techniques cannot cope 
with depending on how serious short term losses are. 
Rappaport doe~ not say in his paper what has been used for 
VADIS. 
It is difficult to make a costs/overheads comparison 
between the various techniques, however some general 
statements can be made: 
* If failures do not occur often then the differential 
file technique and the careful replacement technique 
give an extra overhead, because other recovery 
techniques, such as incremental dumping or backup 
current version or a salvation program are, in general, 
needed anyway for failures with which these two 
techniques cannot cope. However, the failures these two 
techniques do cope with, are coped with much better (t~e 
data base is crash resistant, thus the correct state 1S 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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maintained) and more efficiently (no separate tapes, for 
example, need to be mounted and processed). 
The multiple copies technique as, for example, used in 
HIVE coul~ be .regarded as a sledgehammer approach: the 
overhe~d l~ hlg~. However, the technique does provide 
very hlgh lntegrlty such as was required in HI'~. 
The overhead with audit trail is high, because every 
operation on the data base may cause an audit trail 
entry to be created. The audit trail technique as a 
recovery technique is therefore, In general, only 
justified if the audit trail is required for certifying 
the integrity of the system anyway, or if recovery must 
almost always (even after for example a head crash) 
involve the restoration of the correct state. 
The incremental dumping and backup current VerSlon 
technique are, in general, the best technique for 
providing recovery from failures that cause extensive 
damage, such as a head crash on disk, if the recovery 
technique does not necessarily have to restore the 
correct state, but if instead the restoration of a 
consistent state is acceptable. The overhead of these 
techniques lS not very big, because it involves 
checkpointing of the files or the whole data base only 
once every N minutes or N updates. 
The costs of a salvation program completely depend on 
the number of crashes, because overhead is only inccured 
when the program is used, not during normal processing. 
One of the techniques which is used increasingly for 
multi-user environments (or multi-machine environments) is 
the careful replacement technique, either explicitly (New72~ 
(Gam73), (LaS76),(GiS76) (and in fact also in (Lor77)) or by 
the use of the root-segment rule and leaf-first rule In 
systems using a hierarchy of devices (Sch73). The 
combination of careful replacement with multiple copies has 
recently received much attention (GiS76), (Ast76), (Ver77). 
Also the differential file technique is written about more 
than in the past (Rap75), (SeL76). 
The attention that has been paid to these techniques 
during the last few years makes it reasonable to assume that 
they will be used more widely during the next decade. The 
techniques ensure that data integrity is unlikely to be 
corrupted through failures and the extra costs w:igh l:ss 
heavily than they did a number of years ago. Data lntegrlty 
is becoming a more important issue than efficiency, because 
machines are becoming much faster and cheaper and, at the 
same time the complexity and volume of the data maintained 
is increasing. 
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The techniques described in this survey are special to 
provide recovery for data bases (on secondary storage), The 
present thesis generalizes the basic concepts involved and 
describes system structures in which recovery is provided 
for different complex data types (not just files). The 
problems o.f incorporating general recovery techniques to 
provide recovery for different types in different levels of 
a multi-level system are discussed. An analysis of how the 
techniques can be used to provide "nested recovery" as 
provided by recovery blocks and a detailed analysis of what 
the notion of careful replacement implies are given. It 
appears, for example, that the choice of the objects to 
replace is of importance for the feasibility of the 
technique, and that there are different ways in which this 
careful replacement technique can be implemented. 
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3.0 PARTIALLY RECOVERABLE INTERFACES ~ MULTI-LEVEL SYSTE~'fS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an approach to the construction 
of recoverable multi-level systems and a mechanism to 
implement this approach. The recovery considered will, as 
was mentioned in chapter one, be described in terms of the 
particular system structure which has been developed at 
Newcastle upon Tyne, England, to facilitate fault tolerance, 
namely recovery blocks (Ran75). Recovery blocks provide a 
good framework within which recovery systems in general can 
be discussed and described. 
A particular view of how to build fault tolerant 
multi-level systems (which is similar to a view described by 
Randell (Ran75)) is compared with the alternative approach 
described in this chapter. Some of the basic principles are 
compared with the principles used in a new approach being 
developed by Banatre and Shrivastava (BaS77). 
First the definitions of the terms used in this chapter 
are given in section two. Then section three describes the 
basic principles on which the chapter is based. The most 
important principle of the approach taken in this chapter is 
to provide recoverability for types. This approach is 
compared with an approach whereby recoverability is provided 
for operations (BaS77). Section four describes a particular 
scheme for implementing recoverable multi-level systems 
built with so-called completely recoverable interfaces; a 
scheme which is based on that view is described by Randell 
(Ran75). The disadvantages of this scheme are described in 
section five. Section six gives an alternative approach 
where partially recoverable interfaces are used and shows 
that there are good reasons for using this approach. The 
problems and constraints of implementing a multi-level 
system using that alternative approach, and a special 
mechanism to overcome these problems are described in 
section seven. A multi-level prototype system, which shows 
that the ideas discussed in this chapter can be used in 
practice, is described in section eight. Section nine shows 
how the mechanism can be used to build up a system of 
recoverable type managers each of which adds new recoverable 
types, implemented in terms of unrecoverable types, to an 
existing interface. A full comparison between the "rec~ver!, 
for types" approach and the "recovery for operat~ons 
approach is made. Finally, section ten gives some general 
final conclusions. 
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3.2 Definition of multi-level system ~ recoverability 
Before the 
"recoverability" can 
have to be specified. 
notions "multi-level 
be defined, a number 
system" 
of other 
and 
terms 
A level is a set of programs which provides (to a 
higher level) a more abstract view of the machine on which 
it is running. A level is very similar to a class in SI>fl'lA 
(Bir73); a program can be provided with a more abstract view 
of the machine by prefixing it with a class ~n SI~lliLA. 
The more abstract view of the machine given by a level 
is provided by one or more new types implemented by that 
level. Some of the existing types may be hidden by a level, 
however the ways in which this can be done are outside the 
scope of this thesis. A user can write programs to run on 
this level. (That is the programs are effectively-executed 
by the new, more abstract, machine.) 
The new abstract view provided by a level is called an 
interface. A description of an interface consists of a 
definition of types (and/or resources), (for example: core 
words, arrays, files or an operator's console) and the 
operations that can be performed on objects of these types. 
A user's program specifies a sequence of operations on 
objects of these types provided in the interface. Issues 
concerning the languages in which the user has to specify 
his sequences of operations are irrelevant for the purpose 
of this thesis. 
In a multi-level system 
procedures) can be grouped 
following properties hold: 
programs (or program parts or 
in sets La to Ln where the 
1. Every group Li provides one or more new abstract types. 
2. Every ~rogram in group Li is the implementation of an 
operat~on on a new type provided by Li. 
3. Programs of any group Li invoke programs of one or more 
of the groups La to Li, but not programs from groups 
Li+l to Ln. In other words group Li uses the 
abstractions provided by groups La to Li-l. 
4. A group Li may be an inter~reter. Li is an interpret:r 
if no level Lj, j>i, can d~rectly invoke any program ~n 
any level Lk, k<i. A group Li could also consist of a 
set of programs which interpret (see definition below) 
only some of the instructions of the user program, the 
other instructions being interpreted by groups Lj, j<i. 
A program P in a group Lk is said to invoke an 
operation R (i.e. a program) in a group Lm, Ukk; the 
program R invoked is said to interpret an operation for 
program p. 
An example of such a multi-level system is given by 
Madnick anq Alsop (MaA69). and shown in Fig.3.1. 
8 user program 
7 access method 
6 logical file system 
5 basic file system 
4 file organization strategy modules 
3 device strategy modules 
2 input/output control system 
1 central processor, peripheral devices, etc. 
Fig.3.1 A multi-level file system. designed 
by Madnick and Alsop. 
Every group Li is a level in a multi-level system. 
Every level provides a new interface. The new types provided 
in an interface are mapped on (represented by) types 
provided in the interface of the underlying machine (i.e. 
the interface provided by the lower levels). The underl~ing 
machine of a level i is defined in the interface provide by 
level i-r-(see defInition of interface) and is implemented 
by levels 0 to i-I. Thus in Fig.3.1 level 7, the access 
method, provides the different types of files, such as fixed 
length record files. sequential variable length record 
files. and so on, Level 6 maps file names on file 
identifiers and thus provides type: named file. Level 5 
converts the file identifier into a file descriptor which 
gives the logical structure of the file (e.g, a tree, a 
list or a network, possibly with a separate header) and thus 
provides type: file. Level 4 provides type: file structure 
(it map logical virtual addresses on real addresses), level 
3 provides type: physical data structure (it does clustering 
of file records and maintains a list of free records), and 
level 2 provides type: record (it performs the I/O to the 
devices), 
A level Li which ~s not an interpreter level is termed 
a procedural level. 
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The definitions of level and multi-level system are 
very similar to notions defined elsewhere (Dij68), (Par72b), 
(HoR73). There are several reasons for building multi-level 
systems rather than systems consisting of one level. One 
important reason, for example, is that it is preferable to 
split up programming problems into subproblems, that is to 
make one abstraction at a time. 
For example, in an operating system levels could be 
devised to implement a nucleus, a paging mechanism, a 
scheduler and a filing system (not necessarily in that 
order), Similarly, in data base systems, multiple levels 
(or "schema") are used for purposes of providing 
abstractions (sometimes also called views) pertinent to 
different data base users. These abstractions can be 
effectively integrated and consistently maintained, As 
shown below, the need to enhance the reliability of the 
whole system by providing recoverability may give an 
additional strong incentive to implement a system in levels. 
This chapter therefore considers the problem of 
extending the recovery block scheme to multi-level systems. 
A full description of recovery block structures has been 
given elsewhere (Ran75), (Hor74). A brief description of the 
working of a recovery block has been given in chapter one, 
An error in a program is either: 
* a breach in the interface rules (such as a division by 
zero) 
* an unsuccessful acceptance test 
* a user call of ERROR. 
Operation ERROR forms part 
facilities. 
of the recovery block 
An error is not necessarily associated with the program 
"detecting" the error. One could say that the underlying 
machine detects a perpetration of a breach in the interface 
rules while the program itself detects an error if an 
acceptance test is unsuccessful or if ERROR is called. This 
chapter however will not be concerned with error 
• • detection; it only deals with mechanisms,that can be used 
for the implementation of recoverable mult~-level system, 
When the objects of a recoverable ~ (i.e. a type for 
which recoverability is provided) are used in a recovery 
block and an error occurs in that recovery block then the 
underlying machine will restore the values of those objects 
to their state when the recovery block was entered. (The 
next alternative of the recovery block will then be invoked 
by the underlying machine,) If a type is not a recoverable 
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type then it is an unrecoverable type. 
Objects of a recoverable type are termed recoverable 
objects and objects of an unrecoverable type are 
unrecoverable objects. Unrecoverable objects are not 
restored when a recovery block alternative is backed out. 
s~ ope:ating on unrecoverable objects inside recovery blocks 
w~ll ~n general lead to unpredictable effects unless 
special precautions are taken. ' 
The term "type" will be used rather loosely in this 
chapter, because if one object is recoverable and another 
object is unrecoverable then they are not of the same type. 
If however, the recoverability/unrecoverability is the only 
difference between two objects then this thesis will refer 
to them as being recoverable and unrecoverable objects of 
the same type. 
If all types in each interface are recoverable in the 
scheme used, then this scheme will be called the Completely 
Recoverable Interface (CRI) scheme. This in fact is the 
sort of scheme describe~by Randell (Ran75). The scheme 
proposed in this thesis is a scheme whereby interfaces 
generally contain recoverable and unrecoverable types and 
will therefore be called the Partially Recoverable Interface 
(PRI) scheme. 
A fault tolerant level is a level which provides new 
recoverable abstract types, thus extending the recovery 
block facilities. Both the type mechanisms and recovery 
mechanisms are provided explicitly. Ways in which this can 
be done are discussed in this chapter. 
A fault tolerant interpreter (as defined by Randell 
(Ran75)) is an interpreter which provides recovery block 
facilities. According to the definition, all of the types in 
the interface provided by this interpreter are recoverable, 
although recoverability is not explicitly associated with 
types, but with "effects" (which can be undone). This 
strict requirement will not be imposed on the definition of 
"fault tolerant interpreter" in this thesis. A fault 
tolerant interpreter may provide an interface with both 
recoverable and unrecoverable types. 
If the interface provided by a level i contains 
recoverable types (and recovery block facilities are 
provided to the user) then the underlying machine of level 
i+l is said to be a fault tolerant machine. This machine is 
in fa~t the full set of levels up to level i. A recoverable 
multi-level system is a multi-level system of whose levels 
one or more are fault tolerant levels. 
A fault tolerant level L implements user operations on 
objects of the provided recoverable and unrecoverable 
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abstract types. If a user operates on such objects i~sice a 
recovery block then level L must be able to undo these 
operations in case an error occurs in the user program. In 
order to be able to do this, level L will have to store 
information about the changing states of the objects such 
that undoing can be performed when necessary. A cache is a 
data structure local to the level (invisible to--rhe user 
running on it) which is used by the level to store such 
information. The cache is said to be associated with the 
user. If the cache is used to undo operations on objects of 
a particular type (which may be a shared resource) then it 
could be said to be associated with the type. Although 
recovery in this thesis is associated with the types 
provided to the user, caches will be said to be associated 
with users, to indicate that the undoing is done on behalf 
of users; the caches are used to restore user objects in 
order to back out the users. 
Several variant implementations of a particular fault 
tolerant interpreter have been described elsewhere (AnK76), 
(Hor74), (Ran75). In those implementations recoverability is 
provided for program variables. When a variable which is 
not a local variable ~n the current recovery block ~s 
updated inside an alternative for the first time, then the 
interpreter will record its old value in the cache. 
The phrase ~~ cache ~ o?eration will be used in this 
thesis to denote the maintain~ng of sufficient information 
in the cache, by the fault tolerant level, in order to be 
able to undo the effects of the combination of that 
operation and all of the previous operations on the same 
object in the current recovery block, should this be 
necessary. Processing the cache of a level is the act of 
restoring of the user's--objects or -the recoverable types 
provided by that level, to the (abstract) states they were 
in before the current recovery block was entered. This 
chapter will not distinguish between the various different 
schemes that could be used to achieve this restoring. 
Examples have been described elsewhere (AnK76), (Hor74), 
(Von76). Processing the cache in those examples means 
simply using the cache to restore the old values of objects 
that have been updated in the alternative being backed out, 
and subsequently removing the relevant entries (made in the 
current recovery block) from the cache. 
The cache in a level could also consist of, for 
example, a list of entries as maintained in System R 
(Ast76), a data base system, for the backing out of 
transformations. For every operation performed during a 
transaction an entry is made, which consists of suf:icient 
information to undo the operation performed. Process~ng the 
cache then consists of processing this ordered list of 
entries in reverse order, to undo the operations performed 
during the transactions. The cache could also be a means of 
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holding conventional checkpoints (i.e. copies of the entire 
state), or more exactly. of all objects which could be 
modified. 
3,3 Basic principles 
This chapter is based on the following principles: 
1, Recovery lS provided for types. 
Whenever an object of a particular recoverable type is 
to be restored then: 
a, the abstract state of the object at the time the 
current recovery block was entered lS known, 
b. the present state is known (which may be useful for 
efficient state restoration), and 
c. this (and only this) knowledge is used to restore 
the state of the object. 
This is very different from the principles discussed 
and used in a scheme described by Banatre and 
Shrivastava (BaS77) where recovery is provided for 
operations rather than for types. Every operation 
performed may cause a corresponding reverse operation 
to be performed when backing out is done. (This could 
be said to be a "reversed-audit-trail" scheme.) 
2. In general interfaces will contain recoverable and 
unrecoverable types. 
A level implements new abstract types in terms of 
recoverable or unrecoverable types or a combination of 
both. This is different from the original view of 
recovery blocks and multi-level systems (Ran75), where 
in each interface every operation and type was 
recoverable. The fact that input/output operations. 
for example, in the implemented fault tolerant 
interpreter originally were unrecoverable, was regarded 
as a deficiency or incompleteness of the system. 
3, If a program operates on objects of unrecoverable types 
inside a recovery block then it will be the 
responsibility of that program to make sure that no 
inconsistencies or other problems arise if an 
alternative of the recovery block is backed out and the 
program continues with the next alternative. 
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4. If a level L consists of a set of procedures providi~g 
new abstract types which are mapped onto recoverable 
types, then there is no need for this level to 
explicitly provide recoverablity (i.e. implement a 
cacheing mechanism) for these new types. If the level 
L+l program (which invokes procedures of level L) 
generates an error, then the objects used for the 
representations of objects of types provided by L ~ill 
be automatically restored (by the underlying machine of 
L). (See also Fig.3.6, where level i maps objects of 
types Tl, .•. ,Tn, on recoverable objects of types tl, 
••• ,tm; an error in level i+l causes the underlying 
machine of level i to restore objects of types tl, ... , 
tm. thus restoring objects of types Tl, ,Tn.) 
Procedures implementing operations on objects of types 
provided by level L may be invoked from inside a 
recovery block in level L+l. Levels are levels of 
abstraction so the underlying machine of level L ~ill 
also restore level L+l. So the values of the objects of 
the abstract types used in level L+l will be restored 
if the underlying machine of level L restores level L. 
In this case recovery is provided implicitly for the 
new abstract types provided by L. 
There are, however, two good reasons for building 
multi-level systems consisting of levels that 
explicitly provide recoverability (i.e. by performing 
cacheing) for the new abstract types they implement. 
These reasons are: 
a. Flexibility and efficiency in restoring the state 
of the machine as seen by the user. 
A level providing a new type can take advantage of 
the fact that more than one concrete representation 
may exist for a particular abstract state of the 
machine as seen by the user. For example, in a 
level concerned with the management of buffers it 
may not always be necessary to restore exactly the 
contents of all of the buffers in order to undo 
buffer management operations. 
b. Recovery for concurrent processes. 
In some cases when concurrent processes share data 
or acquire and release resources, "it may be 
impossible to continue usefully by restoring the 
concrete representations of the abstract types 
(except at prohibitive penalty). However, this ~s 
outside the scope of this thesis and is the top~c 
of ongoing research discussed elsewhere (BaS77), 
(MeS77), (RLT77). 
3.4 Completely recoverable interfaces 
The multi-level systems considered in this section 
consist of levels that explicitly provide recoverability for 
all types in every interface (such levels are CRI-levels). 
These systems are in fact the sort of systems described by 
Randell (Ran75); every interface contains recoverable types 
only, and when an alternative of a recovery block in a 
program is backed out then the state of the machine as seen 
by that program will be restored completely to what it was 
just before the alternative was entered. 
The recoverable multi-level systems described in this 
section consist of levels which are fault tolerant 
interpreters (all of which provide recoverable types only). 
It will be shown that using interpreter levels is the only 
way in which the CRI-scheme can be implemented if different 
levels provide recovery for the new types explicitly. The 
reasons for describing the CRI-scheme are to give the reader 
an introduction and a better insight into the general 
concepts of recoverable multi-level systems. Everything in 
the CRI-scheme is easy to understand and very 
straightforward; a description of the CRI-scheme serves as a 
good introduction to the (more realistic and more 
sophisticated) PRI-scheme. 
3.4.1 Level: programs ~ ~ objects 
A CRI-level provides recovery block facilities and 
performs cacheing, as necessary, for all of the types it 
supports. These new recoverable types are mapped by the 
level onto recoverable types of the underlying machine. 
Since all types in all interfaces are recoverable, the 
local program data of a level L, including data structures 
used for the cache maintained by this level will be 
recoverable. The level itself is a set of programs written 
to run on another fault tolerant level (except perhaps a 
"bottom level", which can for that reason not use recovery 
blocks and be backed out if an error occurs). Consequently 
programs in this level L, which run on an underlying fault 
tolerant machine, can also use recovery blocks. If a program 
in level L (see Fig.3.2) generates an error and is backed 
out then all of the operations on objects used by that 
program will be undone by the recovery mechanism (which is 
termed "UNDO") in the lower level. The lower level UNDO 
undoes all of the operations performed on the cache (in 
level L) associated with the user, locally used data, and 
all operations on data used for the representation of user 
data. The program being backed out generally implements 
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(part of) a transformation in the next level up 
level). When a program in level L is backed out, 
alternative of its recovery block will be invoked. 
alternative will then try to implement something 
of the user, in an alternative way. 
(the user 
the next 
This next 
on behalf 
This can be illustrated by the following example (see 
Fig.3.3): 
* Suppose that a user uses a complex number C1 which has a 
value 1,3. The user then uses complex operation ADD 
to add the constant 5,4 to C1 inside a recovery block. 
* The level below the users level, the complex level, 
represents CI by reals R1 and R2. Before the user 
updates CI, RI has value I and R2 has value 3. The 
complex level interpretes the user's add-instruction by 
updating RI and R2, which will be given values 6 and 7 
respectively. Since the user makes the update inside a 
recovery block, the complex level will cache this by 
storing tuples RI,I and R2,3 in its cache. The 
complex level uses reals RIOO, RIOI, RI02 and so on, as 
cache. The interpretation of the user's add-instruction 
is done by a program called ADD COMPLEX in the complex 
level, which itself uses two diIferent recovery blocks 
in which it updates RI and R2 (see Fig.3.3). 
* The level below the complex level, the word level, 
represents reals RI and R2 by words WI and W2 and reals 
RIOO, RIOI, RI02 and so on, by words WID, WII, Wl2 and 
so on. Assignments to reals performed in the complex 
level are interpreted in the word level, by program 
ASSIGN REAL. Since the complex level updates the two 
reals of the complex to be updated, inside recovery 
blocks in ADD COMPLEX, the word level will cache the 
changes made to reals RI, R2, RIOO, RIOI, RI02 and so 
on. The word level uses words WIOO, WIOI, WI02 and so 
on, as cache. 
USER 
OBJECTS 
.. 
· . 
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Fig.3.2, A CRI multi-level system. 
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TOLERANT 
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CI:=(1,3) 
C I: =ADD (C I, (5,4) ) ; 
CI 
. 
. 
" ADD COMPLEX 
.. 
[UPDATE_REAL (.) 
UPDATE REAL 
~PDATE_REAL (.) CACHE REAL REAL 
--
.~.-"-. '-. 
I 
V . R2~ 
, 
. 
ASSI _ CACHE_ 
cache 
l. 
RI02 
RIOl 
RlOO 
" ' 
. 
, 
I 
, 
USER 
L.t:'?EL 
COt-1PLEX 
LEVEL 
WORD 
Li~\rEL 
r;JO .. . cache 
( ._, - '_"). _0, 
r 
.-
. 
, , 
Y , I j,:. f. V 
W2...-' ~ WIO,WII,WI2, .. 
Fig.3.3, An example of a CRI-multi-level 
system, providing "complex" data. 
Where: 
WI02 
WIOI 
WIOO 
___ ~) denotes: program i nvokat ion 
, , , .. "~ denotes: type mappi ng (representati on) 
-' - '" denotes: f'rogram uses data poi nted at 
* 
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The following sequences of states are now possible if 
no errors occur: 
1 
before 
ADD 
Cl 1,3 
Rl 1 
R2 3 
cache empty 
Wl 1 
W2 3 
W10 0 
Wll 0 
W12 0 
W13 0 
cache empty 
where 
2 3 4 
after after out 
first first first 
ASSIGN CACHE rec. 
REAL 
-
und 
6 
3 
empty 
6 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Wl,l 
@Ri 
und 
REAL block 
-
und und 
6 6 
3 3 
Rl,l Rl,l 
6 6 
3 3 
@Rl @Rl 
1 1 
0 0 
0 0 
Wll,O 
W1O,O 
Wl,l empty 
address of Ri 
undefined. 
5 6 7 8 
after after after after 
2nd. 2nd. ADD user 
ASSIGN CACHE COHPLEX rec. 
REAL REAL block 
und und 6,7 6,7 
6 6 6 6 
7 7 7 7 
R2,3 R2,3 
Rl,l Rl,l Rl,l empty 
6 6 6 6 
7 7 7 7 
@Rl @Rl @Rl 0 
1 1 1 0 
0 @R2 @R2 0 
° 
3 3 0 
Wll,O 
W1O,O 
W2,3 \-12,3 empty empty 
Fig.3.4, A sequence of states that could occur in 
the system of Fig.3.3. 
If an error occurs in the user 
instruction, but before the user 
(situation 7), then the complex 
restore situation 1. 
program after the ADD 
recovery block is left 
level uses its cache to 
* If an error occurs in the complex level in ADD COMPLEX 
inside the second recovery block, just after the return 
from CACHE REAL (situation 6) then the following 
sequence of- states will be gone through if the second 
alternative of that recovery block performs the same 
operations and no subsequent errors occur: 
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6 9 10 11 12 13 
after after after after after after 
2nd. error 2nd. 2nd. ADD user 
CACHE in ADD ASSIGN CACHE COHPLE}I rec. 
.-REAL COMPLEX REAL REAL block 
- -
Cl und und und und 6.7 6 , 7 
Rl 6 6 6 6 6 6 
R2 7 3 7 7 7 7 
R2 , 3 R2.3 R2.3 
cache Rl,l Rl,l Rl.l Rl,l Rl.l empty 
Wi 6 6 6 6 6 6 
W2 7 3 7 7 7 7 
W10 @Rl @Rl @Rl @Rl @Rl 0 
W11 1 1 1 1 1 0 
W12 @R2 
° 
0 @R2 @R2 
° W12 3 0 0 3 3 
° 
Wll,O Wll.O 
W1O,O W1O,a 
cache W2.3 empty W2.3 W2.3 empty empty 
Fig.3.S. A sequence of states that could occur ~n 
the system of Fig.3.3. 
* If an error occurs in the user level in situations 8 or 
13 then the user program will be aborted. 
Summarising. the following characteristics of a level 
in a CRI multi-level system are important: 
* A fault tolerant level distinguishes its data between: 
Data used to represent the objects of the new 
abstract types provided. 
A cache associated with the user. 
Local data used in and by this level such as: work 
data. housekeeping data. 
* 
* 
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The underlying machine of a level L (see also Fig.3.2) 
will restore objects used inside a recovery block if an 
error occurs in that level. In other words an er-ror in 
level L invokes the lower level UNDO which restores all 
data operated upon in level L (i.e. cache, local cata 
and other objects of types tl, ••• ,tn used to represent 
user objects). 
If an error occurs inside a recovery block in a user's 
program interpreted by a level L, then this level will 
use the cache which it associates with that user to undo 
the operations on objects performed by the user inside 
that recovery block. Level L maps these user objects on 
lower level objects. Consequently it will change those 
lower level objects such that the user's view of these 
data is restored to what it was before he entered his 
current recovery block. Since it is the user's program 
that is to be backed out, this does not necessarily mean 
that the objects used for the representation of objects 
of the newly provided type have to be restored by this 
level exactly as they were when the user program entered 
its recovery block. In other words there may be ~any 
representations of the same state of the machine as seen 
by the user. A level may take advantage of this when 
backing out a user program. Backing out of a user 
program is normal progress of level L. 
An example of operations on a level, implementing a 
recoverable buffer management system, illustrates this: 
Suppose that a user has available a buffer A. He then 
enters a recovery block and subsequently: 
- claims a buffer B 
- claims a buffer C 
- updates buffer A 
- updates buffer B 
- updates buffer C 
- releases buffer C 
If subsequently an error occurs, these operations have 
to be undone. The buffer management level can undo 
these operations by performing the following operations: 
- free buffer B 
- undo the updating of buffer A. 
If recovery would have been provided at a lower level of 
abstraction, say at the word level, then the buffers A,B 
and C would have been restored completely, thus 
requiring more recovery data (cached data) and more 
processing for recovery. The more abstract buffer 
management level can take advantage of the knowledge it 
has about the use of these buffers and the different 
states of the core areas which represent the same state 
of the buffers as seen by the user. So, for example, the 
contents of a released buffer do not matter, so buffer C 
can remain unaltered and B only has to be released. 
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If an error occurs inside a level and there is no 
containing recovery block then that will lead to the 
abandonment of this level and with it any higher levels. It 
is up to the next level down, which deals with the error to 
decide what to do next. ' 
If a program in a level exhausts all of its 
alternatives then that means that it fails to interpret (a 
part of) the user's program successfully. Consequently a 
sensible last alternative of the programs in a level, would 
be to back out the user of that level and see if the next 
alternative of the user's program will be more successful. 
Obviously this will only have a chance of success if that 
user's program happens to be inside a recovery block (and 
not in the last alternative of that recovery block). A 
similar technique has been employed in a fault tolerant 
interpreter which was implemented at Newcastle (AnK76). 
3.4.2 Interpreters for CRI-Ievels 
In order to show 
recovery for new types, 
interpreter rather than 
following situation: 
why a level providing explicit 
under the CRI-scheme, has to be an 
a set of procedures, consider the 
Suppose that a level i is a set of procedures that do 
not implement all of the types in the new interface (see 
Fig.3.6). An error in level i+l will require the processing 
of the cache in level i, for the restoring of values of 
objects of the newly provided types. This error will also 
require backing out by the underlying machine of level i, 
for the restoring of the values of objects of all the other 
types used in level i+l. In other words an error in level 
i+l invokes the UNDO of level i and the UNDO in the 
underlying machine. The UNDO in level i restores values of 
types Tl, .•. ,Tn, while the UNDO of the underlying machine 
restores objects of types tl, ... ,tn. The UNDO in level i 
only operates on objects of types tl, ••• ,tm, which are 
used to represent objects of types Tl, ••. ,Tn. The UNDO of 
the underlying machine will operate on objects used to 
represent objects of types tl, ... ,tm used in levels i and 
i+l, in order to restore all objects of types tl, ••. ,tm 
used. This, however, means that the whole cacheing in level 
i has no effect with respect to the restoration of the 
states of objects in level i+l, because the underlying 
machine of level i will restore the level i+l objects of the 
newly provided types anyway (by restoring the objects onto 
which they are mapped). Thus there is no need to do any 
cacheing in a procedural level in a CRI-system. Such a leve~ 
cannot even provide explicit recovery and therefore level 1 
would have to be an interpreter-level in order to make the 
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explicit restoring of level i+l objects of the new types, by 
level i, possible. Explicit recovery is only performed by 
the interpreter levels in a CRI-system. 
If level i consists of a set of procedures then the 
processing of the cache in level i would be useful, i: level 
i provided recoverable types by using unrecoverable types of 
the underlying machine. The rest of this chapter will 
discuss this feature in greater detail. 
O,(tl, 
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__ ~ERROR 
,tm) 02(Tl, ,Tn) 
. . 
• 
-----UN D 0 ~~I ___ -I 
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Fig. 3.6, A procedural level in a CRI system. 
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3.5 The disadvantages 2f completely recoverab~ interfaces 
There are major disadvantages in building recoverable 
multi-Ieve~ systems in the manner just described. In order 
to illustrate these disadvantages an example will be used. 
Consider a level in a multi-level system. implementing 
a filing system and providing recoverable files which it 
maps onto recoverable disk pages in the underlying machi~e. 
The filing system will then use the available set of 
recoverable disk pages both for storing files and for 
cacheing purposes. Suppose that the lower level, the device 
access level, provides a set of recoverable disk pages which 
it maps onto recoverable disk blocks. This lower level then 
needs separate disk blocks for representing the provided 
recoverable disk pages and for cacheing purposes. 
Now consider the following situation (see also 
Fig.3.7): a user has a file called FILEI. which consists of 
three data pages PI, P2 and P3. in which the user data are 
stored. The user calls ,from inside a recovery block, a 
standard procedure CONVERT to alter all occurences of a 
character A into a character B. The filing system then 
changes pages Pl. P2 and P3 and caches these changes, which 
implies, in this case. that pages P4. P5 and P6 are used to 
keep the previous values of PI, P2 and P3. Pages P4, P5 and 
P6 are thus part of the cache maintained by the filing 
system. The device access level, which maps pages on real 
disk blocks, updates blocks BLI to BL6 when the filing 
system updates pages PI to P6. If the filing system updates 
PI to P6 inside a recovery block then the device access 
level will cache the updates made to BLI to BL6 by placing 
the previous values of BLl to BL6 into, say, BL7 to BL12. 
which are part of the cache. So eventually 9 extra disk 
blocks are needed to update a file consisting of 3 disk 
blocks. 
Thus. in general. this scheme results in a fairly 
substantial loss of hardware resources. A big overhead (in 
time) due to cacheing will also occur. If a user operation 
would normally cost three disk writes (in a system that does 
not support recoverability) then a recoverable filing system 
may interpret this particular disk write as six disk writes 
and the device access level may interpret this as twelve 
disk writes. Thus in order to let the user write three file 
pages inside a recovery block. the whole system may have to 
do many extra disk writes. 
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Thus the major disadvantages of the scheme are: 
1. A loss in hardware resources: the user of the system 
can only use a small part of the resources. 
2. A loss. in efficiency: the system may spend most of its 
time performing cacheing rather than actually 
performing the operations on behalf of the user that 
would happen in a non-recoverable system. 
So even if a multi-level system consisting of 
interpreters is wanted, as for example in an APL system as 
described by Randell (Ran75), then the extra overhead in the 
total system incurred by implementing fault tolerant 
interpreters in every level and using recovery blocks in 
every level, may be enormous. However, in general one would 
not always want to build a multi-level system using an 
interpreter for each level (as is required for the 
implementation of the eRI-scheme); so the approach is 
unrealistic anyway. It is clear that an alternative 
approach is required, if levels in a multi-level syste~ are 
to provide recoverable types explicitly. 
The major advantage of the eRI-scheme is that there are 
no problems in providing high reliability, because recovery 
blocks can be used in every level (except perhaps ~n a 
"bottom level"). It may, however be possible that 
reliability is adversely affected by the fact that much 
extra work is to be done. 
3.5.1 An alternative eRI-scheme: "bottom level" recovery 
Because of the disadvantages of the scheme described, 
it may seem sensible to consider the following scheme to 
implement a recoverable multi-level system, consisting of 
interpreters, more efficiently: 
Only the "bottom level" (i. e. the first software level) 
is a fault tolerant level providing recoverability as 
described in the previous section (by implementing a cache 
mechanism and providing a recovery block structure). 
Recoverability provided by all of the higher levels is based 
on "bottom level" recovery ("bottom level" objects are 
restored to restore all objects of types in higher levels.). 
Since the levels are interpreters, the implementation of 
this scheme is not a trivial exercise. The interpreter must 
interpret the entering of a recovery block in the next level 
up (i.e. the program being interpreted) by entering a 
recovery block itself. Similarly an error in the program 
being interpreted will have to cause the interpreter to 
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generate an error itself, thus causing the "concrete 
machine" to be restored and with it the program being 
interpreted. There is also the complication of ensuring 
that the user's next alternative is entered. 
Altho~gh the disadvantages mentioned above are not 
present under this scheme, the two major advantages of 
providing recovery explicitly (i.e. recovery can be provided 
more efficiently and recovery may be possible for parallel 
processes by providing the recovery at a higher, more 
abstract, level) in different levels are not present under 
the scheme either. 
For this reason the alternative scheme to provide 
recoverable multi-level systems, as described here, is not 
satisfactory. 
3.6 Partially recoverable interfaces 
A level in a partially recoverable interface (PRI) 
multi-level system provides a new interface with, in 
general, both recoverable and unrecoverable types. Any of 
these types can be mapped onto recoverable types, 
unrecoverable types or even a combination of both (although 
no useful application of such a mapping has yet been found). 
An example is given below to show that the provision of 
recoverable types by mapping them on unrecoverable types can 
be very efficient, in time and space. 
Suppose that a new level implements a filing system 
providing recoverable files (see Fig.3.8). These files are 
mapped onto unrecoverable disk pages of the underlying 
machine. The two disadvantages of the CRI-scheme described 
previously are avoided for the following obvious reason. 
Lower levels only provide unrecoverable disk pages so no 
cacheing will be done in lower levels if disk page 
operations are done for the implementation of file 
operations. Only the filing system performs cacheing for 
files or disk pages. Thus the loss of hardware resources 
and overhead in time, due to cacheing in subsequent levels, 
1S restricted to a minimum. 
If a user program generates an error (see Fig.3.8) then 
the UNDO of the filing system (the procedural level) will be 
invoked to restore files and the UNDO of the underlying 
fault tolerant machine will be invoked to restore all of the 
other recoverable user objects. 
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Efficient state restoration, as is possible under the 
eRI-scheme, is also possible under the PRI-scheme. For 
example, the filing system above can provide recoverability 
for files efficiently. The filing system can take advantage 
of the knowledge that many representations exist for one 
state of the filing system as seen by the user (see also the 
filing system described in chapter four). The filing system 
may therefore have a more efficient way of restoring the 
user's view of the files than just restoring all of the 
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modified disk blocks. For example, the values of free pages 
do not have to be restored (as with the buffer managemen: 
example). 
As described previously, there is in general no point 
in implementing a new recoverable type (and implementing a 
cache to undo operations performed on objects of this type) 
if this type is mapped onto recoverable types by a set of 
procedures. Mapping a new recoverable type onto other 
recoverable types will only make sense if the level 
providing this new type actually implements all of the types 
in the new interface and implements a new recovery block 
structure, so the underlying machine will not have to do any 
backing out if the user generates an error. Having to map 
recoverable types on unrecoverable types in a procedural 
level is, in the view of the author, not such a severe 
restriction in general, because in many systems no further 
abstraction of types file, buffer or lineprinter, for 
example, are made on top of levels implementing the filing 
system, buffer management or lineprinter package 
respectively. If further abstractions are made then they can 
generally be made by a set of procedures without providing 
recovery for the new abstract type explicitly; the recovery 
of the new abstract type can be based on the recovery 
provided for the types used in its representation. If 
further abstraction is to be made such that recoverability 
for the new type is to be provided explicitly, then there 
are basically two solutions: 
1. Use an interpreter. 
This could, for example, be done in a recoverable data 
base query system, implemented using recoverable files. 
2. Use unrecoverable objects to construct the new 
recoverable type. 
As will be seen, it is generally necessary to be able 
to provide unrecoverable objects of the same types as 
the recoverable types provided. In that case the data 
base query system could be a set of procedures mapping 
a recoverable data base onto unrecoverable files. 
Finally it is worth mentioning another good reason for 
providing some unrecoverable types (i.e. another good reason 
for PRI-interfaces) or types of which both recoverable and 
unrecoverable objects can be allocated, namely for debugging 
purposes. Suppose, for example, that the programmer of a 
system notices that the first alternative of a recovery 
block in a system fails occasionally (this can be seen from 
the error log that is maintained). If the programmer wants 
to write values of variables and messages to a special file 
in order to track down the error, the file must obviously be 
non-recoverable. In general, unrecoverable objects will be 
needed to monitor the software. 
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This section has shown that there is a case for using 
the PRI-scheme rather than the CRI-scheme. The next section 
will describe the problems and constraints of this scheme. 
3.7 ~ problems and constraints £! the PRI-scheme 
If a given level is a set of procedures providing new 
types and mapping these types onto unrecoverable types then 
these procedures in this level will operate on objects of 
these unrecoverable types. If a user (in the next level up) 
generates an error then the given level will restore all the 
objects of the recoverable types it provides while the 
underlying machine will restore all the other user objects 
of recoverable types. However, if programs in the given 
level use recovery blocks then their operations on objects 
of unrecoverable types will not be undone when a program in 
the given level is backed out. 
For example, a user program running on a level that 
implements a recoverable filing system by mapping files onto 
unrecoverable disk pages, may use filing system operations 
inside recovery blocks. If an error is subsequently 
generated (see also Fig.3.8) then the filing system will 
restore files and none of the levels below the filing system 
level will restore anything used for the representation of 
files (i.e. disk pages). 
If, however, an error is generated by a program in the 
filing system then the operations on (unrecoverable) disk 
pages performed by that program cannot be undone. So if 
filing system programs do use operations on unrecoverable 
disk pages inside a recovery block, then the effects of 
these operations will not be undone when an alternative of a 
recovery block is backed out. However, if these filing 
system programs were not allowed to perform operations on 
disk pages inside recovery blocks then that would be a 
restriction which defeats the aim of building a reliable 
system by using recovery blocks in programs. There is 
always the possibility of errors occuring inside procedures 
of the filing system, so recoverability for disk pages, 
inside the filing system procedures, would be valuable. 
It is therefore reasonable for the procedures to be able to 
use recoverable disk pages (for their own purposes). 
Consequently, there seems to be a dilemma, because the 
underlying machine must provide unrecoverable disk pages for 
other reasons. 
To cope with this problem a new mechanism has been 
developed, which is described in this section. The general 
problems and constraints of PRI-levels, where unrecoverable 
types and recoverable types are used, are described. 
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l.L.l ~ logging mechanism 
If a program operates on objects of unrecoverable types 
and does so inside a recovery block, then it is that 
program's own responsibility to make sure that it can 
continue usefully if it is backed out and forced into its 
next alternative. 
Programs that use objects of unrecoverable types inside 
a recovery block have to restore these objects themselves if 
this is required, inside the next alternative. This, 
however, is not the way in which recovery blocks are 
intended to be used. Also, if the next alternative has to 
undo the actions of the previous alternative explicitly then 
this undoing may well be incomplete or incorrect. 
Consequently it is preferable to devise a mechanism with 
which it could be automated. 
What is required is that whenever operations on objects 
of unrecoverable types are performed inside a recovery block 
(see also Fig.3.9) these operations have 
1. to know that they are inside a recovery block, 
2. to record sufficient information in a local "cache" in 
order to be able to undo the effects of operations on 
objects of unrecoverable types. This cache is local to 
the programs operating on the unrecoverable types and 
is not associated with the user, because this local 
cache provides recovery for these programs, rather than 
for the user. 
This local cache is called ~, to distinguish it from 
the cache which is used to denote the mechanism used to 
restore objects of recoverable types provided to the user 
(i.e. the next level). 
A special mechanism 
achieve these goals. The 
mechanism (see Fig.3.9), 
follows: 
has been designed in order to 
mechanism is called the logging 
its basic principles being as 
1. Whenever unrecoverable types are operated upon, these 
operations are logged (by the programs that invoke the 
operations) in order to make possible the restoration 
of the states of these types to the states they were in 
when the recovery block was entered. This logging is 
done in the same way as cacheing, only logging is on 
behalf of the programs themselves, while cacheing is 
done on behalf of the next level up. Logging is for 
programmed recovery, cacheing is for automatic recovery 
for the next level up. 
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2. An ENTER-procedure is provided to initialise the 
logging mechanism when a recovery block is entered. 
This could for example include the placing of a barrier 
in the log (similar to cache-marks (Hor74)) and perhaps 
the increasing of a global variable such as 
"curre.nt-level" to indicate the level of nesting of 
recovery blocks. 
3. An UNDO-procedure is provided to process the log and 
undo operations performed on objects of unrecoverable 
types such that the program can continue sensibly if 
that program is to be backed out. 
4. An ACCEPT-procedure is provided to process the log (and 
objects of unrecoverable types if necessary) after a 
recovery block in a program (using these objects of 
unrecoverable types) is exited successfully. (See also 
the filing system described in a following chapter.) 
The basic idea is that programs operating on 
unrecoverable types can specify a new recovery block 
mechanism which is the original one extended with the 
automatic invocation of ENTER, ACCEPT and UNDO at the 
appropriate places. The way in which this could be 
implemented depends on the architecture of the underlying 
machine and the high level language compilers available. 
Using this concept an error generated in a program (see 
also Fig.3.9) causes the UNDO of the underlying machine to 
restore all recoverable objects and the UNDO-procedure 
operating on the log in the same level as the program, to 
restore unrecoverable objects used. 
One way in which this could be implemented in, for 
example, a SIMULA-like language is by including the ENTER, 
UNDO and ACCEPT procedures in classes providing new 
(recoverable) types, which are mapped onto unrecoverable 
types. The operations on the new type could be made to 
perform logging. The underlying machine could then provide a 
facility whereby it executes these three procedures when 
necessary as part of the recovery block processing for 
programs that use this class as a prefix. 
A very similar concept is used for cacheing elsewhere 
(BaS77) to invoke reverse-procedures of previously executed 
operations, that are part of a resource allocation 
mechanism. This implementation requires a mechanism provided 
by the underlying machine whereby a (compiled) program can 
specify reverse-procedures to be executed in case of a 
subsequent error occuring in the current recovery block. 
A second way in which this logging mechanism could be 
implemented is by enveloping the given alternatives of 
recovery blocks by these three procedures in the proper 
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manner, (What this involves is shown in the next section,) 
This enveloping could be done by a compiler, 
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In principle there is very little difference between 
these two implementations. In the first implementation the 
underlying machine invokes the UNDO-procedure when a progran 
is backed out, while in the second case the code is 
organised in such a way that ll{DO is executed after an 
alternative has been backed out. and before the next 
alternative is invoked. Similarly ENTER and ACCEPT are 
invoked at the appropriate places. 
The second implementation is used in this section to 
illustrate the logging mechanism. A multi-level system ~n 
which this implementation has been used is described in 
section 3.8. 
3.7.1.1 An implementation ~ ~ logging mechanism 
It is assumed that the underlying machine provides 
recovery block facilities. These facilities are used to 
provide an augmented recovery block mechanism (see 
Fig.3.l0). This new recovery block mechanism envelops the n 
alternatives of a recovery block given by the user. In doing 
so the mechanism forms (n+l) new alternatives out of the n 
user alternatives. The way in which this is done is 
described below (the ENTER, ACCEPT and ll{DO-procedures 
associated with the unrecoverable types are called E~TER UR, 
ACCEPT UR and UNDO_UR respectively), and shown in Fig.3.To : 
1. The first operation in the second through last 
alternatives will be the UNDO UR operation which, using 
the log, undoes the effects of operations on 
unrecoverable types performed in the previously 
executed alternative. 
2. The first operation in the first alternative and second 
operation in the second through last alternative is the 
ENTER UR operation which tells this PRI-level that a 
new aTternative is entered. 
3. The next operation in each new alternative is the 
invocation of the user defined alternative. 
4. The next operation in each new alternative is the 
invocation of the user defined acceptance test. The 
result is stored in the local variable b. 
5. The last operation in each new alternative is the 
execution of ACCEPT UR if and only if b is true. 
ACCEPT UR takes the appropriate actions on the log and 
unrecoverable data after a successful acceptance test. 
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6. An extra new alternative, alternative (n+l), is 
constructed consisting of 1~DO UR followed by an 
operation that sets b to false. 
The new recovery block structure passes the variable b 
and the ne~ (n+l) alternatives as the acceptance test and 
the alternatives to the original recovery block structure 
provided by the underlying machine. The new recovery block 
structure is thereby provided. In order to show how the 
mechanism works the structure of the code at run time 
providing the new recovery block structure 1S sho~~ 1n 
Fig.3.l0 using a BCPL-like (Ric69) notation. 
A compiler for a SIMULA-like language could produce 
"object" code which would basically look like the code shown 
in Fig.3.l0. The notation in a SIMULA-like language that 
could be used to implement a level providing a recoverable 
filing system mapping recoverable files onto unrecoverable 
disk pages provided by a class "disk system" is shown in 
Fig.3.ll. The recovery class, as the level is called, would 
be used as a prefix by programs wanting to use the 
recoverable filing system. The compiler would envelop the 
users recovery block alternatives with the enter, accept and 
undo procedure as shown in Fig.3.l0. User programs could use 
the filing system operations such as create file and 
read file. 
If all of the programs operating on the unrecoverable 
types now use this new recovery block structure instead of 
the one provided by the underlying machine, then the undoing 
of the effects of operations on unrecoverable types is 
provided as necessary. 
When programs operate on unrecoverable types they must 
make entries in their log if these operations are performed 
inside a recovery block. Whether or not an operation is 
performed inside a recovery block can be checked by testing 
a variable" current level" which is maintained by ENTER UR, 
UNDO UR and ACCEPT DR. -
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~ RECOVERY_BLOCK_NEW(origAT.origaltl •..•• origaltn) be 
£( let b = undefined; 
Tet newaltl be 
-£ ( ENTER UR; 
. origaltl; 
b := origAT; 
if b then ACCEPT_UR; 
£) -
let newalt2 be 
-£( UNDO UR; 
ENTER UR; 
origalt2; 
b := origAT; 
£) 
if b then ACCEPT_UR; 
let newaltn be 
-£( UNDO UR; 
ENTER UR; 
origaltn; 
b := origAT; 
£) 
if b then ACCEPT_UR; 
let newaltn 1 be 
-£( UNDO UR;-
b :=-false 
£) 
let newat = valof £( resultis b £) 
RECOVERY_BLOCK(newat.newaltl •...• newaltn.newaltn_l) 
£) 
where: RECOVERY BLOCK(AT.altl •.••• altn) is the 
block structure provided by the underlying 
AT is the acceptance test and altl to altn 
alternatives. 
recovery 
machine. 
are the 
Fig.3.l0: ~ ~ recovery block structure ~!£!.~ 
logging mechanism. 
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recovery class filing system: 
begin integer array cache(l:length): 
integer current_level; 
enter procedure 
begin 
end 
Fig. 3.11: 
accept procedure 
~ procedure 
procedure create_file(f, •.. ); 
procedure read_file(f, ••• ); 
A "recovery class" in a SIMULA-like 
as could be used to implement 
providing a new recoverable type. 
end 
end 
begin 
end 
begin 
end 
begin 
end 
notation, 
a level 
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3.7.1.2 The relation between the logging and ~ caching 
mechanism 
The logging performed in a level is different fro~ 
cacheing, which is done on behalf of the user, in the sense 
that entries are put in the cache associated with the user 
if the user is inside a recovery block, while entries are 
put in the log if the level itself is inside a recovery 
block. Logging in a level has nothing at all to do with a 
user. Logging is for the PRI-level program's own benefit 
since it is knowingly using unrecoverable objects within a 
recovery block. 
If a fault tolerant level maps a newly provided 
recoverable type T onto unrecoverable types (tl, ,tn) 
then a cache is maintained in order to be able to undo user 
operations on objects of type T (see also Fig.3.12). This 
cacheing will be done in terms of objects of types (tl, •.. , 
tn). In the same way in which information is stored in the 
cache, to enable undoing on behalf of the user. information 
can be stored in the log. to enable undoing on behalf of the 
level using unrecoverable types itself. A fault tolerant 
level will check before it performs an assignment (on 
objects used for the representation of recoverable user 
types) whether cacheing is required; in the same way it can 
check whether logging is required (when operating on 
unrecoverable objects, which mayor may not be used for the 
representation of user objects). Also. similar procedures 
ENTER, ACCEPT and UNDO can be used by this level when a user 
enters a recovery block or a program inside this level 
enters a recovery block. when a user passes an acceptance 
test or a program inside this level does. or when a user 
fails an acceptance test or a program inside this level 
does, respectively. For cacheing purposes these procedures 
operate on the cache, for logging purposes they operate on 
the log. 
When a user (see Fig.3.l2) generates an error, the 
UNDO cache in the PRI-level is invoked to restore objects of 
type-T and the UNDO of the underlying machine is invoked to 
restore the rest of the recoverable user objects. lfuen a 
program in the PRI-1evel generates an error, the UNDO_log in 
the same PRI-level is invoked to restore the unrecoverable 
objects operated upon and the UNDO of the underlying fault 
tolerant machine is invoked to restore the recoverable 
objects operated upon by that program. 
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In the special case where a level satisfies the 
following three conditions: 1) the level is a set of 
procedures providing new recoverable types for which it 
provides recovery explicitly. 2) these types are mapped onto 
unrecoverable types of the underlying machine and 3) the 
level does not use unrecoverable types for any other purpose 
but to represent this new recoverable type. then the logging 
and cacheing mechanisms can be combined into one mechanism 
which serves both purposes. In that case the new recovery 
block structure provided by the logging mechanism will also 
be used by the next level as the recovery block structure 
(see also Fig.3.l3). Such a level is called a recoverable 
~ manager. So a recoverable type manager provides 
recoverable types which it maps on unrecoverable types and 
also uses the recovery mechanisms that are used to provide 
the recovery for the user types. for its own purposes. (A 
recoverable type manager can provide more than one type.) 
Recoverable type managers are, because of the combining of 
logging and cacheing. much simpler than general PRI-levels. 
The minimum necessary to provide recovery is done while the 
maximal possible advantage is taken from this recovery 
mechanism; both the user and the programs providing the new 
recoverable types can use this recovery mechanism. 
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3.7.1.3 ~ properties and constraints ~ PRI-levels 
The logging mechanism (see 
requirementJ and constraints 
properties which are worthwhile 
also Fig.3.l0) imposes some 
and has some interesting 
mentioning again explicitly: 
1. The UNDO DR operation in the newly formed alternatives 
has to be the first operation in all but the first of 
the new alternatives. The UNDO DR operation can not be 
placed at the end of the new -alternatives (as: if b 
then ACCEPT DR else UNDO DR), because an error occurlng 
within the alternative wIll cause the alternative to be 
backed out immediately and the next alternative to be 
invoked, leaving the operations on objects of 
unrecoverable types still to be undone. 
2. Procedures ENTER DR, UNDO DR and ACCEPT_DR, used to 
provide a new recovery block structure, are ordinary 
programs in the same level as the programs that use 
that new recovery block structure. If an error occurs 
during the execution of one of these three procedures 
then the underlying machine will restore all of the 
recoverable types provided and the next (enveloped) 
alternative will be invoked. The first operation to be 
executed will then be UNDO UR. If the error in the 
previous alternative occured during the execution of 
UNDO DR then this next alternative may again generate 
an error during its execution of UNDO DR, or may not be 
able to function properly. In other-words if an error 
occurs during the log processing then there is likely 
to be serious trouble. 
3. As a consequence of the previous point, one can say 
that in general the ENTER_UR, UNDO UR and ACCEPT DR 
operations can not use recovery blocks, because they 
are operating on unrecoverable objects for which no 
implicit nor explicit recovery is provided when they 
operate on them. (So if UNDO log in Fig.3.l2 or UNDO 
in Fig.3.l3 generates an error then the underlying 
fault tolerant machine which deals with this error, 
may have to abandon all higher levels on the machine.) 
A solution to this problem could be to organise 
the log (and perhaps the unrecoverable data) in such a 
way that the ENTER UR, ACCEPT UR and UNDO UR can simply 
be retried after failure. An-example of -this is given 
by Lampson and Sturgis (LaS76) who describe a system 
using "intention lists". If the system crashes during 
the processing of an intention list then the system can 
simply restart by processing the list from the 
beginning again. Reprocessing the intention list 
corresponds with an ACCEPT UR or UNDO DR procedure 
being retried using the same-log. 
4. 
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This mechanism copes with all 
PRI-levels described in previous 
involved is: 
of the proble~s of 
sections. All that is 
a, The provision of a new recovery block structure, 
w~ich, as shown above, is very simple. 
b, The maintenance of a log, which means making 
entries in a local data structure plus providing an 
ENTER UR, ACCEPT UR and UNDO UR operation. If the 
unrecoverable types operated upon are used to 
represent a newly provided recoverable type, then 
these three operations are necessary anyway (but 
operating an a cache). 
5. This mechanism does not introduce a new intermediate 
level between the underlying machine and the PRI-level 
using the logging mechanism. This mechanism does not 
introduce new types either. The log is a data 
structure used by both the procedures ENTER UR, 
ACCEPT UR, UNDO UR and the level using -the 
unrecoverable types. The mechanism processes the log 
and possibly restores objects of unrecoverable types. 
It does so with a built-in knowledge of what this level 
does with these types, For example, if the buffer 
system mentioned previously uses unrecoverable arrays 
to provide recoverable buffers in the new interface 
then the logging mechanism will have to provide 
recovery for those unrecoverable arrays. Since the 
level knows what the unrecoverable arrays are used for, 
it can optimise recovery. In other words the mechanism 
can take advantage of the fact that many 
representations may exist for one abstract state as 
seen by the user, in the same way as is done for 
cacheing on behalf of the user. Thus if a buffer was 
free before the buffer management level entered a 
recovery block then it may not have to restore the 
contents of the unrecoverable array if it fails an 
acceptance test after having used that array inside the 
recovery block, because it knows what the array is used 
for (namely for the representation of a buffer) and 
that the concrete state is not important. 
The basis of the mechanism is that when this level is 
backed out and the next alternative of its current recovery 
block is entered, then the underlying machine will have 
restored the recoverable types to exactly the states they 
were in when the previous alternative was entered. The 
logging mechanism is used to undo the effects of operations 
on unrecoverable types (see also Fig.3.9). However, it may 
possibly not restore the states of the unrecoverable types 
exactly as they were when the previous alternative was 
entered. (UNDO _UR may be "cleverer" than that,) 
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3.7.2 !!!!. ~ s truc ture ~ the ~ 
A PRI-level keeps track of its operations on objects of 
unrecoverable types inside recovery blocks by using a log as 
shown above .• When a level is forced into an alternative then 
it uses this log to undo the effects of these operations. 
If such a log were constructed from recoverable data 
structures then an undo action by the underlying machine, 
which is performed when the level under consideration is 
backed out and forced into a next alternative, would also 
undo all of the assignments performed on the log. In other 
words, the log would be identical at the beginning of each 
alternative of a recovery block. Thus all the information 
entered in the log would be lost by the time this level 
wants to undo its operations on unrecoverable types and is 
therefore unable to do so. Consequently, the log used by a 
PRI-1eve1 must be constructed from unrecoverable data. 
A possible solution avoiding the need for an 
unrecoverable log is to use the log in a check-point 
fashion. This means that the values of the objects that may 
be operated upon are copied just before the recovery block 
is entered. Obviously this may lead to gross inefficiency, 
because it may not be known in advance which objects will be 
operated upon and which not. This scheme is therefore not 
considered any further. 
Another solution is to extend the recovery block 
features to include the facility to declare UNDO-procedures 
(and ACCEPT- and ENTER- procedures). If the 
UNDO_DR-procedure could be invoked by the underlying machine 
before any objects are restored to their previous states, 
then the log would not have to consist of unrecoverable data 
objects. The programmer would then have to specify the 
enter, accept and undo procedures which would have to be 
executed as part of the recovery block processing when 
necessary. The fault tolerant machine on which the 
(compiled) code ~s to run must provide (virtual) 
instructions that make it possible to "declare" enter, 
accept and undo procedures. The underlying machine would 
place the entry points of these procedures in a cache area 
and invoke them when necessary (similar to the use of 
recoverable procedures as described elsewhere (Hor74)). The 
compiler would produce code with the special (virtual) 
instructions provided to "declare" the enter, accept and 
undo procedures to the underlying machine. 
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Fig.3.l4: An example to show a possible implementation 
of a fault tolerant machine providing the 
possibility to "declare" enter. accept and 
undo procedures. 
An implementation of this scheme could be as described below 
and illustrated in Fig.3.l4. 
Suppose that program P specified ENTER, ACCEPT and UNDO 
as enter. accept and undo procedures. The object code of P 
could. for example, contain the necessary "declare" 
instructions at the start of each recovery block. which 
causes the fault tolerant underlying machine to put the 
entry points of ENTER. ACCEPT and UNDO in the cache. The 
underlying machine starts executing P and if P generates an 
error inside a recovery block then the underlying machine 
will first execute UNDO and then process the relevant cache 
area and invoke the next alternative. 
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Suppose that operations OPl to OPn are not declared 
inside P. The object code of recovery blocks in OPl to C?~ 
could, for example, "declare" other enter, accept and undo 
procedures. Some appropriate scope rules are needed to ~ake 
sure that the correct enter, accept and undo procedures are 
called during execution of recovery blocks in P, OPl to OPn 
and other (lower level) operations used in OPl to OPn. These 
problems, however, are not the subject of this thesis, but 
are involved in the scheme described by Banatre and 
Shrivastava (BaS77). 
of 
The fact that the log used 
unrecoverable data has 
consequences: 
by a PRI-level must consist 
the following important 
1. If a PRI-level corrupts its own log then no recovery is 
possible at this level, because it is unrecoverable. 
As mentioned in the previous subsection this will most 
likely give serious trouble. Consequently it is 
important to protect these logs from corruption and to 
ensure that log operations are very reliable. A lot 
more protection is needed for logs in general than for 
caches (associated with users) in interpreter-levels, 
because these caches can be recoverable (if the level 
implementing them runs on a fault tolerant machine). If 
such a level corrupts a cache then it can simply fail 
its acceptance test and the underlying machine will 
undo the corruption and force the level into its next 
alternative as described in section four. 
2. It is not possible for a PRI-level to know which types 
are required by a higher level for the use of a log. 
Because of this it would appear to be preferable to let 
that PRI-level provide unrecoverable objects of the 
same types as the recoverable types that it implements. 
An example of this was described in section 6. It is 
clear that this is an important point which will have 
to be taken into account when building recoverable 
multi-level systems. 
Another yet unmentioned problem in PRI-levels is that 
updating of the log and operations on unrecoverable objects 
always have to be organised such that an alternative can be 
backed out at any time. For example, if an object is updated 
and subsequently the log entry is made and an error occurs 
in between these two events, then the operation on that 
object will not be undone. The problems of providing complex 
new types out of unrecoverable types are addressed in 
chapter four. 
It is clear that a cache in a procedural PRI-level has 
to be constructed from unrecoverable data for the same 
reasons as logs do (see Fig.3.l2). 
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1.1.1 Systems consisting of PRI-levels 
Fig.3.l0 showed how a new recovery block structure can 
be constructed from an existing recovery block structure. 
such that the recovery block facilities of the existing 
recovery block structure are extended. Here it is shown how 
different recovery block structures can be used and 
constructed in different kinds of PRI-levels. 
I) ~ general PRI-level. 
To understand the recovery block structures that have 
to be implemented by a general PRI-level. as shewn in 
Fig.3.l2. the following two things have to be considered: 
1. Programs may operate on unrecoverable types 
not used for the representation of newly 
recoverable types. A logging mechanism is 
required. 
that are 
provided 
therefore 
2. Logging the changes made to the unrecoverable types 
operated upon by a PRI-level. has in principle nothing 
to do with the recovery of the newly provided types. So 
the cacheing mechanism has to be used. 
Therefore two different recovery block structures are 
implemented by a general PRI-level as shown in Fig.3.l5: 
RECOVERY BLOCK NEW and RECOVERY BLOCK USER. RECOVERY -
BLOCK NEW is the recovery block structure provided by the 
logging mechanism. and used by the programs internal to the 
PRI-level. RECOVERY BLOCK USER is the recovery block 
structure provided to-the user. The ENTER. ACCEPT and UNDO 
procedures are the procedures that process the cache and the 
recoverable types provided to the user when the user enters 
a recovery block, passes an acceptance test or generates an 
error, respectively. The ENTER UR, ACCEPT UR and UNDO UR 
procedures similarly operate on the log for-programs in the 
general PRI-level. 
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As described before and shown in Fig.3.l3, a 
recoverable type manager maps the newly provided types on 
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unrecoverable types only. So the logging mechanisms is 
sufficient to restore values of objects of the new types 
provided to the user. If no other objects of unrecoverable 
types are used by the PRI-level then no further logging will 
be needed, so the log and the cache can be combined to serve 
a dual purpose. The same mechanism can, in that case, be 
used by the PRI-level and be provided to the user, as shown 
in Fig.3.l6. (One data structure is now used as both log 
and cache and should therefore be called, for example, a 
cache-log. However, the term log will also be used for these 
"cache-logs" in this chapter.) 
----l PROGRAMS 
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Fig.3.16, A recoverable type manager. 
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The recovery mechanism in a recoverable type ~anager 
will only have to undo the damage done to objects 0: the 
types provided to the user. So internal and user recovery 
both restore user types. Restoring user types is sufficient 
for internal recovery, because the unrecoverable objects 
operated upon are used only for the representation of 
objects of the new user types. An interesting example 
showing how this can be done is described in chapter four. 
Programs have no way of knowing whether the recovery 
block structure used is provided by a logging mechanism in a 
recoverable type manager or whether they are running on a 
fault tolerant interpreter. 
III) A generalization of a recoverable ~ manager. 
As mentioned before, it may be desirable to provide 
recoverable and unrecoverable objects of a type (see, for 
example, section 6 under 2.). If a recoverable type manager 
implements new type Tl to Tn, which it maps onto 
unrecoverable types, and it can provide recoverable and 
unrecoverable objects of these types then the following 
structure of the level, as shown in Fig.3.l7, is required: 
* A recovery block structure RECOVERY BLOCK UT, is needed 
to provide local recovery in the recoverable type 
manager for unrecoverable objects used for the 
representation of unrecoverable user objects. 
* A recovery block structure RECOVERY BLOCK USER is 
provided to the user to provide recovery for recoverable 
objects of types Tl to Tn. 
* This level (the recoverable type manager), however, 
needs both of the previous recovery mechanisms. So the 
structure required is one that provides recovery for the 
unrecoverable objects used to represent recoverable user 
objects and for the unrecoverable objects used to 
represent unrecoverable user objects. Another recovery 
block structure (RECOVERY BLOCK RT) is therefore built 
to extend the recovery provided by RECOVERY BLOCK UT 
with recovery for the unrecoverable objects-used to 
represent recoverable user objects. 
* The same recovery mechanism for providing recovery for 
recoverable user objects and for providing local 
recovery for the objects on which they are mapped can be 
used (because the level is a recoverable type manager). 
The log, ENTER, ACCEPT and UNDO used to build 
RECOVERY BLOCK RT are exactly the same as those used for 
RECOVERY-BLOCK-USER. RECOVERY BLOCK RT is the recovery 
block structure used by programs in the level. 
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The schemes described here do not require complex scope 
rules or a complex cacheing mechanism in the interpreter 
providing the basic recovery block structure onto which 
higher levels built new mechanisms. Once a designer or 
programmer understands the basic principles described ~n 
this chapter, then levels are very easy to construct. 
3.8 A two-level prototype system 
In order to show that the 
chapter can be implemented, a 
consisting of two PRI-levels 
implemented successfully. 
ideas put forward ~n this 
two-level prototype system 
has been designed and 
The first level of this system consists of a fault 
tolerant interpreter for recoverable basic OCODE (a 
description of the OCODE machine has been given elsewhere 
(Ric7l)). This interpreter runs on a Burroughs Bl700 machine 
and is written in the microprogramming language B~~ (Del';3). 
The interpreter provides recoverability for OCODE 
variables. All of these variables are mapped onto (virtual) 
machine words. The cache records changes made to the machine 
words used for the representation of recoverable OCODE 
variables. Input/output operations provided by this first 
level are unrecoverable. Consequently the type disk page, 
which is also provided, is unrecoverable. 
The interpreter provides an instruction: 
RECOVERY BLOCK VARS(AT,altl, ... ,altn) 
Where:-AT o-the start address of the acceptance 
test 
alti= the start address of alternative i 
This instruction provides the recovery block structure 
which corresponds to the notation (Ran75): 
ensure AT; 
~ altl; 
~~ altn; 
~ error ; 
A full description of the implementation of this 
interpreter is given elsewhere (Ver76). 
The interpreter also provides the instructions ERROR, 
and PRIOR. The PRIOR operation takes one argument which is 
the address of a variable; the value the variable had at the 
time the current recovery block was entered is returnee. 
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This instruction can be particularly useful ~n acceptance 
tests. 
The second level of the prototype consists of 
BCPL-programs that implement a recoverable filing system. 
(OCODE is the result of a BCPL-program compilation.) This 
level provides recoverable files which it maps onto 
unrecoverable disk pages, provided by the first level. This 
second level uses a logging mechanism as described in the 
previous section and shown in Fig.3.l0. A full description 
of the filing system and the way in which recoverability has 
been provided for files is given in chapter four. 
The logging mechanism provides a new recovery block 
structure: RECOVERY BLOCK FS(AT,altl, ,altn) ~n the 
manner described above. Programs of the filing system use 
this new recovery block structure. The filing system is a 
recoverable type manager, so users use the same recovery 
block structure as the filing system, namely 
RECOVERY BLOCK FS. 
The filing system consists of the following parts: 
1. Procedures ENTER FS, ACCEPT FS, and UNDO FS, which take 
the necessary actions for the filing- system if a 
recovery block in a filing system program or user 
program is entered, an acceptance test has been 
successful or unsuccessful respectively (these 
procedures are particular examples of the ENTER UR, 
ACCEPT_UR and UNDO_UR in Fig.3.l0). -
2. File operations for recoverable files. These operations 
are log-oriented, which means that they maintain 
sufficient information in the log to be able to restore 
the states of the files used. 
3. RECOVERY BLOCK FS providing the new recovery block 
control flow structure. 
The total structure of the two-level machine is shown 
schematically in Fig.3.18. 
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3.9 Recoverable types as a basic concept for recoverable 
multi-level !Zstems 
Recoverable type managers can easily be added to a 
system. In other words the machine can be extended with new 
levels each adding new recoverable types to an existing 
interface by mapping them onto unrecoverable types of the 
underlying machine (so long as the underlying machine 
provides the recovery block structure). 
In order to show the flexibility with which recoverable 
type managers can be used to build up a recoverable 
multi-level system, another example is given below. 
3.9.1 A recoverable lineprinter manager on ~ of the 
reeoverable file manager 
Suppose that the two-level system described in the 
previous section provides an unrecoverable lineprinter with 
one (unrecove:able) operation: 'send_char_to-yrinter'. In 
order to prov~de a recoverable and more abstract printer a 
set of programs providing operations such as 
'print integer', 'print file', 'new line', and so on, are 
written. When these operations are invoked the output is not 
printed immediately, because the operations would then be 
unrecoverable. Instead the output is spooled to a 
recoverable file. If the outermost recovery block is 
successfully exited then the spoolfile will be printed. 
In this way recovery is not provided by performing 
operations and undoing their effects later if necessary. 
Instead the effects these operations would have are recorded 
and this record will be discarded when necessary. ~~en no 
further undoing can follow (that is when the outermost 
recovery block is exited) then the file used to register the 
effects of lineprinter operations is used to actually print 
the output. The file used is recoverable, so the effects of 
user lineprinter operations are undone automatically if a 
program is backed out. 
A recoverable lineprinter manager providing this 
recoverable lineprinter will consist of the following parts 
(programs are given in a BCPL-like notation). 
1. A procedure 'send char to recoverable-yrinter' is used 
to replace 'send:char:t0:Yrinter'. This procedure ~s 
shown below: 
~ send_char_to_recoverable-yrinter(char) ~ 
£( if pr_level=O ~ send_char_to-yrinter(char) 
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£) 
else add to file(printer file,char) 
- - - -
where: pr level is a recoverable variable the use of 
whIch will be explained below. 
printer file is the name of the recoverable 
spoolfile. 
add to file is a procedure that appends a 
character string to a given file. 
2. The procedures such as: 'print integer', 'print_hex', 
'print_file', 'skip-yage', 'new_line'. 
These procedures use 'send char to recoverable 
printer' to map information to be-printed- on a stream 
of characters for the line printer. 
3. The procedures ENTER PR, UNDO PR and ACCEPT_PR, which 
are given below: -
let enter-yr be £( if pr level=O then 
-- - -eIDpty(printer file) 
£) 
pr_level:=pr_level+l -
~ undo-yr ~ £( £) II a null body. 
let accept-yr be £( 
£) 
pr level:=pr level-l 
if-pr level=O then 
printIile(printer_file) 
where: empty is a procedure to empty a file, 
printfile ~s a procedure that prints a g~ven 
file. 
The variable pr level is used to indicate the 
recovery block level of nesting. 
If an error occurs during the execution of a 
recovery block alternative then 'pr level:=pr level-I' 
will be done automatically, - because 
'pr level:=pr level+l' of ENTER PR will be undone by 
the- underlying machine. UNDO-PR can be a null 
procedure, because of the recoverable spoolfile and the 
recoverable variable 'pr_level' used. 
4. The new recovery block structure is provided by 
'RECOVERY BLOCK PR' which is constructed from 
'RECOVERY-BLOCK-NEW' in exactly the same way as 
'RECOVERY-BLOCK-NEW' is constructed from 'RECOVERY-
BLOCK' as-shown-in Fig.3.l0. The ENTER, UNDO and ACCEPT 
procedures are given above. 
The user can now use the recovery block structure 
'RECOVERY BLOCK PR' and the recoverable printer. The 
interface-provided by the recoverable file manager is thus 
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extended with a recoverable printer. The new recovery block 
structure can also be used by the print procedures in the 
recoverable lineprinter manager. 
As mentioned above, the user of the new system is not 
aware of the construction of the multi-level system usee. 
The user cannot know whether subsequent levels perform 
cacheing and logging in order to provide recoverable types, 
or whether all of the recoverable types are provided by one 
fault tolerant interpreter. 
3.9.2 Recoverable types versus recoverable operations ~n a 
multi-level system 
The use of recoverable type managers gives a system 
structure as shown in Fig.3.l9. Just before or after the 
fault tolerant interpreter providing the basic recovery 
block structure has restored the values of the recoverable 
types it provides, the UNDO-procedures of all of the 
recoverable type managers will be invoked. 
Similarly all of the ENTER-procedures will be invoked 
when an alternative is started and ACCEPT-procedures will be 
invoked when an alternative finishes successfully. 
Consequently after an alternative has been executed and, 
say, failed its acceptance test, then all of the recoverable 
type managers will check to see if any objects of the 
recoverable types they provide have been altered. If so they 
will restore the values of those objects (see Fig.3.l9). 
Consequently, any recoverable type manager that has not been 
invoked by the alternative will have its UNDO-procedure 
invoked unnecessarily. However, if any objects of types 
provided by the recoverable type manager have been altered 
then the restoring of the states of the objects is 
independent of the sequences of operations performed; the 
type manager knows the present state (which may be useful 
for optimisation of the restoring of the old state) and the 
state to which to go back to. The original states will be 
restored using this knowledge only. Methods of performing 
recovery for complex data structures based on this 
principle, are discussed in chapter four. 
For example, consider a recoverable stack manager. 
Suppose the user had invoked the operation PUSH ten times 
and subsequently invoked the operation POP ten times and the 
program is subsequently to be backed out (and the stack is 
to be restored to its original state by the recoverable 
stack manager). The UNDO of the recoverable stack manager 
will in that case not do anything, because the present state 
of the stack is identical to the state to which the stack is 
to be restored. 
• 
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Fig.3.l9, A multi-level system consisting of 
recoverable type managers. 
Where: 0u(tl, ,tp)= A set of unrecoverable objects 
of types tl, ,tp. 
0r(tq, ,tr)= A set of recoverable objects 
of types tq, ,tr. 
______ ~~ denotes: program invokation 
...... .!). denotes: type mapping (representation) 
_.-=)denotes: program uses data pointed at 
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This is very different from the approach presented by 
Banatre and Shrivastava (BaS77) where the recovery block 
structure is never redefined. In this approach, every 
operation ~s made recoverable, so the action on an 
acceptance test failure is to call the "undo"s of all the 
operations performed in that alternative. Taking the stack 
example above, it is possible, in this scheme, to make POP 
and PUSH operations independently recoverable. The L~DO of 
the recoverable stack manager would then cause the 
invocation of operation POP REVERSE ten times and operation 
PUSH REVERSE ten times. However, if the user had not used 
the stack at all then the UNDO of the recoverable stack 
manager would not be invoked at all. The scheme presented 
by Banatre and Shrivastava is, however, sufficiently 
flexible so that an optimised recovery scheme for the stack, 
similar to the one described in the previous paragraph, can 
be programmed. 
Admittedly the stack example is certainly not a 
yardstick to compare both approaches. The example is only 
given to illustrate the differences in the approaches. There 
may well be many environments where the recoverable type 
manager approach is more efficient then the 
reverse-operation approach, and vice versa. It is impossible 
to make a general comparison of the efficiencies of these 
methods. 
It is interesting to note that System R (Ast76) employs 
the basic principles of both techniques for two different 
recovery mechanisms, although no nesting of scopes of 
recovery is possible. In order to provide recovery for 
segments (collections of logical address spaces used to 
store the data) two page maps, called the current and 
backup, are maintained. When a page is updated for the first 
time in a transaction, its new value will be directed to a 
new page pointed to by the current page map, while the 
backup page map and the original pages are left intact. This 
could be classified as type recovery. 
The recovery for transactions is supported through the 
maintenance of time ordered lists of entries, which record 
information about each change to the recoverable data. 
During transaction recovery, the listed entries for the 
transaction are read in last-in-first-out order. Special 
routines are employed to undo all the listed modifications 
back to the recorded save point. This could be classified as 
reverse procedure recovery. 
The recovery for segments is used to create system 
checkpoints. The listed entries can be used as an audit 
trail to restore files to their original state, in case of a 
system crash. The recovery for transactions basically 
provides a scope within which the user can undo all his 
operations (a very simple recovery block with one 
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alternative). The use of "inverse updates" in System R has 
been justified elsewhere (EsC75). Eswaran and Chamberlin 
define an integrity subsystem as a subsystem which permits 
users to make assertions which define the "correctness" of 
the data base, and to specify the actions to be taken when 
assertions are not satisfied. An integrity subsystem depends 
on a logging and recovery subsystem which can selectivelv 
back out a given update request. This may be carried ou~ 
either by performing "inverse-updates" or by keeping a copy 
of the data base that exists at the start of the execution 
of the update request and resurrecting the copy. 
It is, however, the author's personal view that 
programs (or systems) should be built based on the data 
types used (see for example a method described by Jackson 
(Jac75)). Much research has been done in the area of 
proving correctness of programs (see chapter one). However, 
the results so far fall short of a tool for routine use and 
different approaches have been sought. Much of the recent 
research has been aimed at proving correctness of data types 
and data structures (Gut76), (WLS76). Host recent research 
in protection and security (Den76), (Lin76) has also been 
based on data types (rather than on programs or program 
structures and properties). Similarly it is the author's 
view that recoverability should be provided for types, 
rather than for pieces of programs executed, for which 
"reverse-pieces of programs" exist. 
3.10 Conclusions and relation to other areas 
This chapter has described how recoverability can be 
linked with types. The presence of both recoverable and 
unrecoverable types in the interfaces of a multi-level 
system can be efficiently used to construct a recoverable 
multi-level system. The use of recoverable type managers, 
which provide new recoverable types by mapping them onto 
unrecoverable types in the interfaces provided by the lower 
level, has been shown to be a flexible, reliable and 
efficient way to implement levels in a recoverable 
multi-level system. Programs in such a system operate on 
both recoverable and unrecoverable types, which leads to 
non-trivial recovery and consistency problems. A mechanism 
devised to solve these problems and an implementation of 
this mechanism in a recoverable two-level system have been 
described in this chapter. 
The scheme proposed has been described as part of a 
possible way to construct recoverable multi-level syste~s. 
The scheme could, as was mentioned already, be used as a 
part of a mechanism to provide extended types. It was shown 
how, for example, a recovery class could be specified. This 
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could be done for other purposes than just t:-,e 
implementation of fault tolerant systems as described In 
this chapter. If a programmer could also specify invariants 
or assertions, as for example in ALPHARD (WLS76), then the 
enter accept and undo procedures, specified as part of a 
ALPHARD "form", could be invoked before an object of that 
form was updated, after it was updated successfully (i.e. 
the assertions and invariants were still valid) or 
unsuccessfully respectively. If the accept procedure was 
usually empty and most operations were perforcec 
successfully, then overheads would be fairly small. 
Similarly there are other ways in which the scheme could fit 
in languages providing type extension facilities. Progracs 
written in these languages will need to be compiled and this 
chapter has dealt with the concepts and mechanisms needed at 
run time. Language issues have not been addressed, but are 
the subject of ongoing work at Newcastle (BaS77). 
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4.0 RECOVERY FOR COMPLEX DATA STRUCTURES 
This chapter investigates mechanisms that can be used 
to provide recovery and consistency for global data 
structures. Consequently this chapter is basically 
concerned with the problems of providing recoverability in 
data base systems and filing systems, or more generally 
systems providing complex data structures, that remain in 
existence after the running of a job. 
Several mechanisms are described and their advantages 
and disadvantages are discussed. A recoverable filing 
system, which has been implemented, is used to illustrate 
the problems. This chapter also describes how consistency 
in global data can be maintained at any time, even when 
recovery is not possible such as when a system crash occurs. 
Several mechanisms are described and compared. 
4.1 Definitions 
The terms defined in the previous chapters will also be 
used in this chapter. Some new definitions necessary for the 
purpose of this chapter are given. 
A multi-level data structure is an abstract data type, 
provided by levels--:u1 a multi-level system, by mapping 
objects of this type onto objects of one or more types 
provided by the underlying machines of those levels. See 
also Fig.4.l. 
level i+2 
new interface T 
level i+l 
interface with --- (tl,t2, .•••• ,tn) 
underlying------------------------------------------------
machine 
level i 
where: T,tl,t2, ..• ,tn are types. 
Fig.4.l, A multi-level data structure representation. 
The mapping done by level i+l defines the 
representation of the new type, T in level i+2. 
A multi-level data structure could be represented as a 
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type T for which T=Ql(Q2( •.. Qn(tl, ••. ,tm), ... » where 
every Qi is a mappings function providing a new abstract 
type by representing it by a (possibly composite) data 
structure. In the multi-level systems envisaged, mappings Ql 
to Qn could be done in one level. For example, a level 
implementing a filing system may map type file onto 
<file_index, file_structure>. Type file_structure may be 
mapped onto <file_header, file body>. Type file body may be 
mapped onto type file-page. TThe filing system- of Madnick 
and Alsop (MaA69), described in chapter three, is an example 
~f this.) The ter~ com£lex data structure will be used 
~nstead of the term mult~-level data structures", in order 
to avoid confusion with the notion of level as used in the 
present thesis, because these data structures can be 
provided by one level in a multi-level system as discussed 
in chapter three. 
The notions of recoverable ~ and recoverability 
provided for ~ type will be used ~n this chapter to mean 
that such types can be reset to values held earlier, such as 
needed for recovery blocks. So in terms of recovery blocks: 
if a recovery block is used in a program then operations on 
recoverable types performed inside an alternative will be 
undone if the acceptance test fails, while operations on 
unrecoverable types will not be undone. For convenience, 
recovery is discussed in terms of recovery blocks, although 
the mechanisms discussed are general recovery mechanisms 
which need not be part of a system providing recovery 
facilities in the (syntactic) form of recovery blocks. 
Commitment of modifications made to global objects 
(global to the program performing the modifications) inside 
nested recovery blocks, occurs when the outermost recovery 
block is left. The notion of outermost recover~ block is 
used, in general, with respect to data to enote the 
recovery block outside which no recovery for those data can 
be done. (Either because it is the outermost recovery block 
used and the data are globals, or the data objects are local 
to that (outermost) recovery block.) 
The term to cache is used to include the storing of any 
data to aid later recovery. These data used to aid later 
recovery form the cache. (Differences between a cache and a 
log are irrelevant for the purpose of this chapter.) A 
barrier is placed in the cache each time a new recovery 
block is entered. At the end of a recovery block (after the 
acceptance test has been evaluated) the information 
subsequent to the latest barrier will be processed and the 
barrier removed. 
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4.2 An example of a complex data structure: a filing syste::-. 
A recoverable filing system has been implemented on a 
B1700 compllter in the Computing Laboratory in ~ewcastle U?O:'. 
Tyne, in order to test the ideas and mechanisms described in 
this chapter. This filing system was part of the prototype 
two-level system described in chapter three. The filing 
system and basic principles on which the filing system and 
recovery mechanisms are based, are fully described in this 
section. 
In order to implement the described recoverable filing 
system, the filing system of OS6 (StS72a,b,c,d) has been 
redesigned. The user interface has been kept unchanged. OS6 
was chosen for several reasons. First of all the Computing 
Laboratory at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne posesses 
a version of OS6, which is running on a B1700 computer. 
Furthermore, OS6 is written in the high level language BCPL 
(Ric73) and is very modular: it is easy to replace parts of 
it. Finally the system is a single user system (more users 
exist but only one can be logged on at one time), This 
allows the problems of protection and recoverability in 
parallel systems (Ran75), (RLT77) to be avoided. This 
example of a recoverable filing will g~ve the reader a 
better understanding of the notions and mechanisms used, 
such as cache, recovery and abstract data, and it is used in 
the rest of the chapter to illustrate the general problems 
and mechanisms discussed. 
This section will not discuss the reasons behind the 
choice of the particular mechanisms chosen. The following 
sections will do this in a more general context, whereby the 
filing system described in this section is referred back to 
for illustration purposes. 
4.2.1 The structure of the filing system 
Files are regarded as sequences of objects of type 
word. User programs running under OS6 may create and 
destroy files. Files can also be freely assigned to 
variables, and be passed as parameters or be the result of 
function calls within a single program. A bottom-up 
description of a file is given in this subsection. 
* The file body. 
At the conceptually lowest level a file consists of a 
~ body consisting of one or more directory pages and 
~ pages. 
A directory page is used to point to the data 
top-
di rectory-
page 
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pages. Both a directory page and a data page occupy one 
disk block each. When there are more data pages than 
entries in the directory page then a new level with a 
new directory page (the new ~ directory) is created 
which points to the directory pages which point to the 
data pages, etc. Examples of possible file body 
structures are shown in Fig.4.2, shaded areas indicate 
unused words. 
data-
data- pages 
pages D D directory- D top-di rectory-
I 
page 
! 
D D 
Fig.4.2 Two examples of possible file body structures 
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* The header. 
For each file there is a unique header which contains 
general information about the file, such as: the address 
of the top directory page, the address of the last page, 
the date-last-accessed, the date-last-written and the 
type of. the file. These headers are kept in a special 
file: the Header file. 
* The file index. 
Each file has a unique index. This index is the index in 
a table which contains the addresses of the headers for 
all the files in the system (an address is a tuple: page 
in Header file, offset). This table is kept in a special 
file: the Master File List (MFL). The disk address of 
the top-directory page -or-the MFL file is known by the 
filing system (a constant which is initialised when the 
system is set up). 
* The file name. 
Index files are used to associate names with file 
indexes, in order to be able to use files in other 
programs. An index file contains entries: file index, 
file name. The System Index is the index file i,'hich 
contains all the entries for all the system files. The 
file index of this file (the system index) is known by 
the filing system (it is a constant which is initialised 
when the system is set up). 
The data pages of the file body are the objects ~n 
which the user data is stored (the user "sees" file, but 
doesn't know about data pages). The directory--pages, 
headers, file indices, and file names map higher level 
descriptions of a file onto these data pages, thus providing 
subsequent abstractions. 
The MFL file, the Header file and the System Index are 
special system files. There are two other special system 
files. The first one is file "usercodes" which is an index 
file containing as entries the tuples: userindex, username. 
Each user has his own index file (a file directory) and when 
a user logs on, the system will look up his user index and 
set the system variable "current index" to the user index of 
that user. The other special system file is the ~ Store 
File (FSF) which is used to contain the addresses of the 
free pages on disk. If a disk page is free then it is marked 
"free" and its address is in the FSF. 
* address~ 
fir s t r~ F L - f i 1 e 
page 
MFL 
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HEADER-file 
iusercodes 
~ ( 
I
s y s t e m ~--:,--,--=~!""4 
i n d e x Io-oo"'--.:...-'--.L....I~ 
I 
5 
current~~~~~~ 
in de x 2 
8 
index file S Y S T U1 I N D E X "USERCODES" 
9 
i 
i 
---+ llsercode 
- - - - --
~--+i ndex fi 1 
user name 
"usercode " 
fi le name 
3 6 
The two variables marked by a '*' are known to the system 
and set during system initialization. The value 'current 
index' is set when the user logs on, so after that the 
search for a user file starts in the NFL-file from 
'current index'. 
Accesses 1-6 are made when a user logs on in order to 
set up the current index. 
Accesses 7-11 are made when the current user wishes to 
access one of his files. 
Fig.4.3, The structure of the prototype filing system. 
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If a user wants to access a file with a given na~e the 
following steps are involved: 
1. With the current index, the address of the header of 
the user index file is looked up in the }WL file. 
2. The header is read and the first page of the user index 
file can be read. 
3. The user index file is searched to find the index of 
the file with the given name. 
4. With the index of the file the address of the header of 
that file can be found in the }WL file. 
5. The header of the file can be read and used to access 
the file itself. 
4.2.2 
The total structure of the filing system is shown ~n 
Fig.4.3. 
The mechanisms !£ provide recoverability ~ ~ 
Files are regarded as globals for each program, even if 
they are created inside a recovery block. So only when the 
acceptance test of the outermost recovery block used is 
successful, final commitment of the filing system operations 
performed in the recovery block (which may contain nested 
recovery blocks) occurs. The updates for the filing system 
are made in such a way that the state of the filing system 
can be restored to what it was at a certain 
programmer-determined point (e.g. at the point of entering 
the current recovery block). The general principles upon 
which the filing system and recovery mechanisms are based 
are: 
1. A m1n1mum of information is to be kept in order to 
restore the state of the filing system (as seen by the 
user) to the state it was in at recovery block entry. 
The information must be sufficient to restore the state 
no matter which operations have been performed in the 
mean time. Since, for example, an audit trail scheme 
or "reverse audit trail" scheme keeps track of all of 
the operations performed and executes the reverse 
operations in the reversed order in which the original 
operations were performed, recovery may involve the 
accessing and restoring of previous values of one 
object, many times. The final value is then the value 
to which the object was to be restored. In the 
interest of storage usage recovery is to be linked with 
data structures and values rather than with operations, 
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and an audit trail scheme or reverse audit trail scheme 
is therefore unsuitable. 
2. The choice of the level of abstraction at which 
cacheing is to be done, (i.e. the logical units for 
which .recovery is provided) is of extreme importance 
for the efficiency with which the recovery is provided. 
For example for file bodies, disk pages are cached 
rather than disk words. 
3. Updating of objects "in place" is avoided. The original 
values are left in the original objects and the new 
values are copied into new objects the first time these 
objects are assigned to inside a recovery block. A 
cache is used to maintain pointers to old and new 
copies of the objects. Crash resistance is provided, 
because new values are cached while original objects 
are left unchanged. Subsequent assignments are 
redirected to affect the new objects (cached values) 
rather than the original ones. Using this scheme, reads 
as well as writes trigger a search through the cache. 
The original cache scheme updates all objects "in 
place" and old values, as they were at the checkpoint 
(at the point of entering the current recovery block), 
of those objects are cached (Hor74). This scheme is 
appropriate for simple program variables, but not for 
complex global data types which will remain ~n 
existence after the running of the program, because it 
may leave the data in an inconsistent state if a 
failure occurs during the running of the program. 
4.2.2.1 The mechanisms for updating ~ cacheing of ~. 
Updating and cacheing of files is done using a 
technique which is very similar to the "careful replacement" 
technique (see chapter two) which can be used to update 
files as safely as possible, i.e. minimising the chance of 
being left with an inconsistent filing system in the event 
of anything going wrong. Using this technique two versions 
of a file are kept when it is operated upon inside a 
recovery block. The versions overlap in sharing unchanged 
disk pages. A table is kept by the system to keep track of 
which pages belong to the new version only, and which pages 
they replace in the original version (if any; see below). 
This table is called the ~ cache. For reasons, which are 
described in subsequent sections, the MFL file and Header 
file are treated differently. Whenever an MFL entry is 
created, destroyed or updated an entry is placed in the ~ 
cache. Similarly a header cache is used to store entr~es 
when headers are created, destroyed or updated. These two 
"typed" caches contain all the cached information about 
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operations on MFL entries and headers. The pages of 
original versions of files, which are not shared with new 
versions, plus the three caches, form all the cached 
information in the filing system. 
The way in which the first operation on each file is 
done after a (possibly nested) recovery block has been 
entered is described in detail below, in order to show how 
this cached information (recovery data) is formed and 
maintained to support the nested recovery. When such an 
operation is performed then the relevant data page to be 
updated will be copied into a new disk page and the change 
will be made in this new disk page. (This is for the case 
when a data page is updated; the file can also be extended 
by a data page in which case that new page is the newly 
created one. When a data page is deleted from a file, that 
data page will remain unaltered and not be copied into a new 
page.) If the directory page pointing to the original data 
page has not yet been changed inside the current recovery 
block alternative, then the contents of that directory page 
will be copied into another new page, and the pointer to the 
original data page is replaced by a pointer to the new data 
page. (This is for the case when a data page is updated; 
when a data page is added to the file a new entry will be 
placed into the new version of the directory, and when a 
data page is deleted from the file then the entry will be 
deleted from the new version of the directory page.) The 
same is done for possible higher level directories. Thus the 
new value of the file is defined by the new top-directory, 
and the original value, i.e. the cached value, is defined by 
the original top-directory. Thus inside a recovery block 
two forms of the file are kept from the point when a file is 
first changed inside that block. These two forms are the 
file as it was before entering the recovery block and the 
up-to-date version. When recovery blocks are nested then 
several forms of the file can be kept. In general: suppose 
that there are m nested recovery blocks and a file has 
already been changed in k of the m levels of nesting, then 
(k+1) versions of the file are kept in the innermost 
recovery block. 
In order to keep track of which page is replaced by 
which other page a tuple <old page i, new page j> is put 
into the page cache for each replaced page. A tuple <old 
page i, new page j> in the page cache will be combined with 
another such tuple after the latest barrier if possible. 
Pairs of tuples are combined according to rules T1-T4: 
T1) <page 1, page 2> & ~page 2, page 3> ==> 
page 1, page 3 , page 2 is freed. 
T2) <"new", page 1> & <page 1, page 2> ==> 
"new", page 2 , page 1 is freed. 
T3) <page 1, page 2> & <page 2, "deleted"> ==> 
page 1, "deleted" , page 2 is freed. 
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T4) < "new", page 1> &< page 1, "deleted"> ==> 
page 1 is freed. 
(Note: rules 
because page 2 in 
but overwritten. 
processing of the 
Tl and T2 will never be applicable here, 
Tl and page 1 in.T2 will not be replaced, 
Those two rules w~ll be used, however, for 
cache after an acceptance test.) 
When the top-directory of a file is updated then the 
header has to be updated as well. The header of the file is 
then copied into a header cache, which in the prototype 
filing system is kept in core, and the new value of the 
address of the top-directory is placed in that header in the 
cache. A few other fields in the header--ffiay have -ro~ 
updated too, such as "date last accessed". However, this is 
not of importance for the mechanism. Similarly, a tuple 
<file index, tag> is put into the MFL cache when a file is 
changed. The tag field can have the values "changed", 
"deleted" or "new", to indicate that the file has been 
changed, deleted or newly created respectively, within the 
current recovery block. A tuple <file index i, tagl> will 
be combined with a previously stored tuple <file index i, 
tag2> after the last barrier, if possible. Pairs of tuples 
are combined according to rules T5-T8: 
T5) <file index i, "new"> & < file index ~, "changed"> 
==> < file index i, "new"> 
T6) <file index i, "new"> & < file index i, "deleted"> 
==> nothing. 
T7) <file index i , "changed "> & < file index i," changed"> 
==> < file index i, " changed"> 
T8) < file index i, "changed"> & < file index i, "deleted"> 
==> < file index ~, "de Ie ted "> 
(A new tuple <file index i,"deleted"> causes a cached tuple 
<file index i,"new"> (i.e. cached in the same recovery block 
level) to be erased from the cache and the "deleted" tuple 
will be discarded. This is done, because all it means is 
that a file has been created and subsequently destroyed 
inside the same recovery block alternative. Consequently no 
further processing in order to undo or accept these 
operations will be necessary after the acceptance test.) 
Subsequent changes in the same disk page or file 
header, made within the same recovery block level, are done 
in the newest version of the page or header without any 
further cacheing. As far as the ~WL cache is concerned, only 
a deletion of a file can cause an already cached tuple to be 
overwritten; other subsequent changes in the file in the 
same recovery block level do not affect the MFL cache. The 
same also holds for the page cache. 
Each time 
entry is sent 
a page, header or MFL entry is changed, an 
to the respective caches. The caches with 
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their routines decide what to do with the received en:r':. 
Original pages, headers and MFL entries do not carry a~y 
indication to show whether or not there is an updated 
version of them (which is in the cache for headers and ~·:Fl 
entries). Therefore, the definition of access paths has to 
be changed to include the caches. In other words, the search 
order for an MFL entry or header is changed to start the 
search in the caches. The fact that three separate caches 
are used instead of one cache is irrelevant. Because there 
are logically three kinds of cache entries it is convenient 
to speak of three caches. However, these three caches could 
well be implemented as one cache in which each entry has a 
type descriptor to distinguish its kind. 
The given design and definition of files is well 
structured in the sense that many versions of a file can be 
kept without any unnecessary duplication of information. 
Each version has the same structure and is defined by its 
index (and header). No complicated merging (as with 
differential files; see chapter two) after acceptance of the 
operations, nor restoring of individual disk pages (as an 
audit trail would require) after a failure, are needed. 
Another advantage of the technique used is that by cacheing 
new values rather than old values of }ITL entries and 
headers, the original files are kept on disk and will remain 
undamaged in case of a system crash. 
4.2.2.2 Processing of caches and files after the acceptance 
test 
At the end of a recovery block alternative the page 
cache is used to update the FSF (Free Store File) and to 
free pages. It is important to note that changes in FSF are 
not cached. The algorithms which process the page cache, 
header cache and MFL cache after a recovery block acceptance 
test are described here and an example of the page cache 
processing is shown in Fig.4.4. 
In the case that the acceptance test of a recovery 
block has failed, all the "new pages" in the tuples <old 
page, new page> in the page cache up to the latest barrier 
in the cache, are freed. The cache is cleared up to the 
barrier. If the acceptance test was successful then there 
are two possible cases. The first possible case is that the 
outermost recovery block has been successful, in which case 
all the "old pages" in the tuples <old page, new page> in 
the cache are freed, and the whole cache is emptied. The 
other possible case is that an inner recovery block 
acceptance test has been successful, in which case the 
latest barrier is removed and all the tuples are moved up. 
Pairs of tuples up to the next barrier are combined 
2 
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THE TOP-DIRECTORY PAGE AT DIFFERENT STAGES (the address of the current page is 
after success- after unsuc- given) outside 
rec. b 1. 
7 
15 
2 
in outer 
rec. b 1. 
12 
15 
5 
4 
in inner 
rec.bl. 
19 
23 
9 
4 
ful inner cessfu1 inner 
rec.b1. rec.b1. 
19 
23 
Q 
2 
12 
15 
_Ii 
after success- after success- after unsuccess- after unsuccess-
ful outer rec.bl+ ful outer and ful outer and full outer and 
unsuccessful successful successful inner unsuccessful 
;",,,aV'V'Cll"n 1. 'ClC n 1 'nnaV' V'ar ~ 1 • 
12 
15 
5 
4 19 
23 
9 
THE PAGE CACHE 
~12 ,," ~ not~ 
accepted 
result 
(inner test) 
7 7 
15 
pages 2,5 and 12 
are freed. 
pages 4,19,9 and 
23 are freed. 
15 
not 
accepted 
? 
~ 
accepted 
not 
accepted 
I 
~ 
accepted 
(outer test) 
V
pages 4,19,9 and 
23 are freed. 
the cache is emptied. 
fpages 1,7 and 15 are freed. the cache is emptied. 
[
pages 2,5 and 12 
are freed. 
the cache is emptied. 
[
pages 1 and 7 are 
freed. 
the cache is emptied. 
Assumed is that no cacheing is done between the execution of the 
inner and outer test. 
Fig.4.4, PaQe cache processing: an example with a file \'Iith one directory oa("]e. 
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according to rules Tl to T4. 
When an inner recovery block acceptance test ~s 
successful then the headers in the header cache after the 
latest barrier are merged with the headers between :~e 
latest barrier and the next latest barrier. If the sa~e 
header appears both before and after the latest barrier but 
after the next latest barrier, the earlier header i~ the 
cache is replaced by the most recent one. The latest 
barrier is then removed and other headers r;:ove up to fill up 
empty spaces in the cache. If an 1nner recovery block 
acceptance test is not successful then the cache is emptied 
upto and including the barrier. The MFL cache is processed 
like the header cache. Pairs of tuples are combined 
according to rules T5 to T8 in case an acceptance test has 
been successful. When an acceptance test of an outermost 
recovery block in a program is successful then the caches 
are used to update the MFL file and Header file. 
4.3 Cacheing for complex data structures 
A generalization of the approach that is exemplified in 
the filing system is given in this section. The problems 
and constraints in designing a cacheing scheme for 
recoverable complex data structures, and possible solutions 
for those problems, are discussed. 
The representation of an abstract object is a data 
structure which can logically always be distinguished into 
~ providing ~ abstraction and information carrying data 
Information carrying data is used to store the user's data 
(values) whenever he makes assignments to the abstract 
object. These data are addressable from the higher level 
through the system (a level providing the complex data 
structures). 
In order to provide a concrete representation of the 
abstract structures, the relations between the components of 
the structure must be represented in some way, and the 
abstract operations interpreted in terms of these relations. 
The extra data used to describe the representation will be 
called "data providing an abstraction". In other words, this 
data is additionally required to support the abstract view 
of the data structure being provided. In effect, it is part 
of the mechanism structure rather than the data structure. 
For example in the prototype filing system decribed in 
the previous section the directories, MFL entries and 
headers are data that is used to describe the relationships 
between the data pages and the file index. Directories, ~~L 
entries and headers are therefore referred to as "data 
providing an abstraction", 'Y'hich in this case provide an 
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abstraction that is called "file". 
The general logical structure 
structure is shown in Fig.4.S. 
of a complex data 
higher level 
object where: 
represented by 
lower level 
objects 
-
-solid arrows denote: 
"represented by". 
-dashed arrows 
denote: 
"provide an 
abstraction on" 
-
Fig.4.S, The logical structure of a complex data 
structure. 
The provision of recover ability for a type represented 
by a complex data structure as shown in Fig.4.S, involves: 
1. When an object of such a type is updated then the 
information carrying objects have to be updated and 
cached. 
2. Depending on the way in which updating and cacheing is 
done, the data providing an abstraction may have to be 
updated. 
4.3.1 Separating data providing an abstraction and 
information carrying data 
The approach which is nowadays becoming more important 
as data base complexity grows, is to store the data 
providing an abstraction (data that define the 
"relationships" as defined by Hartin (Mar7S)) separately 
from the information carrying data. The major objectives of 
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this approach are to make possible faster data retrieval and 
to provide more complete data independence (Har75). 
It will be shown that not separating data providing an 
abstraction and information carrying data in any data 
structure ~y make recoverability prohibitively expensive. 
This can be illustrated by an example: 
Consider the example of the filing system described in 
the previous section. Suppose that instead of using 
directory pages to record the relationships between data 
pages, pointers in the data pages themselves are used to 
link the pages. If a data page is updated then this means, 
under the scheme used, that the given page is replaced by 
another page. Consequently the link in the page pointing to 
the given page must be changed to point to the new page. The 
page containing the link must then be replaced as well, 
requiring an update in the link of the page pointing to it, 
and so on. Thus a whole chain of pages will have to be 
updated and cached. This chaining of pages is therefore 
obviously totally impracticable if recoverability is to be 
provided on a disk page basis as described. There are of 
course ways to get around this such as only replacing a page 
if the data part were changed and cacheing the changes to 
links in a special link cache. Although it is difficult to 
say anything about efficiency, it is clear that the 
definition of a file becomes very messy. It will be shown 
that also safely updating the file once the operations 
performed are accepted becomes more difficult. For those 
reasons these kinds of schemes are rejected. 
In general it can be said that, whatever the structure 
of the complex data structure is, for example a chain, ring, 
tree, plex (Har75) or any other, if the information carrying 
data is not separated, both physically and logically, from 
the data providing an abstraction then the problems of 
updating and providing recoverability may become 
prohibitively expensive or impracticable as data structure 
complexity grows. 
Redundancy, such as redundant pointers to make linear 
searching a little easier, or sumchecks, are part of the 
data providing an abstraction, i.e. part of the mechanisms, 
unless this redundancy is used as "hints" (Lam75). Hints 
are, as described ~n the first chapter, always checked 
against some "absolutes" and are used to optimise the 
efficiency of operations on the data structures. It is, 
therefore, unnecessary to maintain correctness of hints all 
the time. Absolutes are data providing an abstraction, 
which therefore must be always correct. If redundant 
information items are not used as hints then they are part 
of the data providing an abstraction. Consequently, it is 
important to be careful with the choice and use of 
redundancy in data structures. 
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4.3.2 The cacheing problems for complex data structures 
In general, if a level (in a multi-level system) 
provides a .type T, then it may use some specially reserved 
objects of type T to store data necessary to support the 
abstraction being provided (i.e. to store data that is part 
of the mechanism used to operate on the co~plex data 
structures). So these special system objects contain data 
providing an abstraction. For example, the MFL file a~c 
Header file in the filing system of the previous section. 
If these special objects of type T are treated as 
ordinary data structures, like all other objects of type T, 
as far as updating and cacheing are concerned, then this IT.ay 
cause the same sort of linked update problems as described 
in the previous subsection. The problems now occur at a 
higher level and at a larger scale: 
Suppose that a data structure Dl is to be updated, and 
this update has to be cached. As a result of this the data 
providing an abstraction may also have to be updated. Again 
this update may have to be cached. Suppose that the data 
supporting an abstraction is stored in data structures which 
have the same type as data structure Dl. Also suppose that 
the data supporting the abstraction of the updated data 
structure Dl is stored in data structure D2. Consequently 
data structure D2 may have to be updated. As a result of 
this the data providing the abstraction for this particular 
data structure D2 may have to be updated and cached as well. 
So the data supporting the abstraction of data structure D2 
may have to be updated, and so on. 
A particular example of this problem is (see Fig.4.6): 
Consider the filing system described ~n the previous 
section. A change made in a file within a recovery block 
causes its top-directory to be changed. Consequently the 
header has to be changed. If the header file is to be 
treated as an ordinary file then this means that the disk 
page in which the header to be updated is stored (in the 
Header file) will have to be replaced. As a result of this 
the addresses of the updated header and all the other 
headers in the replaced disk page of the header file change. 
The header of the header file also changes as a result of 
this, and consequently several other headers may get a new 
address. This means that for all these headers the 
corresponding MFL entries will have to be changed. If the 
MFL file is treated as an ordinary file then this implies 
that all pages in MFL, in which an entry has to be changed, 
have to be replaced. Obviously the header of the MFL file 
also has to be changed. Again the Header file must be 
changed. Thus each first change on the filing system within 
a recovery block may cause a large part of the filing system 
to be replaced (cached). 
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Summarising it can be said that data providing an 
abstraction may use the same data structure as those 0: 
which an abstraction is provided. but recovery for the~ ~ust 
be provided separately. 
MFL fil e HEADER file USER file 
D D D 
. 
D 
. 
D 
Where: a double arrow is used to indicate "replace for update". 
The user updates page Pl, which causes also the data page 
of the Header file containing the header of the user file 
to be updated. This causes the data page of the MFL file 
that contains the MFL-entry pointing to that header to be 
updated as well. All the relevant directory pages are 
also updated. 
Other headers and MFL-entries are updated as well (see 
text), causing more page replacements. However. these 
updates are not shown in this diagram. 
Fig.4.6. The explosion of updates that may be caused by a first 
update of a file inside a recovery block \vhen careful 
replacement is used and the Header file and MFL file are 
treated as ordinary files. 
Pl 
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4.3.2.1 ~ general solution ~ ~ specific implementations 
The distinction between information carrying data and 
data provid~ng an abstraction has already been stressed, and 
will be necessary in this subsection for a solution to the 
cacheing problem described above. The general solution to 
this cacheing problem is as follows: 
The cacheing for the information carrying data is done 
by storing the original values of the objects in which this 
data is stored. When the value of an object used to keep 
information carrying data is changed then the data providing 
an abstraction for that object may have to change, because 
of the way in which updating and recoverability are 
inplemented. The cacheing for data providing an abstraction 
has to be done differently from cacheing for information 
carrying data. Data providing an abstraction consists of 
logical units, for example, headers, descriptor, addresses, 
mapping tables or pointers. Rather than providing 
recoverability for the objects in which the data providing 
an abstraction is stored, recoverability will be provided 
for the logically independent units. 
For example in the filing system of the previous 
section, data pages are the data objects used as information 
carrying data. Data pages are cached when updated. The data 
providing an abstraction consists of the headers and ~uL 
entries. This data providing an abstraction is stored in two 
files, but recovery is provided for headers and ~ITL entries, 
as units of recovery rather than data blocks as for ordinary 
files. 
According to the definitions g~ven in this chapter the 
directories, used in the filing system described in section 
4.2, are data providing an abstraction. Yet in the 
implementation recoverability for directory pages ~s 
provided as for information carrying data, i.e. for each 
object used to contain the data (the disk page). In the 
implementation of the previous section this was possible for 
two reasons: 
1. One data or directory page always completely belongs to 
one file. It is not possible that half the page is 
used to store data of one file and the other half used 
to store data of another file. In other words these 
data and directory pages form the bricks out of which 
data structures called file bodies, are constructed. 
Obviously a directory cache could be implemented to 
contain directory pointers, like the ~L cache and 
header cache are used to contain ~ITL entries and 
headers respectively. Using such a directory cache cay 
even be more efficient under certain circumstances, 
although it is impossible to make general statements 
-114-
about this. 
2. Directory pages are part of the data structure, called 
file body, and not data providing an abstraction that 
are stored in another data structure of the same type 
as the one it is providing an abstraction of (like 
headers and MFL entries are stored in files). A 
distinction between these two kinds of data providing 
an abstraction could be made. Directory pages could be 
said to be used to define the "relationships" (as 
defined by Martin (Mar7S)) of data objects in the data 
structure. Headers and MFL entries provide an 
abstraction of these data structures. However, it is 
not felt to be necessary for the purpose of this thesis 
to make this kind of distinction. 
The main point is that from some level of abstraction 
onwards, in a complex data structure, recoverability for 
data providing the abstraction must be provided for each 
type rather than for each physical object used. This 
general solution breaks the vicious circle described above, 
because objects containing data providing an abstraction are 
treated as special objects for which the prov1s1on of 
recoverability is independent of the type of data objects 
used. 
Two different ways in which this scheme can be 
implemented are considered. The two methods look very 
similar, but are in fact fundamentally different. The first 
method (from now on referred to as method I) is to change 
the data providing an abstraction when necessary and cache 
the original values of the changed units. The second method 
(from now on referred to as method II) is to leave the 
original data providing an abstraction unaltered and cache 
the new values of the units. This is the same distinction 
as discussed earlier (in section two) with respect to update 
"in place" and cacheing original values as opposed to 
cacheing of new values. (See Fig.4.7, Fig.4.8, Fig.4.9.) In 
order to show the differences, suppose that an update is 
made to an object causing the data providing an abstraction 
to be updated too. Also suppose that the object is a global 
(either because it is declared outside the outermost 
recovery block, or because it is a type which is always 
global even if it is created inside an inner block, for 
example a file on disk or some other resource). If the 
update is made inside a nested recovery block then method I 
will work according to the following principles (Fig.4.7 
shows an example program and Fig.4.8 and Fig.4.9 show how 
methods I and II, respectively, update objects and cache 
values.): 
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(0) 
~ 
change_file (a,vl) 
create file (b) 
change-file(a,v2) 
change:file(c,v3) 
change file(b,v4) 
create-file (d) 
destroy file (e) 
des troy:) i le (b) 
r 
change file(c,v5) 
change:file(f,v6) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
change· file(f,v7) 
change:file(d,v8) 
(5) 
-
where: change file(fl,vl) 
destroy file(f2) 
create_file(f3) 
gives file fl value vl 
destroys file f2 
creates file f3 
used to mark the scope of a 
recovery block 
used to mark the scope of 
an alternative 
All files are global objects, even when they 
are created inside a recovery block. 
Fig.4.7, An example program operating on 
global objects. 
\ 
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* The data providing an abstraction will be updated a~c 
the previous value will be cached with a tag to indicate 
the kind of update that has been done, e.g. change, 
delete or create. 
* Up-to-d.ate versions of the data providing an abstraction 
are now kept while previous values are cached. 
* 
The entries in the cache can only be thrown away when 
the outermost recovery block acceptance test has been 
successful, because the objects are globals to recovery 
blocks. 
* If there are several abstractions each providing a more 
abstract view, thus implementing a complex data 
structure, then a different cache will be associated 
with each set of data providing an abstraction. This may 
not be necessary in the case that one level implements 
them, but it is irrelevant in that case whether there is 
one cache with type-flags for each entry or different 
caches. However, it is convenient to regard a separate 
cache as being associated with each set of data 
providing an abstraction. The processing of these 
caches can now be done completely independently. ~o 
information from other caches will be needed to process 
a cache in order to accept or undo the operations 
performed on a set of data providing an abstraction. 
Method II 
principles: 
will work according to the following 
* The objects in which data providing an abstraction are 
stored will remain unaltered and new values will be 
stored in a cache. The definition of the data providing 
an abstraction is completely changed. The data providing 
an abstraction now consists of the caches and the 
original data providing an abstraction. So the-mapping 
functions are different. 
* If several sets of data providing an abstraction are 
used then there may be a problem in constructing new 
values of data providing an abstraction if an abstract 
data type is operated upon inside a recovery block. This 
problem can be shown in an example: 
In the filing system described in the previous 
section, the MFL file and Header file are not updated 
immediately when a file is operated upon inside a 
recovery block. Instead the new value of the header is 
cached and an entry to indicate that the file has been 
operated upon is put in the MFL cache. An MFL entry (in 
the MFL file) contains a pointer to the corresponding 
header in the Header file. However, if a new header is 
cached then the ~WL entry can not be constructed yet. 
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place cache values of files 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
a b c d e f 
empty va NE vc NE ve vf 
a=va vl NE vc NE ve vf 
a=va v2 empty v3 NE ve vf 
-------
b=new 
a=vl 
c=vc 
a=va v2 NE v3 empty ill: vf 
-------
b=new 
a=vl 
c=vc 
-------
b=empty 
d=new 
e=ve 
a=va v2 NE v3 empty NE vf 
-------
a=vl 
c=vc 
d=new 
e=ve 
a=va v2 NE vS v8 NE v7 
-------
a=vl 
c=vc 
d=new 
e=vew 
f=vf 
a=va v2 NE vS v8 ~E v7 
c=vc 
d=new 
e=ve 
f=vf 
empty v2 NE vS v8 NE v7 
Where: NE means non-existent. 
Fig.4.8, The cache contents and values of files at various 
places in the program of Fig.4.7, while cacheing 
method I is used and no errors occur. 
* 
* 
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Instead an ~ITL entry is made to indicate that a new file 
has been created. 
The entries in the caches can only be processed (i.e. 
put in the sets of data providing an abstraction in 
order to update the original sets) when the outermost 
recovery block acceptance test has been successful. 
As a consequence of these last two points the caches 
associated with the different sets of data providing an 
abstraction cannot be processed independently. When the 
outermost recovery block acceptance test has been 
successful, the data providing the lowest level 
abstraction has to be updated first. Then the data 
providing the next level abstraction can be updated, and 
so on. So some communication or simultaneous processing 
will be necessary between the procedures that process 
these caches. 
The last point is a characteristic difference between 
method I, i.e. doing the actions immediately and cacheing 
the previous states, and method II, i.e. delaying the 
actions and recording the new states. 
4.3.2.2 A comparison ~ ~ ~ methods 
Both methods described above have their advantages. 
Neither of the methods can be said to be Buperior under most 
circumstances. 
Method I has the advantage that caches can be processed 
independently. Another advantage of method I is that the 
definitions of data providing an abstraction are the same 
for an unrecoverable system and for the recoverable system 
with the same structure. 
Method II has the advantage that the original values of 
data providing an abstraction are kept so they remain 
unchanged in the event of a system crash (unless the crash 
occurs during the cache processing after a successful 
outermost recovery block acceptance test). This is of 
importance if data has a longer lifetime then the runtime of 
the program, and is kept outside core. Another advantage of 
method II arises when more than one user exists and there is 
an access strategy providing multiple reads but exclusive 
updates for the data structures. While an update proceeds, 
and until it satisfies its acceptance test, other users can 
use the previous version. The update program must exclude 
other readers only during the actual cache processing and 
updating of the original version when the outermost recovery 
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place cache values of files 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
a b c d e f 
empty va NE vc NE ve vf 
a=vl va NE vc NE ve vf 
a=vl va NE vc NE ve vf 
-------
b=new 
a=v2 
c=v3 
a=vl va NE vc NE ve vf 
-------
b=new 
a=v2 
c=v3 
-------
c=destr. 
d=new 
e=destr. 
a=vl va NE vc NE ve vf 
-------
a=v2 
c=v3 
d=new 
e=destr. 
a=vl va NE vc NE ve vf 
-------
a=v2 
c=vS 
d=v8 
e=destr. 
f=v7 
a=vl va NE vc NE ve vf 
-------
a=v2 
c=vS 
d=v8 
e=destr. 
f=v7 
empty v2 NE vS v8 NE v7 
Where: NE means non-existent. 
Fig.4.9, The cache contents and values of files at various 
places in the program of Fig.4.7, while cacheing 
method II is used and no errors occur. 
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block acceptance test has been successful. If the test 
fails other readers are completely unaffected. Even if t~e 
test succeeds other readers could continue using the old 
version. This involves constructing new mapping tables for 
new files (new file directories), letting other readers 
still use old mapping tables. However, these issues are 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Summarizing: 
* If an existing system is to be made recoverable then 
method I is probably the most practicable one, because 
mapping functions do not change. In general, however, 
making an existing system recoverable will almost 
certainly give many problems. 
* It is expected that method II is more feasible in a 
multi-user system with multiple reads but exclusive 
update access strategy for the data structures. 
* With method II the caches associated with the different 
sets of data providing an abstraction cannot be 
processed independently, while with method I they can. 
This may complicate the cache processing with method II. 
* Method II may have advantages in the event of a system 
crash and has been chosen for this reason in the filing 
system described in section 4.2. 
4.3.3 Alternative solutions ~ the cacheing problem 
It could be argued that cacheing file words rather 
whole blocks would solve the problems described in 
section. However, there are several other problems 
this scheme. 
than 
this 
with 
In the first place, if method II is used for cacheing 
then a linear scan through a file could be very complicated 
and inefficient, because a stream of words rather than disk 
pages is to be constructed from the original version of the 
file and the cache. The cache will have to be implemented on 
disk, because core store may safely be assumed to be too 
small to contain such a cache. Consequently the method of 
cacheing will have to be method I, which may be a 
disadvantage in itself. 
Secondly, if 
undoing after an 
cumbersome and 
acceptable since 
frequently. 
method I is used for cacheing then the 
unsuccessful acceptance test will be very 
inefficient. However, this could be 
acceptance tests are not expected to fail 
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Finally. the overhead in administration data in the 
cache will be fairly big e.g. a page address plus offset for 
each cached word. This would mean, for example. that only 
33% of the cache would consist of cached words if the page 
address and offset occupy a word each. The overhead can 
under cert.ain circumstances be justified such as in the 
special representations used for sparse matrices (i.e. if on 
average only a few words per data page are updated). 
Cacheing will in any case be complicated and probably 
inefficient, because writing one cache entry to disk every 
t~me a file word is changed would obviously be too big an 
overhead. Consequently this will have to be optimised. which 
may be complicated, because cache entries must be written 
before the file is updated, in order to be able to cope with 
errors occuring between these events, or system crashes. 
The scheme looks in fact rather like one where bits are 
cached to provide recoverabi1ity for integers. However. it 
is not that this particular scheme is in all environments in 
all cases a bad scheme, but rather that the problems 
discussed in this section are real problems and the 
solutions sought are feasible ones. 
4.3.4 Main conclusions 
The main conclusion drawn from the discussion on 
recoverabi1ity for complex data structures is that data 
providing an abstraction and information carrying data have 
to be separated in different physical objects whenever 
possible. They also have to be treated separately when 
recoverabi1ity is to be provided for them. 
The information 
physical objects for 
for data providing 
preferably provided 
from which the data 
carrying data is preferably treated as 
which recoverabi1ity is provided, while 
an abstraction the recoverability is 
explicitly for the logical units (types) 
is composed. 
In the filing system of section 4.2 the types that 
could be distinguished at different levels of abstractions 
were: word. page, directory pointer, header and ~ITL entry. 
It was shown that recovery is to be provided for types 
rather than for the physical objects used to store the data, 
from some level onwards. Below that level recovery is to be 
provided for those physical objects used. In the filing 
system the recovery for types was provided for headers and 
MFL entries: it could have been provided for directory 
pointers and even words in data pages as well. However, that 
would have been less efficient in the particular 
environment. 
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4.4 Maintaining consistency ~n recoverable complex data 
stuctures 
So fa~ facilities to make state restoration possible 
have been discussed. Another aspect of recovery is crash 
resistance, which is, as described in chapter two, of 
importance for data structures that remain in existence 
after the running of the program has finished. It will be 
shown that the same mechanisms that have been discussed ~n 
sections 4.2 and 4.3 for providing recovery, can be used to 
provide crash resistance. 
The notion of recovery block provides a convenient way 
of talking about the problems and will therefore be used in 
relation to the techniques and mechanisms used for 
recoverability and crash resistant systems. Recovery blocks 
may be used to define the scope of recovery from crashes. 
The scope of recovery from crashes is taken to be the ti~e 
between entering and leaving the outermost recovery block. 
(Only recovery for sequential processes is considered here.) 
The use of a recovery block with a trivial acceptance test 
and one alternative must assure the writer of the program 
that unless a catastrophe occurs, so that data are lost, 
everything he wants to do will be done or nothing will be 
done at all. The kind of consistency considered is 
explained by an example: 
If a program inside a recovery block wants to update a 
file header on disk (the header is a variable length block 
which may be divided over more than one disk page), then 
that header must either be updated completely, or must not 
have been modified at all. Thus suppose that a header is 
partially in disk page x and partially in disk page y. Then 
a power failure could occur when x has been updated and y 
has not been updated yet. This would leave the header 
neither in its original nor in the new state and, therefore, 
must be impossible. 
4.4.1 Crash and crash resistance 
The notions of crash and crash resistance have been 
defined in chapter two of this thesis. These notions, 
however, will be defined more precisely here for the purpose 
of this chapter. 
Program P, shown in Fig.4.l0, may have to be abandoned! 
because a level j<=i fails and cannot continue. Level ~ 
performs operations on objects objl, ••• ,objn whenever it 
interprets an operation on Ot in the user program P. If 
level i has to abandon program P (or the interpretation 0: 
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an operation on Ot), because a level j (j<=i) 
then this will be called a crash. It is assumed 
at does not disappear with program P, but rather 
which can be used again by a following program 
finished. 
Program P 
declare at : T global; 
recovery block 
r---
1 st. alternative 
alternative 
A level mapping at onto objl, 
of the underlying machine. 
level i+l 
,objn 
level i 
has f ailec., 
that object 
is a global 
after P has 
underlyjng machine 
Fig.4.l0, A diagram of a level on which a program using an 
abstract type T provided by the level, is 
running. 
In order to show which sorts of crashes the system is 
required to be able to cope with, all crashes are classified 
in either one of the following classes: 
1. None of the objects objl, .,. ,objn is corrupted, 
because of the crash. 
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2. One of the objects obj 1, ... ,objn lS corr'.:?tec. , 
because the crash occured while a correct state 
transltlon for at was in progress. Thus that object is 
left in an invalid state. 
3. k of t~e n objects objl, .• , objn are corrupted, with 
2<=k<=n, because of some catastrophe. 
For example, in the filing system described earlier in 
this chapter a crash of class 1 occurs if the system crashes 
while no disk write was in progress, or the disk write is 
not affected once initiated successfully. A crash of class 
2 occurs if a disk write is interrupted or unsuccessful. A 
crash of class 3 occurs if a head crash occurs, or the 
operating system fails to perform normally and goes on 
writing to disk for a while, or the disk head does not 
position itself correctly before a disk write. 
A class 3 crash may corrupt the whole data base such 
that repairing is impossible and built-in defense mechanis::-.s 
are destroyed or have not worked properly. So, as described 
in chapter two, other recovery mechanisms are required to 
cope with such failures. Recovery from a crash of class 3 
is possible is by keeping complete backup versions of all 
the objects objl, ,objn on different physical storage 
devices. (However, other failures may of course corrupt 
these backup versions.) From now on the term "crash" is 
used in this section to mean just one of the first two sorts 
of crash, unless indicated differently. A class 3 crash is 
called a "catastrophe". Crashes of class 2 are 
distinguished separately, because in many systems there are 
many kinds of failures that may cause the (so far correct) 
execution of a program to be stopped abruptly, even when an 
update of an object obji is in progress. It is therefore 
useful to be able to cope with this particular class of 
crashes. 
The consistency requirement described means that after 
a crash occurs while the system is in a recovery block, the 
system as seen by the user must either be in the state it 
was in before the recovery block was entered, or the new 
state which is the one it would be in if the recovery block 
had been left normally after a successful acceptance test. 
The only concession that will be made is that some objects 
on which the user objects are mapped, may have to be "freed" 
by some sort of garbage collector, for reasons which will 
become clear in the following subsection. If the system can 
cope with crashes of class 1 and class 2 (in the way 
described here) without requlrlng special recovery actions 
after the crash, then it is called crash resistant. 
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4.4.2 The provision of crash resistance ~ recovery 
There are several ways in which crash resistance can be 
provided. Chapter two showed that the careful replacement 
technique is one of the best techniques to provide crash 
resistance. There will however, using careful replacement 
always be some information which has to be kept in a fixed 
place, because the software must have a "grip" on the data 
structures (e.g.: the address of the first page of a system 
directory in a filing system). This information dll 
therefore have to be updated "in place". 
There are of courSe other strategies that could be 
used. A complete survey of techniques has been given ~n 
chapter two. However, the careful replacement technique ~s 
one of the most efficient ones and fits in nicely with the 
recovery strategy discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
It was argued that updates to an object Ot have to be 
done as follows: 
1. Cache the information carrying objects (see Fig.4.5) 
which have to be changed and make the necessary 
updates. 
2. Cache new values for data providing an abstraction (see 
Fig.4.5) and process the cache and the data providing 
an abstraction after passing the recovery block 
acceptance test. 
Step 1 can be implemented by the careful replacement 
scheme. The data providing an abstraction of step 2 then 
comprise the information that has to be updated "in place". 
Thus the careful replacement technique for providing crash 
resistance fits in nicely with the recovery strategy 
discussed. The original versions of objects that are 
replaced (i.e. updated) are now the cached objects. 
Consequently they are not thrown away after the operation on 
Ot inside a recovery block has been completed, but are kept 
until the appropriate recovery block acceptance test has 
been successful. If this acceptance test fails then the new 
vers~ons of the objects have to be thrown away. 
For example, in the filing system described in this 
chapter, file bodies, i.e. directory and data pages, are 
updated using the careful replacement technique. New values 
of data providing an abstraction, i.e. headers and MFL 
entries, are kept in caches. Consequently whenever a user 
operation on a file is performed inside a recovery block and 
a crash occurs, the file will keep its original value. The 
critical moment is when the data providing an abstraction 
have to be updated "in place" after a successful acceptance 
test. 
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~.~.~.l The critical updates 
The strategy followed leads to the following situations 
in the event of a crash occuring at different stages of the 
processing pf user object at, using recovery blocks: 
* If a crash occurs inside a recovery block before either 
an "UNDO" or an "ACCEPT" has been executed for that 
block then the user object at (see Fig.4.10) will not 
yet have been changed, because the data providing an 
abstraction still map onto the original version. (The 
"ACCEPT" l.S the accept procedure after a successful 
acceptance test. The "UNDO" is the backup procedure 
after an unsuccessful acceptance test.) Only new 
objects obji (see Fig.4.l0) will possibly have been 
allocated by the level providing object at. 
* The "UNDO" frees newly allocated objects obji and undoes 
the cacheing of new values of data providing an 
abstraction. "UNDO" does not affect the objects obji of 
the original representation of at. Thus if a crash 
occurs during the execution of the "UNDO" procedure then 
at will remain unaltered. 
* The "ACCEPT" for an inner recovery block processes 
caches only and possibly frees some objects obji that 
were newly allocated (for a detailed example see the 
filing system described earlier). So the same holds for 
such "ACCEPT" procedure as for the "UNDO". 
* The "ACCEPT" procedure of the outermost recovery block 
does update the data providing an abstraction "in 
place". Other objects obji remain unchanged during the 
"ACCEPT", because there is already an old and a new 
version for every changed object. So only some objects 
obji need to be freed. If the crash occurs during the 
updating of the data providing an abstraction then this 
could leave an inconsistent data structure behind (i.e. 
the user object is in an invalid state). 
Consequently the problem is now isolated to the 
"ACCEPT" of the outermost recovery block, during which 
information is updated "in place". This updating is called 
the critical update. 
Several approaches to this problem are possible, some 
of these are: 
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1. The principle of multiple copies could be used. This 
concept provides absolute crash resistance at any ti~e. 
2. By using extra levels of indirection the amount of 
information to be updated "in place" could always be 
reduced to one object (see also (New72)). For exa~ple, 
rather than updating the whole system catalogue "in 
place", a new version of the catalogue could be made 
and a fixed disk page could be used to contain the 
address of the first page of the catalogue, thus 
reducing the amount of information to be updated "in 
place" to one word. The updating of the one object "in 
place" could be done using one of the other approaches 
described. 
3. The probability of a crash occuring during the updating 
of the data providing an abstraction in "ACCEPT" can be 
so small that we can afford to update them "in place" 
and still be very safe. If a crash occurs anyway then 
it is to be treated as a class 3 crash. 
4. If there is only one object to be updated "in place" 
(or just a few) then an external device (or the 
operator) could be used as a backup of the value of 
this object (for example write it to a mini-tape or 
type it on the operator's console and let the operator 
type it in again In case a crash occured before the 
"OK-message" is printed). In fact this could be 
regarded as an implementation of the multiple copies 
technique. 
Many other schemes, possibly involving audit trail, 
differential files, checkpoint/restart for the whole 
process, or other techniques, could be devised. However, the 
techniques described here are the most commonly used ones 
and seem the most obvious ones. 
For example, in the filing system described in this 
chapter, strategy 3 has been chosen, because 1 and 2 are 
both too cumbersome, and critical updates are not likely to 
happen very often (only during the "ACCEPT" of an outermost 
recovery block). 
The advantage of strategies 1,4 and 2 (if method 1 or 4 
is used for the single object to be updated "in place") is 
that after a crash that occurs within any recovery block 
(even the outermost) the system can usually just restart as 
if nothing has happened. With strategies 3 and 2 (if method 
3 is used for the single object to be updated "in place"), 
however, some way of finding out whether the crash occured 
during an update of data providing an abstraction "in place" 
or not, is needed. If it did then the crash is to be 
treated as a class 3 crash, if it did not then all is still 
well. Two ways in which the system can find out when the 
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crash occured are using a salvation program and using a flag 
to indicate "critical update in progress". A conditio:-. for 
the use of a salvation program is that it must be possible 
to validate the data structures (and data providing a~ 
abstraction). The same program could be used for other 
purposes. for example if after a hardware failure it has to 
be established whether a crash was a class three crash or 
not. An implementation of a system with such a salvation 
program (called a "verification procedure") is described by 
Fraser (Fra69). A vector of the length of the number of 
available disk blocks is kept. The directory of a file 
points to an entry in this vector. which indicates the first 
block of the file. Each entry points to another entry which 
indicates the next block of the file. The validation program 
checks the length of the file. which is kept in the 
directory. with the number of disk blocks belonging to the 
file. If there is any inconsistency then the file involved 
is deleted. Many systems also use a flag "update in 
progress" or. as it is sometimes called. a "damage flag" 
(Cur77) • 
4.4.3 Conclusions 
This section has discussed how it can be ensured that 
data structures are updated completely and correctly, or not 
altered at all. Thus a crash occuring inside a recovery 
block appears to the user as having happened just before the 
outermost recovery block with respect to the values of the 
global data structures. It is always possible to guarantee 
such consistency in data structures at any time, even after 
a system crash which may occur at any time. 
Several strategies and solutions have been discussed 
and in many cases there is a trade-off between efficiency 
and reliability. However. it looks as if one may have to 
pay a lot in terms of efficiency to get a system which is 
crash resistance at any time during the processing. The 
mechanisms used to update objects and cache modifications 
may provide crash resistance while inside any recovery 
block. Programs may be inside recovery blocks for 99% of 
the time. Only during the "critical updates", which may be 
done during 1% of the time. no crash resistance could be 
provided. Implementing multiple copies or extra levels of 
indirection to overcome this problem. may be very expensive. 
Trade-offs are very difficult to make in general. All 
that can be said is that the overhead with certain 
strategies will be bigger than with some other strategies. 
The costs of a crash of class 3 are completely dependent on 
the specific application. 
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5.0 A COST ANALYSIS OF THE IXPLE~'!E~TED RECOVER .. \BLE 
PROTOTYPE SYSTEM 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the costs of the provision and 
use of the recoverabi1ity in the recoverable (two-level) 
system described in this thesis. In this two-level syste~ 
the first level (i.e. lower level) consists of a fault 
tolerant OCODE interpreter, and the second level consists of 
(an operating system with) a recoverable filing system. 
The fault tolerant OCODE interpreter used ~n the 
prototype system was built only to provide a fault tolerant 
underlying machine, to the next level, with a partially 
recoverable interface. The fault tolerant OCODE interpreter 
provides an interface with recoverable OCODE types (24 bit 
words), unrecoverable OCODE types and unrecoverable disk 
blocks, as described in an earlier chapter. All of the work 
for this thesis has concentrated on subsequent levels 
(PRI-1eve1s on a fault tolerant machine). The efficiency of 
the recoverable OCODE interpreter implemented was therefore 
not important; so an implementation which was very efficient 
in space (there was not much core space to spare) and could 
be written with little effort, was chosen. The implemented 
fault tolerant OCODE interpreter is, however, not very 
efficient in run time ~n cases where many different 
variables are updated inside recovery blocks. Details of 
the run time overhead and a description of the 
implementation details of the fault tolerant OCODE 
interpreter have been g~ven elsewhere (Ver76), (Ver77a). 
Comparisons and cost analysis of different ways in 
which such fault tolerant interpreters can be implemented 
have been made before (Hor74), (Ran75), (Ker74), (Von76) and 
will therefore not be repeated in this thesis. The cost 
analysis given in this chapter will concentrate on the 
recoverable filing system. 
The cost analysis given, consists of a formal 
performance analysis (i.e. execution times of programs using 
the recoverability provided) and an analysis of the extra 
data space and program space required by the filing system 
for the provision of recoverabi1ity. A comparison is made 
with some alternative techniques that could have been used 
and some experiments have been performed to measure the 
overhead incurred by the use of recovery blocks. 
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5.2 Basic principles of the ~ analysis 
The cost analysis of this chapter is based on: 
1. The times necessary for the execution of the operations 
provided. 
The extra time used by the filing system for the 
provision of recoverability for files, is estimatec by 
considering the extra number of disk accesses necessary 
to provide this recoverability. 
2. System program sizes. 
The total size of the programs providing a recoverable 
filing system is compared with the total size of the 
programs providing a filing system with an identical 
structure and identical operations, but for which no 
recoverability is provided. 
3. The extra data space needed to keep redundant 
information for potential backing up. 
The filing system maintains three caches (in core) and 
uses extra disk space, needed to keep cached pages. 
The total amount of cache space needed by the system is 
difficult to estimate in general. Some initial work in 
this area has been reported elsewhere (Wye73). Only 
some rather general statements can be made about the 
sizes of these caches, since the amount of cache space 
needed entirely depends on the use made of the system. 
4. A formal analysis of the overhead incurred by the use 
of recovery blocks. 
The overhead in the number of disk accesses needed 
during normal operations on files to provide 
recoverability, is compared with the overhead that 
would be required when alternative techniques were used 
to provide the recoverability. Other advantages and 
disadvantages of those techniques are also discussed in 
order to make a reasonable comparison. 
5. Some experiments measuring the overhead incurred by the 
use of recovery blocks. 
A number of experiments were done to measure the 
overhead in the number of disk accesses needed during 
normal processing, in order to provide recoverability. 
These five aspects form a fairly comprehensive cost 
analysis of the recoverability provided by the system. 
The only 
recoverability 
way in which 
provided could be 
the benefits of 
determined would be 
the 
by 
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measuring the availability and reliability of the syste~, 
with and without the use of recovery blocks in real life 
situations. For practical reasons this was not possible 
within the framework of the work done. It would have 
involved the monitoring of a system while used by a number 
of users. The system built is a prototype and there are no 
users on the system. The running of a general and 
arbitrarily chosen set of user programs taken from similar 
systems was impossible or impracticable. Such experi~ents 
would require an appreciable effort and almost make a 
project in itself. For these reasons the experiments were 
restricted to the monitoring of a little test program and a 
real life utility program. 
A very important factor for the provision of high 
reliability based on recoverability is the use of a good 
error detection scheme. The costs of the tests involved 
must, for every particular application, be taken into 
account if the costs of reliability is to be determined, 
rather than just the costs of recoverability. The costs of 
such tests is completely ignored in the cost analysis given 
here. 
5.3 Execution times: an analysis of the overhead ~n disk 
accesses 
The execution times necessary for the file operations 
are completely determined by the number of disk accesses. 
(The system is a single user system, so there will be little 
overlapping of CPU processing and disk accesses.) The 
number of disk accesses required for operations in a filing 
system that does not provide recoverability are compared 
with the number. of disk accesses required for the same 
operations in the implemented recoverable system. 
If the operations on files in the recoverable filing 
system are not done inside a recovery block then their 
implementations will be identical to those of the operations 
in the unrecoverable filing system. This makes the 
evaluation of the overhead easy to analyse, both formally 
and empirically. 
If read access to a file is done inside a recovery 
block then this may be cheaper in the recoverable syst:m 
than a similar read access in the unrecoverable system. Th~s 
is because access paths have been changed to include the 
caches (see previous chapter), which are kept in core. 
Consequently it may happen that a header does not have to be 
read from disk, which may save several disk accesses. 
If a header is updated then the number of disk accesses 
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necessary for this update are the same whether the update is 
done inside or outside a recovery block. If this update is 
done inside a recovery block then the update is postponed 
until the (outermost) recovery block is left. When the 
outermost recovery block is left the header is updated in 
the way in . which updates are done outside recovery blocks. 
However, if a header is updated several times within one 
recovery block then this will lead to only one update of the 
header on disk. So the use of recovery blocks as implemented 
will save disk accesses in this situation. 
MFL entries are only updated when files are created and 
destroyed, and only read when the disk address of a header 
is wanted. Again if a file is created and subsequently 
destroyed inside a recovery block then this will have no 
effects on the MFL-file. So using recovery blocks will lead 
to the same number or less disk accesses to the ~ITL-file. 
In order to compare the costs of writing a file inside 
with not inside a recovery block, the actions perfo~ed and 
disk accesses done for the implementation of the two basic 
update operations: 'update_a_data-yage' and 'add a data~­
page' are considered. (Operation 'delete a data page' ~s 
basically similar to 'add_a_data-yage'.) -Tab~e 5.1 below 
shows the operations performed on file bod~es for the 
implementation of operations 'update_a_data-yage' and 
'add_a_data-yage'. 
operation 
data-yage 
I unrecoverable 
system 
1.1 read data 
page 
1.2 write new 
value in 
data page 
II recoverable 
system 
i) The update action. 
2.1 read data page 
2.2 write new value ~n 
newly allocated page 
if this page has not 
been updated inside 
this recovery block 
yet, else write 
to original page 
and goto (2.7) 
2.3 read directory page 
pointing to original 
page that has just 
been updated 
(replaced) 
2.4 write new value of 
directory page to 
newly allocated 
page if this 
directory page has 
not been updated 
inside this recovery 
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~ add_a_data- 3.1 write value 
page of new data 
page to new-
ly allocated 
page. 
3.2 read the di-
rectory page 
that must 
point to the 
new data 
page. 
3.3 write new 
value to 
this direc-
tory page. 
Note: the case 
where a 
directory 
page ~s 
full and a 
new one is 
to be 
allocated 
for the 
new entry, 
is ignored 
here. 
block yet, else write 
it to original page. 
2.5 if the directory page 
just updated was the 
top directory page 
or was overwritten 
instead of replaced 
then goto (2.6) 
else goto (2.3). 
ii) At the end of the 
(outermost) recovery 
block 
2.6 free the original 
data and directory 
pages that have 
been replaced. 
2.7 finish. 
i) The update action. 
4.1 write value of new page 
to newly allocated page. 
4.2 read directory that must 
point to the newly 
allocated page. 
4.3 like 2.4 
4.4 if the directory page 
just updated was 
the topdirectory 
page or was 
overwritten instead of 
replaced then goto 
(4.5) else goto (4.2). 
ii) At the end of the 
(outermost) recovery 
block. 
4.5 free the original 
directory pages 
that have been 
replaced. 
4.6 finish. 
Table 5.1, A comparison of file body operations in the 
recoverable and unrecoverable system. 
the 
Free pages 
Free Store 
are marked "free" and their address 
File. Updating of the Free Store 
is ~n 
Fi~e 
-134-
involves very few disk accesses and will there:ore be 
ignored. 
In both the recoverable and unrecoverable syste~ 
freeing a page involves an extra disk write. The "free"--r::ark 
in a page .is redundant, because there is a list of free 
pages in the Free Store File (see a previous chapter). 
Dispensing with this redundant "free"-mark in free pages 
would also dispense with the extra disk writes necessary to 
free pages. However, it is felt to be desirable to keep this 
redundant mark in order to have a check in case the critical 
update (see chapter four), i.e. the updating of the Header 
file and MFL-file, goes wrong. Another reason for 
maintaining "free" marks is that updates of the Free Store 
File are buffered, so after a crash it may not contain all 
the addresses of free pages, or addresses of pages that have 
been allocated just before the crash. A free page is only 
given on request if the address of that page is in the Free 
Store File and the page is marked "free". Allocating a free 
page therefore involves a disk read to check the "free" 
mark. If the critical update is done in an absolute crash 
resistant way (see previous chapters) and the Free Store 
File is updated as first action of the critical update (part 
of the Free Store File is kept in core and must be forced 
out) then the "free" mark in free pages will not be 
necessary. 
The 
operations 
below. 
number of 
under the 
A update_a_data_-
page 
~ add_a_data-yage 
disk accesses 
two systems 
I 
(unrecoverable 
system) 
2 
4 
necessary for the 
are given in Table 
II 
(recoverable 
system) 
between 2 and 
4+4*number-of-
directory-
levels 
between 4 and 
6+4* (number-of-
directory-
levels - 1) 
Table 5.2, The number of disk accesses necessary 
for the two operations shown in Table 5.1, 
when performed inside and when performed 
outside a recovery block. 
two 
5.2 
If free pages were not marked "free" 
upperbounds for the two operations A and B under 
then the 
II (i.e. 
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inside a recovery block) would be: 
(2 + 2*number-of-directory-levels), and 
(3 + 2*(number-of-directory-levels-l)), respectively. 
The upperbounds given for an operation inside a reco'."ery 
~lo:k represent the costs of the first update of a file body 
~ns~de a recovery block. Every subsequent update inside the 
same recovery block will be cheaper. In order to show this 
an example is given below. 
A few concrete examples of operations on a file Fare 
described to show what these figures and formulae g~ven 
above can mean in practice. Suppose that file F consists of 
one directory page and 50 data pages (pointed to by this one 
directory page). 
If one disk page of file F is updated inside a recovery 
block then this will cause: 4+4*1=8 disk accesses to be 
done. If no "free" marks were used in free pages then it 
would cause 2+2*1=4 disk accesses. (The allocation of two 
pages costs two reads to check the "free" marks, the freeing 
of two pages costs two writes. Thus four disk accesses are 
saved by dispensing with the "free" marks.) If the update 
is done outside a recovery block then 2 disk accesses are 
needed. (The directory page is not updated, ~hich saves 
another two disk accesses.) 
If ten disk pages of file F are updated inside a 
recovery block then this will cause: 4+4*1=8 disk accesses 
for the first update and 9*6=54 disk accesses for the other 
nine disk page updates. Thus in total 8+54=62 disk accesses 
are done. Every subsequent update costs still 6 disk 
accesses: one to read the data page, one to check the "free" 
mark in the newly allocated page, one to write its new value 
to a newly allocated page, one to read the directory page to 
be updated, one to update that page and finally one to free 
the replaced data page. If the 10 updates were done 
immediately after each other and a good buffer management 
system were used, then the reading of the directory page 
from disk 10 times could be avoided, because the page would 
probably still be in a buffer. Also writing of that same 
directory page 10 times could be avoided. So by using such a 
buffer management system, the 62 disk accesses could be 
brought down to just 44 disk accesses. The ACCEPT FS and 
UNDO FS (see previous chapters) would have to force buffers 
to dIsk or "clean" buffers, if necessary, as part of the 
filing system processing at the end of a recovery block 
alternative. 
If no "free" marks were used in free pages then it 
would cause 2+2*1(for the first page) + 9*4(for the 
rema~n~ng nine pages) = 40 disk accesses. A good buffer 
management system could take this down to just 22 disk 
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accesses (if the updates are done without access to o~her 
files in the mean time, which could cause the loss of the 
directory page from the buffer.) If, however, the updates 
are done not inside any recovery block then 10*2=20 disk 
accesses are needed. 
If the same page is updated (assumed is that it is 
partially updated, so a read before write is required) 10 
times, then this will require 4+4*1=8 disk accesses for the 
first update and 2*9=18 for the other nine updates. This 
totals 26 disk accesses. If no "free" marks were used then 
this number would be 2+2*1=4 (for the first update) + 9*2 
(for the other nine updates) = 22 disk accesses. 
Consequently the more often disk 
updated inside a recovery block, the 
relative overhead. 
pages of one file are 
smaller will be the 
Summarizing: 
It is impossible 
numbers of disk accesses 
in the recoverable and 
following reasons: 
to generalise the differences 1n 
necessary to do operations on files 
the unrecoverable system, for the 
* If recovery blocks are used then generally less disk 
accesses will be necessary for reading and writing of 
headers and MFL entries. (Clearly the standard system 
could be changed to incorporate similar buffers.) 
* Operations on file bodies will require more disk 
accesses if recovery blocks are used; however, it is 
hard to say how many more on average, because this 
depends on the series of operations performed inside one 
recovery block. 
In general, however, it seems reasonable to expect that 
operations inside recovery blocks will cost more disk 
accesses than operations performed outside recovery blocks, 
because the number of disk accesses necessary to update 
headers and MFL entries is in the OS/6 environment 1n 
general small compared with the number of disk accesses 
necessary to update the file bodies. 
The overhead in disk accesses in the implemented system 
is as high as shown in Table 5.2 and the examples, for two 
reasons: 
1. A "free" mark is placed in free pages. Since updating a 
page the first time inside a recovery block, involves 
the replacing of that page by another page, a free page 
is to be allocated (and checked) and the original page 
is to be freed at the end of the recovery block. The 
use of these "free" marks could be avoided as described 
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above, which would save the extra disk accesses. 
2. Since a data page is replaced, when updated (for the 
first time) inside a recovery block, the directory page 
pointing to it has to be updated as well. However, a 
good puffer management system could bring down the 
overhead incurred by having to update a directory page 
many times if many pages it points to, are updated. 
5.4 Program sizes 
An unrecoverable filing system with exactly the same 
structure as the recoverable system, was designed and 
embedded in OS/6 (to replace the original OS/6 filing 
system). This filing system occupies 9K bytes. The total 
size of OS/6, with the filing system, is 23K bytes. 
In order to make the filing system recoverable, the 
cacheing mechanisms had to be incorporated. This meant that 
many filing system programs had to incorporate operations 
which make cache-entries, and the cache manipulation 
programs and ENTER FS, UNDO FS and ACCEPT FS (the enter, 
undo and accept procedures, see previous chapters) had to be 
written. The new recoverable filing system now occupies 
l6.SK bytes. Other programs, providing the new recovery 
block structure (see a previous chapter) and supporting some 
other facilities required (such as an allocation mechanism 
for unrecoverable store, which is used for cache (log) 
space, see a previous chapter) occupy about 0.5K bytes. 
Therefore the total OS/6 system with recoverable filing 
system, occupies 3lK bytes, an increase of about 30%. 
5.5 Cache space 
As shown in chapter three, "the cache" in the filing 
system consists of: 
1. The disk pages that are part of new versions of files, 
but not of the original versions. 
2. The page cache, header cache and MFL cache. 
The header cache and MFL cache will generally not be 
very big, because a user will not update many files within 
one program. The page cache will generally not be very big 
either, because a user will normally, in OS/6, not update 
thousands of disk pages inside one program. Initial 
experiments performed sofar seem to indicate that the sizes 
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of the caches (page cache, header cache and ~~L cache) will 
not be significant; most users are not expected to need more 
than a few hundred words of cache space (1 word = 3 bytes). 
The number of extra disk pages needed for keeping 
several ve~sions of files depends completely on the way in 
which recovery blocks are used and on the operations 
performed inside these recovery blocks. 
5.6 A comparison with other techniques 
The whole filing system has been designed and built in 
such a way that recovery and crash resistance were provided 
as features of the total system, rather than having been 
grafted on. A careful replacement technique was used 
together with the page cache, header cache and ~WL cache, to 
provide these features. The careful replacement technique 
used in combination with these three caches, therefore 
implements a cacheing scheme. The three caches are kept in 
core and the costs of mainta~n~ng them is negligible 
compared with the costs of the disk accesses required. The 
costs of the careful replacement technique, as used in our 
system, is therefore compared with other techniques that can 
be used to provide recovery as defined in the present thesis 
and provided in our filing system. 
Some of the most obvious and reasonable alternative 
techniques (see also the survey given in chapter two) that 
could be used to provide recoverabi1ity for files are 
described in this section and compared with the careful 
replacement technique used: 
* An audit trail based technique. 
An audit trail could be regarded and used as a 
cache. However, if an object was updated more than once 
within a recovery block then more than one entry would 
be put in the audit trail, because the audit trail keeps 
an entry for every operation performed. The audit trail 
is thus likely to contain many more entries than a 
standard cache. This would lead to gross inefficiencies 
in the cache processing. The audit trail scheme does not 
provide crash resistance either, but the system can 
always be backed out after a crash if the writing to the 
audit trail is not buffered. 
The audit trail technique used in this fashion 
could be optimised in the manner of a cacheing scheme so 
that previous values of objects which are updated within 
recovery blocks, are not written to the audit trail more 
than once for each recovery block in which they are 
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updated. This is nothing more than the normal cacheing 
scheme (Hor74), (Ran75) for disk pages, in our filing 
system. Thus recoverability would be provided for disk 
pages, and recoverability for files would be provided 
implicitly by mapping files onto recoverable dis~ pages. 
If the, cache is (partially) kept on disk then the 
updates on the Free Store File should not be cached. A 
table, similar to the page cache in the present systec, 
could be used to indicate which pages (on disk or tape) 
contain previous values of the updated pages. This 
recovery technique cannot, as the careful replacement 
scheme could, be used to provide crash resistance, but 
recovery after a crash is possible using the cache. 
This recovery is only possible after a class 1 crash 
(see previous chapter). because if a page containing a 
previous value is corrupted. no normal recovery as 
discussed here is possible. This optimised audit trail 
scheme is much more efficient than the ordinary audit 
trail scheme. The ordinary audit trail scheme will 
therefore not be discussed any further. 
The optimised audit trail scheme. is in fact 
similar to the cacheing scheme providing recovery for 
file words, using method I. as described in chapter 
four. That scheme was compared with the cacheing scheme 
used in the implemented system. The scheme in the 
implemented system has definite advantages with respect 
to crash resistance and in multi-user environments, 
because the original version of a file is not altered 
and still accessable while a user is updating the file 
(inside a recovery block). The provision of recovery is 
embedded in the total design of the system. It was 
argued in earlier chapters of this thesis that recovery 
may impose special requirements on the system and data 
structures. Embedding recovery in the system such that 
it forms an integral part of that system was shown to be 
almost essential if recovery is to be provided as in our 
filing system. The data structures in our system remain 
the same while operations are performed or backing out 
is done. The audit trail technique, however. is in fact 
an external tool which is grafted on the system and the 
complete system, with the recovery techniques, will thus 
be less structured. So the careful replacement scheme 
is more structured and should therefore lead to better 
and more reliable software. 
The optimised audit trail scheme uses 3 disk 
accesses if the cache is on disk. or 2 disk accesses 
plus a tape write, when a disk page is updated for the 
first time within a recovery block (assumed is that a 
read before write is needed). The number of disk 
accesses per update in the careful replacement scheme 
used was shown to depend on a number of factors and 
could on average be anything between just over 2. and 8 
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(if there is only one directory page in the file body). 
If a series of pages is updated and no "free" marks are 
placed in free pages and a good buffer management system 
is used, then this average is likely to be around 3. So 
the optimised audit trail scheme may be more efficient 
but wil~ not always be more efficient, than the schem~ 
implemented. It entirely depends on the use made of the 
system. 
* A differential file based technique. 
A differential file could be regarded and used as a 
associative cache (Hor74) which is described as method 
II in the previous chapter. A full description of the 
differential file technique is given in the survey of 
techniques in a previous chapter. 
Basically the scheme is exactly like the optimised 
audit trail scheme, but new values, rather than previous 
values of disk pages are cached. The costs in number of 
disk accesses required for each first update of a page 
within a recovery block, are the same as for the 
optimised audit trail scheme: so there are no obvious 
general advantages ~n efficiency compared with the 
present technique. 
The disadvantages of the scheme are: 
1. The differential files have to be merged with the 
main files after a successful acceptance test of the 
outermost recovery block. This may be expensive, 
certainly if crash resistance is to be provided 
during the merging. In the present system it merely 
involves the freeing of some pages. 
2. An access to a page must first search the 
differential file. This could be solved by keeping 
a table similar to the one described for the 
optimised audit trail scheme (this table resembles 
the page cache in the present scheme). 
The two disadvantages of the optimised audit trail 
scheme (with respect to crash resistance and multi-user 
environments) compared with the present scheme, can only 
exist for the differential file technique during the 
merging of the differential files with the main files. 
The main disadvantage is that merging has to be done and 
may be expensive. Another advantage of the careful 
replacement technique, compared with the differential 
file technique, is that the scheme is more structured, 
as described above, so the software should be more 
reliable (for the same reasons as mentioned above, 
although the differential file technique is more 
integrated than an audit trail technique). 
* 
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The only other technique that seems worth consideri~g 1S 
the backup version and current version technique. 
This technique would involve the creation o~ a 
backup copy for every file operated upon inside a 
recovery block. If recovery blocks are nested then r::2.:'.y 
versions may have to be created. It is obvious that the 
creation of a complete backup copy of a file before it 
is u~date~ inside a recovery block will, in general, be 
too 1neff1cient. The scheme could be optimised, as for 
example for segments in System R (Lor77), using 
different versions of page tables pointing to the files 
data pages, such that the different versions of the 
files overlap in identical pages. This, however, still 
implies the dynamic creation of such a page table for 
each file updated inside a recovery block. If a 
particular page table fits in one disk page then this 
scheme is identical to the careful replacement scheme 
used (although no nesting of recovery blocks 
(transactions) in System R is possible). If it does not 
fit in one disk page then the overhead of having to copy 
the whole page table will incur a bigger overhead then 
the overhead in the present system. The significance of 
this extra overhead depends on the number of disk pages 
occupied by the page table and the average number of 
updates of data pages inside a recovery block. This 
page table versions scheme provides the same facilities 
as the present scheme and has the same advantages and 
disadvantages, but will generally be less efficient. 
5.7 Some experimental results 
Two experiments have been performed to examine the 
overhead in disk accesses incurred by the use of recovery 
blocks. The first one involved a little test program, which 
was run without any recovery blocks and with recovery blocks 
used in different ways. The second experiment involved a 
real-life utility program, which was run to do certain tasks 
both with and without using recovery blocks. The 
experiments were such that the acceptance tests of all of 
the recovery blocks used were trivial and always successful, 
since we were only interested in measuring the overheads 
incurred by the use of recovery blocks. 
When considering the figures given in this section for 
the number of disk accesses for different programs, the 
following two aspects have to be taken into account: 
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1. The number of disk accesses required by a program may 
not always be the same, if that program is run several 
times. For example, the creation of a header will 
require more disk accesses in case that header does not 
fit in the last data page of the Header file, than when 
it doe~ fit in that last page. 
2. The filing system was developed as part of the research 
done. The resulting prototype is, as most prototypes 
·are, not very efficient, and no I/O buffers are used. 
However, the experiments are still useful and give, in 
the opinion of the author, a reasonable impression of 
the overhead required even for more efficient 
implementations. 
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5.7.1 A little ~ program 
A little test program was written to examine the 
overhead incurred by the use of recovery blocks in a 
situation w~re it would be exactly known what was happening. 
The program consists of two parts: 
A: Create a file "TEST" and put a vector of 155 words in it 
(data pages can contain 55 words). 
B: Append another vector of 155 words to file "TEST". 
This program was run in the following six structures: 
1) A' 2) [;; 3) A' 4) E; 5) 6) ~: , , B' ~ [I: , B· , B' ~ ,
Where: [ denotes: inside a recovery block. 
The number of disk accesses performed for the running 
of these programs has been subdivided into reads and writes 
of free pages, directory pages and data pages. The measured 
number of disk accesses are given in table 5.3. 
disk accesses - program 1 2 3 4 5 6 
writes: free pages 0 0 2 2 0 1 
directory pages 7 8 8 8 7 9 
data pages 14 15 16 l3 10 19 
total 21 23 26 23 17 29 
reads: free pages 7 8 8 9 7 9 
directory pages 35 42 23 36 24 42 
data pages 54 63 52 58 37 74 
total 96 113 93 103 68 125 
total number of accesses 117 l36 119 126 85 154 
l' 
Table 5.3, The measured number of disk accesses of a test 
program using recovery blocks in different ways. 
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The only program which ~s cheaper than 1) is, not 
surprisingly, program 5). A lot of disk accesses are sa\'ec 
by not having to read the headers of TEST and the syste~ 
index (see chapter four) from disk every time: t~ey wi:l be 
in the cache after the first time they are used, because a 
field "date:-last-accessed" will be updated when a header is 
read, causing the new header value to be cached. 
The overhead is, in general, not very high. Only for 
program 6 the overhead is just over 30% of the disk accesses 
required when no recovery blocks are used. For the other 
programs the overhead is about 15% or less. 
5.7.2 A real-life utility program 
Similar tests as with the test program in the previous 
subsection, have been done with a BCPL compiler. There are 
two good reasons for chosing the BCPL compiler to do these 
experiments. The first reason is that the compiler is very 
much a real-life program and, although the exact text ~2y 
not have been published, it is generally known how the 
compiler works. The second reason is that the compiler 
operates on three files called TOKENS, OCODE and TEXT. It 
empties these files and then uses them to store the tokens 
in the TOKENS file, the produced OCODE vector in the OCODE 
file and the final text in the TEXT file. So the compiler 
uses the filing system fairly substantially. The compiler 
basically consists of five parts which are invoked 
subsequently: 
LEX: the lexographical analyser, which reads the source code 
from cards and writes the tokens to the TOKENS file. 
SYN: the syntactical analyser, which reads the tokens from 
the TOKENS file and produces an in-core tree. 
TRN: the transformer, which transforms the identifiers into 
internal addresses, so it resolves the addressing 
problems. (This module transforms the in-core tree.) 
OGN: the code generator, which takes the in-core 
builds an OCODE vector which it writes to 
file. 
tree and 
the OCODE 
ASM: the assembler, which reads the OCODE from the OCODE 
file and produces the final object code which it writes 
to the TEXT file. 
The program was run in the following four structures to 
compile the same BCPL program (of about 30 lines of code) 
for each case: 
-145-
1) LEX; 2) 3) 4) ~X; SYN; LEX; ~EX; TRN; SYN; OGN; TRN; ETI: ASM: OGN: fEYN; ASM; 
ER..~; 
feRN; 
~GN; EGN; 
~SM; 
ESM; 
Where: ~ denotes: inside a recovery block. 
The number of disk accesses performed by the compiler 
in these structures has been subdivided again into reads and 
writes of free pages, directory pages and data pages. The 
measured number of disk accesses are given in table 5.4. 
disk accesses - program 1 2 3 4 
writes: free pages 12 12 14 14 
directory pages 12 12 12 12 
data pages 40 28 46 48 
total 64 52 72 74 
reads: free pages 12 12 14 14 
directory pages l2~ 82 164 208 
data pages 182 98 336 324 
total 31E 193 514 546 
total number of accesses 382 244 586 620 
T ble 5 4 The measured number of disk accesses of a BCPL a ., 
compiler using recovery blocks in different ways. 
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The results are very similar to those obtained with the 
little test program in the previous experiment. The figures 
can be explained like with the little test program and need 
no further commenting. 
5.8 Conclusions 
The recoverable filing system works exactly like the 
standard filing system if no recovery blocks are used. If 
recovery blocks are used then an overhead in disk accesses 
will be incurred. This overhead will be significant if file 
updates are sparse; if the number of updates of pages of one 
file inside a recovery block is high, then the overhead will 
be relatively small for the operations on that file, 
especially if a good buffer management system is used. The 
extra space necessary for the caches kept in core is 
generally not expected to be much. The number of extra disk 
pages necessary to maintain several versions of files is 
difficult to estimate. The programs comprising the standard 
filing system occupy 9K bytes, the programs comprising the 
recoverable filing system occupy 16.5K bytes. 
The major overheads are caused by the use of "free" 
marks in free pages and the fact that the careful 
replacement technique also causes directory pages to be 
replaced whenever a data page is replaced (or added or 
deleted), if that directory page has not yet been replaced 
inside the current recovery block. Consequently, the more 
pages of a file are updated inside a recovery block, the 
less significant the overhead will be. (Pages are only 
replaced once inside a recovery block: only one value needs 
to be cached.) 
The careful replacement technique used appeared to 
compare well with other schemes. It is difficult to make 
general conclusions about the efficiency of the technique 
compared with other techniques, because much depends on the 
use made of the system. However, certainly if a good buffer 
management technique is incorporated in the system, keeping 
directory pages as long as possible, and if free pages are 
not marked "free", then the present technique is not 
expected to incur a bigger overhead than other techniques. 
The present technique was shown to have other advantages 
over techniques that are more efficient under particular 
circumstances. These advantages are the provision of crash 
resistance and the structured way in which the provision of 
recovery is embedded in the system, rather than having been 
grafted on the system. These factors make the maintenance 
of consistency in the system much easier. 
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~.£ DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Directions for future research 
The present thesis has tackled the problems of 
providing recovery in multi-level systems and for complex 
data, but only in a uni-process environment. One of the 
important topics of ongoing research is the provision of 
recovery for parallel, possibly interacting, processes. 
There are two ways in which this is approached at present 
(these two approaches are basically also distinguished by 
Curtice (Cur77)): 
1. Prevent the interactions. 
Clearly this approach is only feasible when the 
interactions are not required, so that the results that 
would be obtained by, for example, executing the 
processes in sequences are acceptable. This can, for 
example, be done by using a locking scheme, either 
explicitly (Gra76) or implicitly (BaS77). The explicit 
locking schemes are widely used in data base systems. A 
user, or a program, can, in general, request access to 
an object, in various modes. Gray, for example, 
distinguishes six modes, such as exclusive access or 
shared access. Several access modes are incompatible, 
which means that if one user has access to an object in 
a certain mode, then another user is refused access to 
the same object in an incompatible mode. Thus such 
locking schemes prevent unwanted interactions, while 
still allowing shared access to objects in cases where 
this will not lead to any unwanted effects of one 
program on another program. Implicit locking by 
programs is done if, for example, monitors (Hoa74) are 
used to implement resource allocation algorithms. 
Programs wishing to acquire and release resources 
invoke appropriate monitor procedure calls. If these 
locking schemes are used then basically uni-process 
recovery techniques can be used, because the schemes 
ensure that only one process at a time will update an 
object and commit itself before releasing the object. 
So other processes are prevented from updating that 
object as long as the process which is updating that 
object is in a unit of recovery, which may be, for 
example, a transaction (Gra76) or a recovery block 
(BaS77). A similar way in which the restrictions can 
be enforced is by using a capability architecture 
(Den76) to implement a high degree of error confinement 
(Lin76). Compared with a lock, as used in a locking 
scheme, a capability could be best described as a key; 
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a capability is a generalized permission to use storage 
objects and procedures. Capabilities are, therefore. 
in fact a means of implementing locking. The use of 
capabilities prevents unwanted interactions like 
locking schemes. and therefore limits the risk that 
errors.will do much damage before being detected. 
2. Synchronize the processes with respect to recovery. 
Where interactions are intended and required, a 
conversation, as described in chapter one, 1ncorporates 
processes working on one task and prevents other tasks 
from reading or writing objects updated by that task. 
If one process involved in a conversation fails, then 
the effects of the operations performed inside the 
conversation by that process and all other processes 
involved in the conversation will be undone. In order 
to be able to back out all the processes involved 
so-called recovery lines (RLT77) must exist. A recovery 
line is a set of consistent recovery points (states 
that can be reinstated by the recovery mechanism) for 
the process which is 1n error, and for all other 
processes affected. 
These approaches are designed to overcome one of the 
major recovery problems of parallelism. namely the so-called 
domino-effect (Ran75). This effect occurs if no recovery 
lines exist for the interacting processes. This means that 
all the processes that have interacted with a failing 
process. and all the processes that interacted with those 
processes, and so on, will have to be backed out to their 
"begin"-states. The two approaches above force the system 
to progress such that recovery points always form recovery 
lines, and so can be used if a failure occurs. 
The present thesis has discussed recovery by state 
restoration. Whenever a failure occurs, a state which is 
hoped to be error-free is restored before attempting to 
continue further operation. Other recovery techniques 
deserve further investigation, for example: 
* Error diagnosis and repair. 
Instead of restoring a state when an error is detected, 
an attempt could be made to identify the fault that 
caused the error (RLT77), and repair the error(s) it has 
caused. This may be very difficult, because different 
errors may be caused by one fault and different faults 
may cause the same error. 
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* Compensation. 
Rather than undoing operations by state restoration, it 
could be attempted to nullify the impacts of these 
operations by compensating their effects. This can be 
done by providing supplementary corrective information 
(Dav72)., (RLT77). For example, if a data base had been 
updated to indicate that an employee has been given a 
£1000 wage increase, instead of an intended £100 
increase, then a wage decrease of £900 could be g~ven as 
compensation, rather than invoke some general form of 
backing up of the data base. 
Recovery techniques have been discussed and a survey of 
existing techniques has been given. This thesis has not 
concentrated on the costs of recoverability very much. 
Different kinds of recovery can be used to provide recovery 
for different kinds of failures or to provide different 
degrees of recovery. For example, recovery may just restore 
the data structures, such that they are in consistent or 
valid states again, or it may restore the data to previously 
existing valid states. Hardly any work has been done to 
examine which failures recovery should cope with and what 
degrees of recovery are required in different environments, 
and what the costs are of providing them. The survey given 
provides some general guide lines, rather than detailed 
analyses of some degrees of recovery. 
Apart from the costs of the recovery mechanisms used, 
the costs of the error detection scheme used also have to be 
taken into account. The error detection scheme used, and its 
cost, will depend on the failures the recovery mechanism has 
to cope with. Hardly any work, so far, has been done on 
systematic approaches to error detection. Error detection is 
absolutely essential to make recovery useful as a mechanism 
for providing fault tolerance. Error detection, using 
tests, could be done using the following two approaches: 
1. Test if algorithms perform completely according to 
their specifications. 
2. Distinguish certain types of faults and errors, and 
test for their presence (or absence). 
Testing the validity of all of the input data and 
parameters of procedures is an example of a systematic error 
detection scheme based on the second approach. However, few 
systematic ways in which tests can be constructed, using 
either approach, are reported in literature (RLT77) and 
little is known about the costs of error detection schemes. 
Error detection in system software is generally done in an 
ad hoc fashion using the second approach. Some initial work 
on the construction of (run time) tests, using the first 
approach, has been done and the results of this work and the 
problems encountered are the subject of the rest of this 
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section. 
6.1.1 The construction of complete acceptance tests 
To date, hardly any work has been done on the 
construction of run time tests for testing whether or not 
the results of the programs comply with the specifications 
of the programs. The notion of acceptance test, as used in 
recovery blocks, will be used to denote such tests for the 
purpose of this section. An acceptance test is just a 
special (syntactic) form of error detection and can easily 
be generalized to any other form of error detection. A 
complete acceptance test is a test which tests whether all 
the required effects-or-a computation have been achieved. 
It is probably contrary to the spirit of acceptance 
tests to expect or requ~re them to be as complete as 
specifications of the programs they test, because they are 
just a special form of error detection. Acceptance tests 
could, for example, be used to check only redundant data or 
check if the data are consistent (rather than whether they 
have the correct value). However, the designer of the 
acceptance test may want to know what would constitute a 
complete acceptance test, so that he can decide what to put 
in the (run time) test and what not. If a test is 
constructed by trying to think of a few important effects of 
the program to be checked then the designer of the test will 
not have a very good idea of the degree of completeness of 
the test; he doesn't know what the loopholes are, nor how 
big they are. 
A program designer may design his programs such that 
redundant data, such as sumchecks, and tests on its 
correctness are incorporated in programs and data. This may 
increase the reliability of the programs enormously. 
However, this approach will not be considered here. This 
section will concentrate on acceptance tests that try to 
test whether the required effects of programs were achieved 
or not. Methods to find complete acceptance tests (which 
may be cut down for efficiency reasons, in a particular 
implementation) will be investigated. 
To illustrate how difficult it is to construct complete 
acceptance tests I will show a simple inconsistency in tests 
used in a very simple example given in a report describing 
the verification and abstraction in ALPHARD (WLS76). 
ALPHARD provides the programmer a very nice framework 
within which pre- and post-conditions for operations on 
objects of the types being specified can be included. On 
page 15 of this report the specification of type "stack" is 
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given to illustrate the concepts. The post-condition for 
the operation "pop" on a stack is: 
(s. sp=s. sp '-1) 
where s = the stack 
s.sp = the stack pointer 
An apo.strophy is used to indicate the value before 
the operation was performed. 
So after a "pop" only the effects 
are checked. This is of course not a 
also the effects on the stack should be 
the post-condition given for the 
on the stack pointer 
complete test since 
checked. In contrast 
complete, namely: 
(s.sp=s.sp'+l) & 
where s.v = a 
a(v,n,x) 
operation "push" 
(s • v= a (s . v' ,s • s p , ,x)) 
vector used to represent the stack 
a vector identical to v except that 
v(n)=x. 
~s 
These kinds of errors in the construction of tests (or 
conditions in ALPHARD) are very easy to make (even for very 
simple types, as has been shown), unless these tests are 
constructed such that their completeness and sufficientness 
can be proven easily. This is still a big proble~. Another 
big problem with the use of tests in multi-level systems is 
an efficiency problem. It is shown that a system may spend 
more time doing tests than actual processing, if complete 
tests are used in multi-level systems. 
6.1.2 A single computation 
An abstract specification of a program specifies the 
meaning and function of a program and the effects visible to 
the user of the program. It does not specify actions to be 
taken or operations to be performed for achieving these 
effects and for implementing the program's functions. A 
concrete specification of a program, however, does specify 
these actions or operations. 
If a program is a computation for which no abstract 
specification exists, for example a numerical analysis 
program built from a set of formulae (a very concrete 
specification), then in general an acceptance test can only 
be done by recomputing the result. The programmer may be 
lucky in that that result (i.e. the effects of the program 
which are visible to the user) can be checked easily. It 
may also be possible that certain properties that must hold 
for the result can be used to construct a number of tests 
which may give a very good (possibly incomplete) acceptance 
test. A test which simply does the same computation, is in 
fact an application of majority voting rather than a 
complete checking of the results. 
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6.1.3 The construction of acceptance tests from abstract 
specifications 
Programs in software systems considered in this thesis. 
are programs that can be regarded as implementations of 
operations on abstract types. There are several formal 
methods in which data types and operations on them can be 
defined. A very good survey of existing techniques is g~ven 
by Liskov and Zilles (LiZ75). Formal specifications could 
also be used to design and implement the acceptance tests 
for the operations. 
One of the most promising specification methods (for 
building acceptance tests using specifications) is Guttag's 
specification method for abstract data types (Gut75). This 
is the only known specification method which disentangles 
the abstract meaning of a data type from a particular 
representation of it. The specification method consists of 
two parts: 
1. A syntactic specification 
2. A set of relations (axioms). 
As an example the specification of type "stack" might 
be as follows: 
1) Syntactic specification: 
NEWSTACK --> stack 
PUSH stack*integer --> stack 
POP stack --> stack 
TOP stack --> integer 
2) Axioms: 
TOP (NEWSTACK) c: error 
TOP(PUSH(stackl.integerl)) = integerl 
POP (NEWSTACK) = error 
POP(PUSH(stackl.integerl)) stackl 
Suppose that the specifications are given, then the 
question is whether acceptance tests, for the operations 
defined, can be constructed using the axioms. What is to be 
checked by the acceptance test of an operation is whether 
the operation performed did not contradict any of the 
axioms. If it can be shown that the operation did not 
contradict any of the axioms then it follows automatically 
that the operation was performed according to the 
specifications. If the acceptance test tests all of the 
axioms then the correctness of the acceptance test is 
implicit and does not have to be proven explicitlY. 
In order to "construct" an acceptance test for an 
operation on a type, using the axioms, the following is 
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done: 
* Take all the axioms in which the operation occurs. 
* 
Use these axioms to formulate an acceptance test :cr 
that operation. 
* 
Show that none of these axioms can ever be H'. 
contradiction with the acceptance test. 
To show how this could be 
PUSHeS ,x) (see specification 
follows: 
done the acceptance test for 
above) is constructed as 
* There are two axioms ~n which PUSH occurs: 
TOP(PUSH(S,x))=x 
POP(PUSH(S,x))=S 
* The acceptance test AT(PUSH(S,x)) is: 
TOP(S)~x & POP(S)~ prior S. 
(Note: S stands for the value of the stack after the 
execution of PUSH(S,x), pri(r S denotes the value of S 
before the execution of PUSH S,x).) 
The operation ~ is a boolean operation which returns 
"true" if both operands have equal value and "false" 
otherwise. 
* This acceptance test merely checks whether or not the 
operation PUSH complies with its definition since it 
just validates the results of the operation against the 
axioms. It is obvious that the axioms are not 
contradicted when the acceptance test is true, and if 
the operation PUSH has been performed correctly then the 
acceptance test must be true. 
In general the axioms cannot be used so easily to 
construct the parts of the acceptance test. To show this we 
examine the construction of the acceptance test for TOP(S) 
(x is the result of operation TOP(S)): 
* There are two axioms in which TOP occurs: 
TOP (NEWSTACK)=error 
TOP(PUSH(S,x))=x 
* The acceptance test for TOP(S) consists of two parts: 
The first part is derived from the first axiom: 
if result is error ~ prior S ~ l'o"'EI,'STACK 
* 
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The second part is derived from the second axiom: 
PUSH(?,x) ~ prior S, 
The 7 in the expression is to be solved. This ~s 
simply a matter of solving a number of equations: 
the axioms and the equation above. Axiom 
POP(PUSH(S,x))=S is used to solve "?": 
POP(PUSH(?,x))=POP( prior S)=7. 
So the second part of the acceptance test is: 
PUSH(POP( prior S),x) ~ prior S. 
The complete acceptance test is: 
if result ~s error then S ~ NEWSTACK 
else PUSH(POP( prior S,x) ~ prior S. 
The proof of correctness of the acceptance test is very 
trivial. The axioms involved can easily be used to show 
that if the acceptance test is true then the axioms are 
obeyed, and if the operation was performed correctly 
(the axioms were not contradicted) then the acceptance 
test will give the result "true". This proof will not be 
shown here. 
The acceptance tests obtained in the way shown above 
are exactly the post-conditions in the specifications in 
ALPHARD. These tests can also be "translated" into so-called 
output assertions (WLS76), which are the post-conditions in 
terms of the representation used for the type. The 
acceptance test of an operation could be specified either in 
abstract terms (the post-condition) or concrete terms (the 
output assertion) and for the sake of efficiency could be 
made incomplete. However, the complete test will be known 
and the programmer will know the risks and loopholes if he 
decides to use an incomplete test. 
An acceptance test (for a certain operation on a type) 
makes use of other operations on the type, but acceptance 
tests for those operations are not incorporated in those 
operations. Obviously this is not necessary, because if, for 
example, always TOP(S)=x & POP(S)= prior S (operations TOP 
and POP without acceptance test) after PUSH(S,x) then the 
program tested provides a correct implementation of 
PUSH(S,x). 
At first sight the method used seems a good 
Unfortunately, however, this method suffers from two 
problems if complete acceptance tests are required. 
first problem is called the "computability" problem, 
second one is called the "constructability" problem. 
one. 
big 
The 
the 
The first problem (the computability problem) is that 
predicates on instances of the specified types are not 
always computable given the operations on the abstract type. 
For example the operation "~" for type stack is not given in 
the specification of stack shown above. However, this 
operation is needed in the acceptance tests of operations on 
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type stack. 
A possible solution to this problem is to extend the 
specification of type stack with an operation EQUAL? This 
can be done as follows: 
* Syntactic specification: 
EQUAL? stack*stack --> boolean 
* Axioms: 
EQUAL? (NEWSTACK,NEWSTACK) true 
EQUAL? (NEWSTACK,PUSH(S,x» IalSe 
EQUAL?(PUSH(S,x),NEWSTACK) = false 
EQUAL?(PUSH(Sl,xl),PUSH(S2,x2»= 
EQUALINT?(xl,x2) & EQUAL?(Sl,S2) 
(EQUALINT? is the operation ~ on integers.) 
The acceptance test for EQUAL? is AT(EQUAL?(Sl,S2»= 
( if result is (false) then (Sl=NEWSTACK&S2+NEWSTACK) or 
--rsl~NEWSTACK&S2=NEWSTACK) 
~ (Sl=NEWSTACK&S2=NEWSTACK» 
or 
trSl=PUSH(POP(Sl),TOP(Sl»&S2=PUSH(POP(S2),TOP(S2»& 
EQUALINT?(TOP(Sl),TOP(S2»&EQUAL?(POP(Sl),POP(S2») 
The operation EQUAL? can now be used for ~ in the 
acceptance tests for the other operations. However, it is 
important to realize that this operation EQUAL? in that case 
must be correct for the acceptance test to be correct. 
If operations TOP, POP and PUSH in the implementation 
work differently than intented then the implementation of, 
for example, PUSH is still correct if TOP(S) ~ x & POpeS) ~ 
prior S is true after the execution of PUSH, If for the 
operation ~ on stacks EQUAL? is used then this operation 
must be correct. 
The second problem (the constructability problem) is 
that the construction of acceptance tests from the axioms 
may not be as easy as suggested in the stack-example. To 
illustrate this another example is given below. 
The specification of type queue could be: 
* 
Syntactic specification. 
EMPTY --> queue 
ADD queue*integer --> queue 
REMOVE queue -- > queue 
FRONT queue -- > integer 
?EMPTY? queue -- > boolean 
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* Axioms. 
1. ?EMPTY7(EMPTY) = true 
2. ?EMPTY7(ADD(Q,i)) IaiSe 
3. FRONT(EMPTY) error 
4. FRONT(ADD(Q,i)) = if ?EMPTY?(Q) ~ i ~ FRO~T(Q) 
5. REMOVE(EMPTY) --= error 
6. REMOVE(ADD(Q,i)) if ?EMPTY?(Q) then EMPTY else 
-- ADD (REMOVE (Q),T) -
The acceptance test for x=FRONT(Q) is not so easy to 
construct. The construction of it is tried below. 
* 
* 
Applying the third axiom gives: if result is (error) 
~ prior Q = EMPTY ... (1). 
Applying the fourth axiom gives: 2rior Q = ADD(?1,?2). 
?l and ?2 have to be found. Apply~ng FRONT gives: 
FRONT( prior Q) = FRONT(ADD(?1,72)) =(ax.4) 
if 7EMPTY?(?l) then ?2 else FRONT (?l) ... (*) 
AXiom 6 gives: Q=ADD(EMPTY,x) ==> REMOVE(Q)=E}~TY. 
Using (*) this gives: 
if ?EMPTY?(REMOVE( prior Q)) then prior Q=ADD(EMPTY,x). 
rr is still to be resolved in:---
if~?EMPTY?(?l) then FRONT(?l) = x. 
The term.., ?EMPTY"?TIT) can be replaced by: 
~?EMPTY?(REMOVE( prior Q)). 
The biggest problem is to find a useful equivalent for 
x=FRONT(7l). From the axioms it is obvious that 71 ~s 
equal to prior Q without the element last put in. To 
find ?l a "piece of program" which constructs ?l is to 
be written, like given below: 
ql = EMPTY 
begin 
y FRONT(q) 
q REMOVE (q) 
ql ADD(ql,y) 
end repeat until ?EMPTY?(REMOVE(q)) 
After this program 71 = ql. 
The correctness of this program is far from obvious. 
Of course an operation to form 71 could be defined, but that 
would be a rather strange operation for this type queue, and 
its specification might be as difficult as proving the 
correctness of the piece of program shown above. 
Obviously this solution is not satisfactory at all. The 
problem is that elements are put in the queue at the 
"bottom" and taken away from the "top". The only way ~n 
which the bottom element can be seen is by taking away all 
elements from the "top" of the queue. 
* 
* 
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Summarizing: 
If the specification method used exhibits a 
representational bias then the acceptance test 
programmer will probably have to know certain 
impleme~tation details. This makes the proving of the 
sufficiently completeness of both the specifications and 
the acceptance tests very difficult. Therefore abstract 
specifications seem most us~ful for the construction of 
complete acceptance tests. 
Abstract specifications merely specify a type (i.e. its 
semantics and the operations on it). 
Therefore they seem unsuitable for practical use for the 
construction of for example acceptance tests. 
6.1.4 An acceptance ~ problem in multi-level systems 
If complete acceptance tests are used in programs in a 
multi-level system, in the way suggested in the previous 
subsection, then these tests may cause a pyramid effect in 
tests being invoked. 
An example to illustrate this effect is given below: 
Suppose that in a multi-level system as described by Madnick 
and Alsop (MaA69) the following routines exist in different 
levels: 
1) write in file 
2) write-in-volume 
3) write:in:Jage 
4) write in disk block 
Operation 1) invokes 2) which ~n turn invokes 3) which 
subsequently invokes 4). 
Suppose that every routine has a complete acceptance 
test, then the acceptance test of 1) will be: read file( ... ) 
plus a test on the data read. This operation -read file 
invokes operation read volume. Operation read volume 
invokes read-yage which Invokes read disk block. Operation 
write in file invokes operation -write in volume. The 
acceptance test for write in volume - will be: 
read volume( •.• ) plus a test on- the data read. This 
operation read volume invokes read-yage which invokes 
read disk block7 Similarly write in volume invokes 
write_in~age, which has a complete acceptance test. And so 
on. 
So a pyramid effect is created. This effect can easily 
cause the system to slow down to such an extent that it 
spends more time performing acceptance tests than the actual 
operations. For example, if write_in_file, in the example 
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above, causes one disk write then another four disk reads 
will be done in the acceptance tests of the four operations 
(provided that complete acceptance tests are used in the 
four operations), So the whole operation will cost five disk 
accesses in stead of one, 
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6.2 Conclusions 
The first part of this thesis has investigated the 
Completely Recoverable Interface (CRI) scheme and a 
Partially R~coverable Interface (PRI) scheme. It ~as sho~ 
that in certain cases the PRI scheme is less extravagant in 
space and time than the CRI scheme. The CRI scheme also 
appears to be possible only for multi-level systems 
consisting of interpreters. The PRI scheme has been sho~ to 
be a good alternative. 
The consequences of having recoverable and 
interface and of mapping ne~ 
have been sho~. The main 
unrecoverable types in a single 
types onto unrecoverable types 
consequences and conclusions are: 
1. A special mechanism is needed to allo~ a PRI level to 
use unrecoverable types inside recovery blocks. This 
mechanism is called the logging mechanism. Basically 
this mechanism provides, semi-automatically, sufficient 
recoverability for those types. The recoverability is 
not recoverability as defined in the beginning of this 
report, because the state of the machine as seen by 
this PRI level may not be restored exactly to its 
original state (for example as in the buffer management 
example described previously). User programs can use 
the ne~ recovery block structure, provided by the 
logging mechanism, and are not a~are of the ~ays in 
~hich recovery is provided for files and variables in 
the system. A logging mechanism has been implemented 
in a t~o-level prototype system and, as expected, did 
not lead to a great overhead in the programming effort. 
A cost analysis of this prototype is described in 
chapter four. 
2. An unrecoverable data structure called a log is used as 
part of that mechanism (for the implementation 
described, see also Fig.3.5). The fact that this log 
has to consist of unrecoverable data structures has t~o 
main consequences: 
a. Extra protection is needed for the log, since 
recovery from corruption is not possible. 
b. It seems preferable also to provide unrecoverable 
objects of the same types as the recoverable types 
that are provided. The reasons for this is that a 
level does not kno~ ~hat types the next level up 
~ill ~ish to use for the implementation of a log. 
Another reason for this is, ho~ever, that higher 
levels may ~ant unrecoverable objects of the ne~ly 
provided types for the representation of more 
abstract recoverable types (for ~hich these higher 
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levels wish to provide recovery explicitly). 
As seen previously, it is also useful to have 
unrecoverable objects for debugging purposes. So 
even if a log does not have to be unrecoverable, as 
WqS shown to be, possible in other implementations, 
it would st~ll be preferable to provide 
unrecoverable objects of the same types as the 
recoverable objects provided. 
In particular cases, where a level provides some new 
recoverable types which are mapped onto unrecoverable types 
of the underlying machine and does not change the interface 
any further, the logging mechanism appears to be very 
suitable for implementing what have been called recoverable 
type managers. Levels in, for example, operating systems in 
many cases can be regarded as extending an existing 
interface by providing some new types. Recoverable type 
managers appear to be very suitable for the construction of 
such levels (in recoverable multi-level systems). The 
flexible use of recoverable type managers has been 
demonstrated in examples given and ~n the implemented 
two-level prototype system. 
If a procedural level provides new recoverable types by 
performing the cacheing and providing a new recovery block 
structure, then it would map these new types onto 
unrecoverable types (it only makes sense if they are mapped 
onto unrecoverable types). It was shown that this does not 
have to be a restriction, because levels can be made to 
provide recoverable and unrecoverable objects of a type in a 
reliable way. Higher levels can then use unrecoverable 
objects of that type to provide a new (more abstract) 
recoverable type. 
The 
good way 
approach 
provided 
recovery-for-types approach appears to be a very 
to build up reliable multi-level systems. This 
was compared with an approach whereby recovery is 
for operations. 
The major conclusion of the first part of the thesis is 
that partially recoverable interfaces form a useful, and for 
efficiency reasons probably necessary, concept for the 
building of recoverable multi-level systems. It has been 
shown that the concept is not only useful but also 
implementable and flexible. 
The problems of providing recoverability for complex 
data structures have been discussed in the second part of 
this thesis. It appears that using a recovery cache to 
cache previous values of all objects is not a sufficient 
mechanism as such. The kind of information cached and the 
way in which updates are made appear to be of extreme 
importance if recoverability is to be provided ~n a 
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"reasonably efficient" way. and to guarantee consistency of 
the data structures after a crash (although no measure of 
efficiency has been defined). Also the way in which complex 
data structures are formed has been shown to be important if 
recovery is to be provided for those structures. 
A main conclusion is that data providing an abstraction 
("mapping tables") and information carrying data have to be 
separated both conceptually and physically whenever 
possible. They have to be treated differently when 
recoverabi1ity is to be provided for them. 
Different strategies and mechanisms that guarantee that 
the data structures will have the states they were in before 
entering the (outermost) recovery block in case a crash 
occurs have been described and compared. These mechanisms 
are said to provide crash resistance. It appeared that 
crash resistance can always be provided. but possibly at 
very high costs. A prototype recoverable filing system 
incorporating many of the mechanisms discussed has been 
implemented successfully and has been described for 
illustration purposes. 
Finally a cost analysis of the implemented recoverable 
two-level system (including the recoverable filing system) 
has been given. It is difficult to make a cost benefits 
comparison since benefits could not really be measured. 
However. the costs of the recovery mechanisms used in the 
filing system seemed justified. partly because the 
programmer may decide not to use the recovery provided. in 
which case there is virtually no overhead. 
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